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# Sub-Saharan Africa Report

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14 May 1985

## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

## CONTENTS

## ANGOLA

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Portuguese Daily Assesses Current Political Situation<br>(A. da Cunha Raposo; O DIABO, 26 Mar 85) ..... | 1  |
| Party Officials Visit Huila Province<br>(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 7 Mar 85) .....                              | 4  |
| Departing Uruguayan Doctor Discusses Work<br>(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 10 Mar 85) .....                        | 6  |
| Proposed Legislation Excludes Unskilled Foreign Workers<br>(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 12 Mar 85) .....          | 10 |
| Increase in Number of Flights to Brazil<br>(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 9 Mar 85) .....                           | 11 |
| Agriculture in Lunda-Norte Faces Difficulties<br>(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 7 Mar 85) .....                     | 13 |
| Hungarian Solidarity Committee Presents Gifts<br>(JORNAL DE ANGOLA, 7 Mar 85) .....                     | 14 |
| Briefs  |    |
| Friendship Circle in Havana   | 15 |
| Number of BPV's Increase  | 15 |
| Learning Centers Lack Teachers  | 15 |
| OMA Secretary General Honored   | 16 |
| Oil Field Begins Production   | 16 |
| New Municipal Commissars Named  | 17 |
| Commissar Visits Dange Kitexe   | 17 |
| Hotel Course Ends in Portugal   | 17 |
| Huila Leaders Attend Meeting  | 18 |

## BOTSWANA

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Kedikilwe Outlines Steps To Improve Public Service<br>(Jowitt Mbongwe; BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS, 21 Mar 85) ..... | 19 |
|--|----|

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Batswana Migrants Detained in South Africa<br>(Marshall Tiadi; BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS, 20 Mar 85) .....                 | 21 |
| Councils Debts Exceed P1,5M<br>(Bapasi Mphusu; BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS, 22 Mar 85) .....                                 | 22 |
| Agriculture Budget Increased To Support Arable Farmers<br>(Mmonlemang Madikwe; BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS, 15 Mar 85) ..... | 23 |
| Second Batch of Chinese Doctors Arrive<br>(Tarcisius Mudongo; BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS, 25 Mar 85) .....                  | 24 |
| Masire Talks To Rapport on Apartheid, Nkomati<br>(Kwapeng Modikwe; BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS, 25 Mar 85) .....             | 25 |
| Rural Electrification Strongly Recommended To Speed Development<br>(Bapsi Mphusu; DAILY NEWS, 25 Mar 85) .....       | 26 |
| P11M Allocated for Resumption of Drought Relief Programme<br>(BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS, 25 Mar 85) .....                  | 28 |
| Briefs   |    |
| Agreement Signed With Norway   | 29 |
| BMC To Handle Zimbabwe's Beef Sales  | 29 |
| COMOROS  |    |
| Briefs   |    |
| Post-Coup Arrests  | 30 |
| CHAD   |    |
| Popular Support for Habre Seen Growing<br>(Mahamat Saleh Younous; AL-WATAN, 23 Mar 85) .....                         | 31 |
| ETHIOPIA   |    |
| State Planning, Collectivization Spur Agricultural Disaster<br>(HANDELSBLATT, 18 Jan 85) .....                       | 33 |
| Briefs   |    |
| Ethiopia-Djibouti Trade Protocol   | 35 |
| Hungarian Medical, Communications Aid  | 35 |
| GABON  |    |
| Attitude Toward Foreigners Analyzed<br>(Jean-Pierre Challard; AFRICA, Mar 85) .....                                  | 36 |



## GUINEA

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Feasibility Study for Possible Iron Ore Mining<br>(AFP, 20 Apr 85) ..... | 43 |
|--|----|

## GUINEA-BISSAU

|                               |    |
|-------------------------------|----|
| Briefs                        |    |
| Financial Backers End Meeting | 44 |

## KENYA

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Allegations, Accusations Against M'Mbijjewu Continue<br>(THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 12 Apr 85) .....     | 45 |
| Editor Calls for Solution in South Sudan<br>(Hilary Ng'weno; THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 12 Apr 85) ..... | 47 |
| Moi Extends Party Membership Drive by Another Month<br>(THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 5 Apr 85) .....       | 48 |
| MPS Discuss 'Foreigner' Role<br>(THE KENYA TIMES, 11 Apr 85) .....                               | 49 |
| Favoritism in Land Alleged   | 49 |
| 'Force Foreigners To Sell Shares'  | 50 |
| Student Leader Mwandawiro Sentenced<br>(Edward Rihnaa; THE KENYA TIMES, 10 Apr 85) .....         | 51 |
| Work Permits Required for Professional Expatriates<br>(THE WEEKLY REVIEW, 12 Apr 85) .....       | 53 |
| Briefs   |    |
| Rains Wash Bridges Away  | 55 |
| Border Talks With Ethiopia   | 55 |
| Mystoka Wins Kitui Seat  | 55 |

## LESOTHO

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Radio Commentary Hails Relations With Romania<br>(Maseru Domestic Service, 24 Apr 85) ..... | 56 |
| Leabua Jonathan Assures King of Support<br>(WEEKLY, 15 Mar 85) .....                        | 59 |
| PAC Rejects Claims on Refugees<br>(SOWETAN, 4 Apr 85) .....                                 | 60 |

## MOZAMBIQUE

- Portugal Takes Steps To Limit Renamo Activities  
(DIARIO DE LISBOA, 27 Mar 85) ..... 61

### Briefs

- UDF's Solidarity With People ..... 62  
Renamo Hits Outside Intervention ..... 62  
UN Power Assistance ..... 62

## NAMIBIA

- Action Program for New Transitional Government Announced  
(THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 28 Mar 85) ..... 63

- UK Parliamentary Delegation Visits, Says Majority Supports Swap  
(SOWETAN, 2 Apr 85) ..... 64

- Organization of New Interim Government Detailed  
(THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 28 Mar 85) ..... 65

- Indian MPs Tour Operational Area  
(THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 25 Mar 85) ..... 66

- Labor Party Calls for Non-Racial Sport  
(THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER, 2 Mar 85) ..... 67

## SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

### Briefs

- Private Investment in Economy ..... 68  
More Tourism Sought ..... 68

## SENEGAL

- Dependency on Foreign Business Rapped  
(Hassan Toure; WAL FADJRI, No 24, 25 Mar-8 Apr 85) ..... 70

- Motives for American Development, Military Aid Examined  
(M. Fall; WAL FADJRI, 25 Mar-8 Apr 85) ..... 73

- Possibility of Salvaging Senegambia Explored  
(AFRICA, Mar 85) ..... 75

- World Bank Aid Condemned  
(Youssoupha Ndiaye, Idrissou S. Biodan; WAL FADJRI, No 24,  
25 Mar-8 Apr 85) ..... 78

## SEYCHELLES

- Discussions Held With Australia on Trade  
(SEYCHELLES NATION, 20 Feb 85) ..... 80

## SOMALIA

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Ethiopian Rebels Attend Somali Trade Union Meeting<br>(Voice of the Broad Masses of Eritrea, 23 Apr 85) ..... | 81 |
| Tractor, Water Pump Plant Construction<br>(HEEGAN, 12 Apr 85) .....   | 82 |
| Briefs  |    |
| RSA Ties Denounced  | 83 |
| Mogadishu-Nairobi Phone Line  | 83 |

## SOUTH AFRICA

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Plan To Establish Stability Through Hegemony Analyzed<br>(Winrich Kuehne; AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, 23 Mar 85) | 84  |
| Buthlezi Urges Botha Declaration of Intent<br>(Johannesburg Domestic Service, 23 Apr 85) .....                       | 108 |
| Details on Parliamentary Committees Given<br>(John MacLennan; THE SUNDAY STAR, 14 Apr 85) .....                      | 109 |
| Freedom Charter Provisions Reviewed<br>(Gary van Staden; THE CITIZEN, 23 Apr 85) .....                               | 111 |
| Commentary Urges Peace by Renamo in Mozambique<br>(Johannesburg International Service, 24 Apr 85) .....              | 113 |
| Reduction of Arms Imports, Special Defense Budget Reported<br>(Stephen Mcquillan; THE SUNDAY STAR, 14 Apr 85) .....  | 114 |
| NG Kerk Expresses Concern at Unrest, Disinvestment<br>(Johannesburg Domestic Service, 23 Apr 85) .....               | 117 |
| East Cape Leaders Welcome Irrigation Plans<br>(Johannesburg Domestic Service, 23 Apr 85) .....                       | 118 |
| Afrikaner, Inkatha Youth Hold Conference on Future<br>(Johannesburg Domestic Service, 20 Apr 85) .....               | 119 |
| Technological, Sales Agreements With Taiwan Reported<br>(THE CITIZEN, 23 Apr 85) .....                               | 120 |
| Details on Industrial Decentralization Given<br>(Brian Pottinger; THE SUNDAY STAR, 14 Apr 85) .....                  | 121 |
| Exploitation of Homeland Workers Claimed<br>(Jon Qwelane; THE SUNDAY STAR, 14 Apr 85) .....                          | 122 |
| Brits Get First Optical Fibre Factory<br>(THE CITIZEN, 22 Apr 85) .....  | 123 |

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Azanian Students' Confrontation Results in Violence<br>(Ali Mphaki; SOWETAN, 23 Apr 85) .....            | 124 |
| Access to EEC Market Sought<br>(Malcolm Fothergill; THE SUNDAY STAR, 14 Apr 85) .....                    | 126 |
| Transkeian Traders Regulation Reported<br>(THE CITIZEN, 23 Apr 85) .....                                 | 127 |
| Urban Development Boards To Be Established<br>(Brian Stuart; THE CITIZEN, 23 Apr 85) .....               | 128 |
| Economic Growth Rate Need Discussed<br>(Amrit Manga; SUNDAY TIMES, 14 Apr 85) .....                      | 130 |
| New Banks Act Requirements Detailed<br>(Alec Hogg; SUNDAY TIMES, 14 Apr 85) .....                        | 132 |
| Company Bankruptcy, Liquidations Increase<br>(Ciaran Ryan; SUNDAY TIMES, 14 Apr 85) .....                | 135 |
| PFP, NRP Cooperation Welcomed<br>(THE CITIZEN, 23 Apr 85) .....  | 136 |
| Noted Educator Denounces Apartheid, Violence<br>(Franklin Sonn; SUNDAY TIMES, 14 Apr 85) .....           | 138 |
| Black Management Forum Expands White Relations<br>(Malcolm Fothergill; THE SUNDAY STAR, 14 Apr 85) ..... | 141 |
| TV4 Sparks Video Boom<br>(David Cumming; THE SUNDAY STAR, 14 Apr 85) .....                               | 143 |
| Briefs   |     |
| Youths' 'Radical Demands'  | 144 |
| Black Anger  | 144 |
| Energy Synthetic Fuel Plans  | 144 |
| UK Diplomat Raps Disinvestment   | 144 |
| Electrified Border Fence Tested  | 145 |
| Development Bank Aid   | 145 |
| Black Insecurity   | 145 |

#### SWAZILAND

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Bank Official Opposes Disinvestment<br>(SOWETAN, 9 Apr 85) ..... | 146 |
|--|-----|

#### ZIMBABWE

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| Security Official on Disruption of Elections<br>(THE HERALD, 5 Apr 85) ..... | 147 |
|--|-----|

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| FINANCIAL GAZETTE Warns About 'Secretiveness'       |     |
| (Editorial; THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 12 Apr 85) ..... | 149 |
| ZANU Official Condemns United Front                 |     |
| (THE HERALD, 8 Apr 85) .....                        | 151 |
| Muzorewa Manifesto 'Pack of Lies,' Says Minister    |     |
| (THE HERALD, 9 Apr 85) .....                        | 152 |
| Resettlement Plan Records Good Progress             |     |
| (THE HERALD, 5 Apr 85) .....                        | 154 |
| Domestic Vehicle Assembly Output Drops              |     |
| (THE HERALD, 5 Apr 85) .....                        | 156 |
| Electricity Supply Sales Reported                   |     |
| (THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 4 Apr 85) .....             | 157 |
| Movie Filming Holds Up Chrome Ore Shipments         |     |
| (THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 4 Apr 85) .....             | 159 |
| Homes Backlog Tops 100,000 Units                    |     |
| (THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, 4 Apr 85) .....             | 160 |
| Briefs  |     |
| Maputo Route Shut                                   | 162 |
| Phone Problem Solution                              | 162 |
| Bankruptcy Report 'Malicious'                       | 163 |
| Party Youth Order                                   | 163 |
| Migration Drops                                     | 163 |
| Public Approval of Mugabe                           | 163 |
| Railway Union Meeting                               | 164 |
| Airport Telecommunications Equipment                | 164 |

ANGOLA

PORTUGUESE DAILY ASSESSES CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 26 Mar 85 p 17

/Article by A. da Cunha Raposo: "Plutocrats and Communists Side by Side in Offensive against Pretoria"/

/Text/ Another group of prisoners of UNITA was recently released and this is particularly significant to us because among the 27 released prisoners there were five of our fellow citizens. Their release, which had not been expected at this time, was due only to a decision by UNITA President Jonas Savimbi who, in an interview given to the Catholic Radio station, Radio Renacensa, warned the government in Lisbon about the risk to Portuguese interests, in the present and future, deriving from any measures involving the persecution of members of that anti-Communist movement who are in Portugal. In this connection, Jonas Savimbi recalled that the Portuguese cooperants, who were captured by his guerilla fighters, "were treated with special consideration in view of the friendship between him and the Portuguese people."

The presence of Portuguese mercenaries among the Angolan government troops was also denounced by Jonas Savimbi. Confirming what has been printed more than once in this newspaper, Savimbi noted that the person mainly responsible for this kind of behavior is Adm Rosa Coutinho, the former high commissioner in Angola and the chief agent of the Sovietization of the former overseas province.

Concerning military operations, Savimbi -- who was interviewed in his headquarters in Jamba by several foreign newsmen, according to South African radio -- continued to be optimistic, stating that the best proof that Luanda is now practically surrounded by the guerillas consists of the fact that the Marxist regime has restricted the area where diplomatic personnel can travel freely to a radius of 25 kilometers. In this connection, the ARD /Radio Broadcasting Working Group/ television news program in West Germany, disclosed that moderate segments of the MPLA had established secret contacts with the rebel movement, something which will certainly be denied by Luanda,

although it is true and although we have already learned this through a reliable source.

#### False Optimism

Closely tied to the civil war which is devastating Angola, as we know, is the question of the independence of Namibia and of relations between Luanda and Pretoria; these are issues which involve the withdrawal of the Cuban Expeditionary Corps that is supporting the Angolan and Marxist regime. Both issues were once again taken up at Sao Vicente, in Cape Verde, between delegations of Angola and the United States, headed, respectively, by MPLA Interior Minister Alexandre Rodrigues "Kito" and by United States Assistant Secretary of State, the tireless Chester Crocker.

Commentators reporting the meeting are trying very hard to be optimistic to the point of crediting the head of the United States delegation with the statement to the effect that conversations "were very positive and useful." Now, this is not entirely true since, in the opinion of the United States Ambassador in Cape Verde, who attended the meeting, this meeting "did not bring any significant advance." The false optimism with which people insist to see the Marxist regime of Luanda as becoming "domesticated" has already gone beyond the limits of naiveness and has entered the area of hypocrisy.

As a matter of fact, if there are still persons who are who are so naive that they will even believe that the government in Luanda is taking steps that will remove it from the control of the Russians and the Cubans, considered a mere tool of Soviet imperialism on the African continent, they will lose their illusions as they receive news to the effect that a MPLA delegation met in Moscow with leaders of the USSR and Cuba "in order better to coordinate the action of the three countries in terms of strengthening the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Angola."

The unfortunate Angola of the MPLA thus continues to be a satellite of the USSR and will continue to be just that until such time as the party dissidents and the people's revolt will decisively contribute to the victory of UNITA, with the consequent liberation of the Angolan people from Communist despotism to which it was subjected, not due to its own fault, but due to the criminal action of Portuguese governments 10 years ago and by force of the Cuban occupation troops who have since then been keeping the MPLA gang in power.

#### Blackmail Against Pretoria

One cannot rule out the assumption that some new mystification was being planned during the Moscow meeting to fool the West by holding out prospects for a Cuban withdrawal. But this will not come about in fact so long as the MPLA has not been driven out of Luanda -- and that is something we can be absolutely sure of.

As was to be expected, the tripartite meeting in Moscow repeated the usual charges against the Republic of South Africa, attributing to it acts of aggression against Angola and blaming it for the delay in independence for Namibia.

The South African regime will undoubtedly be able to respond to that but only by reversing reality could it be judged the aggressor in Angola or the source that delays self-determination for Namibia.

Oddly enough, almost at the same time when positions between the USSR, Cuba, and the People's Republic of Angola were being firmed up in the Russian capital, with a view to the consolidation of Marxism in a country bordering on South Africa and with a view to the Sovietization of Namibia, a meeting is underway in the British capital, involving representatives of some of the most important United States and British enterprises for the purpose of applying economic sanctions against Pretoria. The initiative is part of the current campaign in the United States -- apparently commanded by Senator Edward Kennedy -- for the purpose of getting Congress to pass legislation barring new bank loans or new business enterprises in South Africa.

If these sanctions are approved and applied, South Africa will certainly not surrender because of that. The history of the past 60 years shows how useless and even counterproductive the blackmail of economic sanctions is. But once again, we can see the rather little edifying spectacle of capitalists walking hand in hand with the communists against positions that are fundamental to the defense of the Western world. In an interview recently published by THE WASHINGTON TIMES, South African Foreign Affairs Minister Roelof Botha recalled the opinion expressed by Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, according to whom "Europe can survive only for between 30 and 60 days if it were prevented from using the route around the Cape, considering its dependence on imported petroleum which is shipped that way, as well as imports of South African minerals."

On that same occasion, Roelof Botha observed that, during the past 4 years -- in other words, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan -- a consensus had been established between Pretoria and Washington regarding the need for ending Soviet rule in any region of southern Africa. In spite of this, there are still American politicians and tycoons who rather foolishly entertain the idea of defeating the Pretoria regime through economic strangulation, perhaps without realizing that only Soviet imperialism would be the big beneficiary of that defeat. That is what it looks like right now if we consider the deductions deriving from the fluctuations in South African policy which undoubtedly are quite justified by the blackmail to which that country is subjected.

The countries ruled by parties and the plutocracies are congenitally inclined toward this kind of aberration. This is why the world is what it is. This is why Angola faces the most complete economic collapse and a civil war.

5058

CSO: 3442/249



ANGOLA

#### PARTY OFFICIALS VISIT HUILA PROVINCE

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 7 Mar 85 p 3

[Text] Huila--The Central Committee secretary for the productive sector, Santana Andre Petra (Petrof), and the deputy minister of health, Luis Gomes Sambo, have been on a working visit to Benguela Province since Tuesday.

At the local airport, Petrof told reporters present that the main object of his visit is to direct the proceedings of the third annual meeting of the sector that he directs, which has been going on since early this morning in the municipality of Lobito.

The meeting is going to review the activities carried out since the last annual meeting. With regard to the supply of electric energy, the party secretary for the productive sector said that the recommendations that emerged from the last advisory council on energy are very encouraging, being viewed with great optimism.

For his part, the deputy minister of health said that his stay in Benguela Province was part of the program of aid and oversight visits to the provincial delegation and that, together with the local leaders, he is going to assess the indices of tuberculosis and leprosy in the province.

Speaking about the emergency program, he revealed that the priority is the health of children and pregnant mothers.

#### Party Provincial Committee Meets

Meanwhile, the Party Provincial Committee of Benguela has been meeting in this city since Tuesday to review the activities carried out by that organ during the past year and to draw up tasks for the next 12 months.

In a short assessment of the work carried out by the members of the supreme organ of the province, Kundi Payama, the coordinator of the Party Provincial Committee and alternative member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA-Workers Party, who is presiding over the meeting, praised the systematic manner and unity with which members of that organ devoted themselves to heeding and fulfilling the tasks.

He said that this year the party's central activity is directed toward holding the Second Party Congress, without neglecting the problems of the defense and increase of production.

The proceedings of the meeting of the Benguela Provincial Committee of the MPLA-Workers Party is scheduled to conclude Wednesday afternoon.

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14 May 1985

## ANGOLA

## DEPARTING URUGUAYAN DOCTOR DISCUSSES WORK

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 10 Mar 85 p 3

[Excerpt] Dr Fernando Rama, a Uruguayan internationalist, is well known among us. His return to Uruguay leaves a vacancy difficult to fill inasmuch as this Uruguayan internationalist succeeded in gaining the affection of all who either directly or indirectly came into contact with him during his almost 7-year stay in Angola.

Dr. Fernando Rama landed in Angola in 1977 as part of a brigade of Uruguayan internationalists. That same year, he began to lecture as professor of histology in the School of Medicine and to collaborate as an assistant in the department of psychiatry.

At the same time, he conducted a psychiatric clinic in the Psychiatric Hospital of Luanda and of Futungo de Belas; he also collaborated in the Minors Reeducation Center of Cacuaco and lectured in the Nursing Higher Education Center.

A member of the Uruguayan Communist Party since 1974, Dr Fernando Rama never spared sacrifices, a fact that fully justifies the nostalgia felt by all who had contact with him, particularly the students of the School of Medicine.

Before leaving, Dr Fernando Rama granted an interview to the Information Bulletin of the Association of Higher Education Students of the School of Medicine, which we publish below:

[Question] The long years that you worked in Angola enable you to make an analysis of university education. Refer particularly to the School of Medicine.

[Answer] It is necessary not to forget that the Agostinho Neto University and consequently the School of Medicine are structures still in the process of formation. It is my opinion that, in fact, there has been something positive in the university. As the complex structure that it obviously is, it is necessary that basic aspects be clearly granted, such as what the university is, its prospects, etc.

The Agostinho Neto University started from a very little in terms of what I consider essential: the human factor. In this aspect, the School of Medicine was relatively favored in sharp contrast to what happened in relation to other schools.

It is recognized that in the School of Medicine, there has been an unprecedented dynamism, which in recent years has made it possible to maintain a quality level of teaching, considering the conditioning factors that exists in your country.

However, I believe that lately markedly negative phenomena have emerged in the school, the product perhaps of a certain lack of understanding of what I would call the "educational phenomenon."

One of the negative phenomena which I mention was the adoption of the "numerus clausus" [closed number] 2 years ago. It was argued at the time that the basic course could not handle more than 400 students. I consider this measure to be mistaken. The second phenomenon, which I also consider mistaken, emerged this year. It was the decision to apply the matter of precepts to the letter. The third phenomenon, also negative, was the matter pertaining to internship. As we had already predicted, practice showed that we were correct.

During the discussions held at the time, the conclusion was reached that the internship would be aimed basically at two aspects: First, the intern should concentrate his activity on fulfilling his thesis; that has not happened. Secondly, the intership should be, above all, a subject connected with public health. Meanwhile, what we have witnessed is that the internship is directed toward merely health care activities. We observe as a negative factor that there is very little activity related to teaching. Furthermore, even when it does exist, it is practically restricted to bookish seminars.

There are two other aspects that are also disturbing but which I cannot in any way ascribe to the School of Medicine alone. The first concern pertains to the medical cadre educated by the School of Medicine. I believe that the school should seriously discuss this question in order to take into consideration other factors judged essential in the analysis and not, as it has done, analyzing the question of the product educated (the doctor) in a unilateral manner.

If on the one hand there is the problem related to the basic shortcomings of the students who enter the first year of the medical course, then it is essential to find its causes. The response of the School of Medicine can in no way be that of "flunking" more students; that is irrational.

What Should be the Profile of the Angolan Doctor?

Many times when one speaks of the level of education, that phenomenon is conceived in a unilateral manner. The level of teaching is much forgotten. The professors should make some effort to overcome certain deficiencies.

The second aspect is the one I consider the most serious of all. It is the absence of the political-ideological and patriotic education of the cadres who are educated in this school. It is necessary to do something in this connection in order not to develop a defeatist and unenthusiastic mentality in some cadres. This negative phenomenon can cause a doctor to become detached from the people, which is bad. When a doctor loses his sensitivity, he ceases to be a doctor.

The level of quality of the doctor cannot in any way be discussed in the abstract. It is necessary to define well the reference points that are taken as a standard to measure that level. If the reference point is the doctor who is educated in Lisbon, Paris or the universities in the United States, then we can stop here. There is no possibility of discussing things from that point of view inasmuch as a doctor of that level would not profit at all professionally by coming to Angola or, then purely and simply, would not agree to work in Angola because of the limitations that exist here.

In that connection, I believe that the reference point for measuring the quality of the doctor educated in the School of Medicine must be defined, above all, in reference to the needs of the Angolan people, in terms of health. The needs of the Angolan people are quite different from those of the people of Western countries or the United States. Thus, as can be seen, defending the point of view that the Angolan doctor must have the same quality as the doctors educated by the Western universities or those in the United States is untenable.

I repeat once more, therefore, that the quality or the level of the doctor educated in the School of Medicine is not something abstract. It is based on very real bases.

#### Scientific Research

Also related to the subject, there is the matter of scientific research. At this level, things tend not only to stagnate but to retrogress.

Despite everything, the School of Medicine has succeeded in doing something. It has educated doctors with a reasonable technical level, due basically to the great role which the basic course has been performing. In this context, I would like to praise Dr Cadete Levite for the great effort he has been carrying out.

[Question] Voices have been raised among the medical students about the "quasiclosing" of the School of Medicine section in Huambo. As a professor and doctor, what is your opinion on the matter?

[Answer] I emphasize here that that matter has been the subject of sometimes disagreeable discussions with the professors of the clinical course. I regret very much that that should happen.

There is a basic problem here because, since the opening of the Huambo section in 1981, several professors of the clinical course declared various times that the opening has been premature and "voluntary." The indicated this directly

or indirectly. Those professors even went so far as to consider the opening of the School of Medicine section in Huambo as a sort of whim on the part of Dr Cadete Leite and myself. Nevertheless, the argument used has been the lack of conditions in the Central Hospital of Huambo, such as the lack of an X-ray machine, laboratories, etc, as well as the support of the structures.

However, I believe that the (maximum) objective sought could have been achieved this year if the fourth year had been opened and the third maintained. Unfortunately, there was not the necessary enthusiasm, nor even the good will on the part of the professors to overcome that situation.

Paradoxically, more difficult things than opening the clinical course in Huambo have been done in this country. The basic course in Huambo has shown what in fact can be done when there is an ideal, a certain quixotic spirit.

I believe that the struggle for the clinical course in Huambo will continue and that the clinical professors will finally understand its importance. However, I must regret a certain lack of humility on the part of some professors who believe that it is demeaning to conduct classes in Huambo. After all, we will see what will happen some time from now because I believe in the youths who are all in favor of the opening of the School of Medicine section in Huambo.

8711

CSO: 3442/221

ANGOLA

# PROPOSED LEGISLATION EXCLUDES UNSKILLED FOREIGN WORKERS

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 12 Mar 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] Lubango--ANGOLAN NEWS AGENCY--At the meeting of its Eighth Advisory Council, the Secretariat of State for Cooperation [SEC] asserted in Lubango that there is an excessive number of unskilled foreign workers in Angola who have impeded the proper performance and accomplishment of the assigned tasks.

This reality, now being brought to light, has been dragging on for a long time as evidenced by the quality of some of the jobs completed by some of the unskilled personnel.

Typical examples are jobs performed by bricklayers and carpenters, or even gardeners, and their apprentices.

The shortage of skilled personnel in our country is not to be confused with the shortage of many raw materials. It is true that a bricklayer or carpenter, whether foreigner or not, cannot do a satisfactory job when faced with a shortage of construction materials.

The SEC advised that the most important measures being contemplated for reducing the foreign work force are already incorporated in the new legislation and urged the SEC's central organizations to submit that legislation as soon as possible for ratification by the state's higher authorities.

"It is to be noted that the increasing need to provide housing and equipment to the cooperants has become gradually worse, particularly in Luanda where no accommodations were provided for Logitecnica throughout 1984 and where, it is predicted, the same crisis situation will prevail throughout 1985." This statement was included in the final communique of the Advisory Council issued by the SEC.

At this point there is need for reflection. In its process of national reconstruction, Angola needs foreign labor capable of helping it develop in an organized manner. And at the side of each foreign technician there should be an Angolan.

8568  
CSO: 3442/222

ANGOLA

INCREASE IN NUMBER OF FLIGHTS TO BRAZIL

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 12

[Text] TAAG (Angolan Domestic Airline) will initiate air service between Luanda and Rio de Janeiro in July, thereby doubling the number of weekly flights between the two countries, as was already mentioned.

This decision was reached at meetings held in the Angolan capital between a delegation from our national air transportation company and another representing the Brazilian company VARIG which, until now, handled that route exclusively.

In statements made to JOURNAL DE ANGOLA, VARIG President Helio Smidt, who headed the Brazilian contingent, said that he was particularly pleased at the manner in which the various topics were discussed, in language which he considered frank and sincere between companies which have been cooperating for 4 years.

The VARIG president stated that this increase in weekly flights has been justified for a long time, not only to enable TAAG to exercise its traffic prerogatives but also because cooperation between the two countries has been getting stronger day by day through the establishment of an increasing number of Brazilian firms in Angola making it necessary for transportation facilities to keep pace with the increased commercial activity; he said that the aforementioned decision will bring the two nations still closer together.

Smidt went on to say that there was no discussion about VARIG's increasing flights to Luanda before July, such flights being handled by TAAG through charter arrangement. "What happened," he explained, "is that, due to the heavy passenger load, the Brazilian company put a plane bigger than the 707 into service to meet the demand."

VARIG also put a training school for pilots and maintenance technicians at the disposal of TAAG, an arrangement which has been in effect for some time as evidenced by the presence of Angolan planes in Brazilian hangars.



VARIG is a privately-owned Brazilian airline company; it was founded in 1927 and has about 25,000 employees, being considered one of the 15 largest airline companies in the world. It has two subsidiaries in Brazil itself, Cruzeiro Sul and Rio Sul, which make domestic flights. It has a fleet of 90 planes including Boeing 747's, 707's, 727's, 737's, DC-10's, the Air Bus, ELECTRA's, F-27's and Bandeirantes, and transports an average of 600,000 passengers per month. It also has seven hotels in Brazil, some of which are known to the Angolans.

8568

CSO: 3442/222

14 May 1985

## ANGOLA

## AGRICULTURE IN LUNDA-NORTE FACES DIFFICULTIES

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 7 Mar 85 p 3

[Text] Chitato--The agricultural sector of Lunda-Norte Province lacks substantial support from the provincial as well as the central organs, declared Provincial Delegate Cecilio Malaquias in an interview with the ANGOLAN PRESS AGENCY (ANGOP).

Mentioned as factors of noncompliance is the lack of a sector of technical-material assistance to the agricultural complexes and integrated peasants that will permit adequate support for agricultural activity.

With regard to the "groups," at the present time only the Cambulo group devoted to rice-hulling is in operation; the others (Canzar and Xa-Muteba) are idle.

The process of consolidating the cooperatives is aimed at the two existing in the municipalities of Lucapa and Cambulo. Cecilio Malaquias revealed, on the other hand, that with regard to poultry raising, there were three poultry houses: two of them with 2,000 birds each and the third with 6,000. That official also referred to the multifaceted support that the Angola Diamond Company (DIAMANG) provides for the solution of the problems, specifically in poultry and hog-breeding.

The National Agriculture Mechanization Company (ENAMA), an important sector for the development of agriculture in the region is also struggling with the lack of equipment due to the obsolete condition of almost 70 percent of the machinery it possesses and the lack of qualified personnel.

8711

CSO: 3442/221

ANGOLA

HUNGARIAN SOLIDARITY COMMITTEE PRESENTS GIFTS

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 7 Mar 85 p 3

[Text] Andras Gulyas, Hungarian ambassador to the People's Republic of Angola (RPA), yesterday presented gifts from the Hungarian Solidarity Committee to its Angolan counterpart, the Angolan League of Friendship and Solidarity With the Peoples (LAASP).

The 50-ton gift is comprised of medicines, food items, children's and adult's clothing, medical equipment and wheelchairs for the physically handicapped, which will soon be channeled to social organs for later distribution to the war victims of Cunene.

In his speech, Andras Gulyas reiterated the solidarity of the Hungarian people with the fraternal people of Angola and regarded as worthy and just the struggle carried out by Angola for the definite annihilation of internal and external reaction, the indispensable condition for achieving its objectives.

Further on, he considered the armed, political and diplomatic struggle in which the RPA is engaged as essential for peace, prosperity and well-being and emphasized the unconditional support of the Hungarian people for the achievement of the aspirations of the Angolan people.

In conclusion, the Hungarian ambassador recognized with great admiration the successes achieved by our people and government notwithstanding the difficult working and living conditions stemming from the unjust war that is waged against us by the Republic of South Africa and its UNITA puppets.

In his speech, Coelho da Cruz, president of the LAASP, expressed his thanks for the gesture and said that he was touched by the many acts of humanitarian cooperation by the Hungarian people for the RPA. In conclusion, the president of the LAASP also expressed the RPA's repudiation of the militarization of cosmic space and the arms race and expressed Angola's support for all peace efforts.

The support which the Angolan people have been enjoying at the international level is the evident sign that our voice has already found a response among the peace and freedom-loving peoples. That proves their support for our just struggle without the shadow of a doubt.

8177  
CSO: 3442/221

ANGOLA

BRIEFS

FRIENDSHIP CIRCLE IN HAVANA--Havana--The Circle of Friendship and Study of the People's Republic of Angola was officially opened in this city on Friday in the context of the 10th anniversary of national independence and the consolidation of bilateral relations with Cuban social organizations. In the friendship and study circle of the secondary school pioneers will study the facts about Angola from the colonial occupation to the process of economic and social reconstruction underway and the role of the Angolan revolution in the continental, regional and subregional context. The opening ceremony took place in the "Fabric Aguilar" secondary school with the participation of representatives of the party, the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Union of Communist Youth (UJC) and international workers who spent time in Angola. A photographic exhibit symbolized the opening ceremony followed by speeches by the directors of the school and the Angolan ambassador in Cuba, Mawete Joao Baptista. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 6 Mar 85 p 12] 8711

NUMBER OF BPV'S INCREASE--N'Dalatando--The official in charge of the municipal sector dealing with the Popular Vigilance Brigades (BPV's), Domingos Masa, told the ANGOLAN PRESS AGENCY (ANGOP) recently that 71 BPV's comprised of more than 1,000 members and controlled by five intermediate directorates have been formed in the municipality of Bolongongo. The municipal BPV's have carried out extensive activities in fulfilling their duties. This action guarantees important successes in safeguarding the interests of the local population, added that official, who considered that there is acceptable popular support for those organs in the region. Among the main tasks that occupy the attention of that mass organization in that municipality, about 110 kilometers from N'Dalantando, are: participation in the health and hygienic protection and promotion services in collaboration with the municipal health organs; the organization of demonstrations repudiating the acts of terror committed by the enemies against the civilian populations; as well as population census. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 9 Mar 85 p 3] 8711

LEARNING CENTERS LACK TEACHERS--Zaire--The Normal Institute of Education (INE) and the Preuniversity Center (PUNIV) of Zaire Province are currently closed due to a lack of teachers, the director of that student complex, Francisco Mario Fernando, told the ANGOLAN PRESS AGENCY (ANGOP). According to the director, the lack of teachers has prevailed since last April when the seven cooperating teachers left the province, resulting in the noncompletion of the past school year as well as the second semester of the PUNIV: meanwhile, the

students of the INE had recourse to Angolan collaborating teachers. The INE and Preuniversity Center operate in the same building with two classrooms since last year. For this school year, 14 students have registered for the 9th grade, 25 for the 10th; and 8 for the first semester and 28 for the second semester, of the INE and PUNIV, respectively. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 7 Mar 85 p 3] 8711

OMA SECRETARY GENERAL HONORED--On International Women's Day, Fidel Castro, president of Cuba's council of ministers, honored Ruth Neto, secretary general of the OMA [Angolan Women's Organization], with the Ana Betancourt medal, the highest award of the Federation of Cuban Women [FMC]. At a ceremony officially recognizing International Women's Day and attended by upper-echelon officials of the PCC [Cuban Communist Party], delegates to the Fourth Congress of the FMC and foreign guests, the commander in chief of the RAF [Revolutionary Armed Forces] also awarded medals to the representative of the Soviet women, the representative of Nicaragua and Freda Brown, chairwoman of the WIDF. At the same ceremony leaders of the FMC were honored with the Mariana Grajales medal. In conducting the award ceremony, Machado Ventura, member of PCC's Politburo, explained the significance of the high honors being bestowed, starting that those awards represented the appreciation of the Cuban Revolution for the self-sacrificing combatants for the peace and liberation of peoples. International Women's Day, 8 March, had a special significance in Cuba, for it coincided with the closing of the Fourth Congress of the FMC which the Cuban Revolution held in homage to the untiring efforts of combatants for peace throughout the world. Saturday, the OMA secretary general met with the chairwoman of the WIDF and other officials of the international feminist movement to analyze various aspects of the present international situation and prepare for the World Conference of Nairobi scheduled for July. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 12 Mar 85 p 1] 8568

OIL FIELD BEGINS PRODUCTION -- SONANGOL (National Fuels Company of Angola), the national hydrocarbons prospecting, research, and production concessionaire in Angola, revealed through a note distributed to ANGOP [Angolan Press Agency] that production has been started at the offshore field in Block 3. According to the announcement, the offshore field was discovered in 1981 as a result of the drilling of offshore well 1 and this was later on confirmed by two assessment wells so that the development of this field began in 1983; work is currently continuing at a good pace and four producing wells have already been drilled; a well protection platform and a production platform have been installed; this is where the oil is processed. Block 3 is operated by ELF [Gasoline and Lubricants Company of France] Aquitaine Angola as part of a production sharing contract signed with SONANGOL; the contracting group is made up of the following companies and partnerships: ELF Aquitaine Angola (operator) 5 percent; Mobil, 25 percent; AGIP [National Italian Oil Company], 15 percent; Inaftagas, 5 percent; and Inanaftaplin, 5 percent. The SONANGOL announcement also emphasizes that the output is being stored in a tanker with a capacity of 250,000 tons, permanently moored at a SBM buoy; export shipments are made from that floating terminal and work is being continued to develop other fields in this block. [Text] [Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 16 Mar 85 p 1] 5058

NEW MUNICIPAL COMMISSARS NAMED--Kwanza-Sul Assistant Provincial Commissar Antonio Narciso recently installed Carlos Alberto do Amaral Pombares as Cela Municipal Commissar and Pedro Manuel Lourenco as Provincial Delegate of the Veterans Department. Carlos Alberto do Amaral Pombares replaces Carlos da Conceicao Cunha, who is currently Municipal Commissar of Porto Amboim. /Text/ /Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 Mar 85 p 3/

COMMISSAR VISITS DANGE KITEXE--Uige Provincial Commissar Zeferino Estevao Juliana visited the city of Dange Kitexe with Augusto Lopes Teixeira, the Minister of Education of the People's Republic of Angola. The Uige provincial commissar's visit to this city was part of the campaign to integrate compatriots who have been living in the jungle back into society. In fact, Zeferino Estevao Juliana carried on a dialogue with some compatriots who had recently approached Angolan authorities. The compatriots who came forward here assured the provincial commissar that the others still in the jungle would come forward en masse, saying that jungle life is terrible and that they want peace, not war. In reply, Zeferino Estevao Juliana expressed his appreciation for the patriotism shown by the compatriots and presented the main points of the policy of clemency decreed by the Angolan government. The provincial commissar encouraged cooperative efforts with compatriots still living in the jungle to integrate them back into the larger Angolan family. He also encouraged a people's meeting to increase production and productivity. At the Dange Quatro Territorial Coffee Company, the Uige provincial commissar, who was accompanied by the Minister of Education, visited the company's infirmary and the coffee husker, which is shut down for lack of a generator. /Text/ /Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 Mar 85 p 3/ 8844

HOTEL COURSE ENDS IN PORTUGAL--Intensive courses in hotel safety and security and hotel project evaluation were concluded here recently at the National Domestic Trade School. According to a reliable source, the courses, which were taught by two Portuguese specialists from the National Tourist Training Institute (INFT), began in June of last year with 264 students. The newspaper reports statements made by one of the specialists in speaking of the staff of some twenty persons from the INF working in Angola, who said that his work just goes to show "what cooperation can and should be doing for the natural advantage of both countries," pointing out that "we must not forget that Luanda alone has ten large hotels." According to the newspaper, two more hotel schools will be opened in March in Lubango and Huambo with the assistance of Portuguese specialists in the hotel sector. /Text/ /Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 Mar 85 p 3/ 8844

HUILA LEADERS ATTEND MEETING--Lubango--The fifth plenary session of the Huila Provincial Committee was closed here by Lt Col Sapilinha Sambalanga, provincial commissar. The two-day meeting examined the operation of the Party municipal committees, the JMPLA (the youth of the Party), social and mass organizations and approved reports submitted by the Control Commission and the Executive Commission. In his closing speech to all the participants, the Huila leadership Party coordinator recommended strengthening the Party's leadership role at all levels and said that a Party leader should place full confidence in the grass-root militants to accomplish the goals that have been set. The mobilization and consciousness-raising efforts of the Provincial Secretariat for Party Youth in the area of military, defense and security recruitment among youth in the struggle to wipe out puppets who are trying to impede the progress of the Angolan revolution also merited Lt Col Sapilinha Sambalanga's attention. Participants at the meeting urged greater diligence on the part Party members in the implementation of resolutions intended to improve the functioning of the provincial Party structure in order to solve the people's problems. Concurrently, the Huila Provincial Commissariat opened its first regular session Saturday morning in Lubango to determine the extent to which last year's plan was fulfilled and to approve 1985 goals. Among the recurring items on the working agenda, analysis of the fulfillment of tasks by the Supply Commission in 1984 and the review and approval of a document to be submitted to the Tenth Session of the Huila Provincial People's Assembly, recently called by its President, Lt Col Rafael Sapilinha (Sambalanga), who is also a member of the Central Committee of the MPLA-Labor Party, stand out. Huila Provincial Commissar Rafael Sapilinha Sambalanga presided at the ordinary session. /Text/ /Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 17 Mar 85 p 3/ 8844

CSO: 3442/239

BOTSWANA

# KEDIKILWE OUTLINES STEPS TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SERVICE

Gaborone BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS in English 21 Mar 85 p 1

[Article by Jowitt Mbongwe]

[Text]

**GABORONE:** The Minister for Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, Mr Ponatshego Kedikilwe has said steps are underway to improve the efficiency and productivity of the public service.

In a speech to a meeting of the Bank of Botswana Employees Union last weekend, Minister Kedikilwe said two exercises of job evaluation and organisation and methods are presently going on.

"And everything being equal, it can be expected that the efficiency and productivity of the public service will be improved for the benefit of all."

He noted that the question of low labour productivity in Botswana has been of major concern for a long time.

Explaining the "Incomes Policy," Mr Kedikilwe said, "in a developing country with very wide disparity in resources endowments among and between different social groups, and rapidly rising incomes can only bring about income inequalities especially between the skilled and unskilled workers and between those with formal employment and those without it."

He said a major objective of the incomes policy was to prevent this inequality from happening, adding that the policy aims at maximising the growth of employment opportunities by trying to avoid giving more to those already fortunate enough to be employed.

Mr Kedikilwe pointed out that the incomes policy arouses much interest and evokes much emotion. "The basic principle of the incomes policy is that basic local wage and salary levels in the private and parastatal sectors should generally conform to, and on no account significantly exceed, those paid by government to comparable grades of public employees."

Minister Kedikilwe defended Government against the charges that it did not want Botswana to be given reasonable wages. He said, the policy envisages that the pay structure should reward responsibility, greater experience, skill and training.

Concerning expatriate salaries, he said, the policy exempted them from much scrutiny and control with the result that it is now thought that the economy may be "paying for history."



He promised that Government will, with the help of the National Employment, Manpower and Incomes Council (NEMIC) review the policy on the issue.

Mr Kedikilwe observed that another area of concern to the Bank of Botswana Employees Union was the question of manpower training and localisation.

He said he noted with satisfaction that the Bank of Botswana had made substantial progress in this regard. He added that out of 228 positions, only eight remain to be localised.

The importance of training as an instrument of development of individual employees and organisational effectiveness can hardly be overemphasised, he said.

Minister Kedikilwe told the union members that their union exists to articulate and press with the authorities the collective opinion and requirements of its members.

An enlightened employer, he remarked, should welcome the existence of a forum that provides it with an opportunity to know the feeling and opinions of its workforce.

He urged for the promotion and cultivation of a feeling of wellbeing and commitment amongst the employees, arguing that the union must be constructive in its approach in issues of industrial disputes.

Mr Kedikilwe called for a strong union leadership with a sense of direction.

CSO: 3400/54

BOTSWANA

BATSWANA MIGRANTS DETAINED IN SOUTH AFRICA

Gaborone BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS in English 20 Mar 85 p 1

[Article by Marshall Tiadi]

[Text]

**PALAPYE:** Immigration officials have confirmed reports that 10 Batswana who illegally crossed into South Africa to take up employment at farms there were arrested in August last year. They were detained in prison on the South African side of the border with Botswana. The ten people were from the Tswapong North areas bordering South Africa, from the villages of Lerala, Mokobeng and Seolwane.

The Acting Immigration Officer, Mr Denias Mopipi Mokomeng, told BOPA that his office received a cable from the Botswana labour representative at Roodeport in South Africa to confirm that citizens of Botswana were being held in South Africa.

They are Esther Ngwenya, Babane Tapologo, Lesedi Letowa, Marea James, Ramonnye Moduto, Thandi Bothomilwe, Mabalane Mokgethi, Obert Samuel, Galekgathe Gaborate and Dimakatso Thakadu, whose ages range from 17 to 40 years.

BOPA learned from reliable sources that they crossed the border illegally with the hope of getting employment. South African farmers along the border with Botswana are said to be exploiting cheap labour at their gigantic farms.

It is alleged that rather than pay them for a month's work, the farmers report the labourers to the South African Immigration officials who arrest them as aliens.

The Immigration Officer has asked the labour representative in Roodeport to arrange for extradition of the 10 men and women back to Botswana.

Headman Mr Show Moroka of Lerala village said the farmers took advantage of the drought situation to recruit his people by promising to offer them jobs at their farms.

Councillor B.K. Balekile told BOPA that he had been alerted to this state of affairs and had appealed to his people to stop illegally crossing into South Africa  
BOPA

14 May 1985

## BOTSWANA

## COUNCILS DEBTS EXCEED P1,5M

Gaborone BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS in English 22 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Bapasi Mphusu]

[Text]

**PARLIAMENT:** The councils' outstanding debt regarding service levy and building material repayments now exceeds P1,5 million, it was disclosed in Parliament on Monday.

The Minister of Local Government and Lands, Mr Lesedi Mothibamele, made the disclosure when he was presenting the recurrent and development estimates of his ministry to Parliament.

He argued: "If we are to provide 10 000 serviced plots in the next stage of the housing construction programme, and if we are to replicate these projects to benefit more and more of our people, we can no longer afford to overlook this unfortunate debt management problem."

To make sound progress, the Minister suggested that people must be educated "so that they understood that the days have long passed when we expected everything for free, and that we are now in a fast developing country with tremendous opportunities for everyone to have a much better standard of living than ever before.

"All this cannot be done if the present situation of public debt continues," he said, and urged members of Parliament to do all they could to continue to make Botswana the progressive country that it was and to make up the challenge of financial self-sufficiency as a means of promoting and maintaining development, self-reliance and social justice objectives.

Earlier, the Minister had addressed himself to the problem of housing in both urban and rural areas.

He disclosed that a recently completed housing needs study indicated that 90 per cent of the housing stock in rural areas had no sanitation facilities, that 40 per cent of the rural population could not afford the equivalent of a house provided under the site and service scheme.

The study, according to the Minister, also indicated that only 15 per cent of the urban population could afford a mortgage for a typical low cost house and that by 1990/91 there would be a shortage of 90 000 housing units.

Middle-income housing programmes are being developed and a specific rural

housing programme is also being drafted, he said, adding that considerable finance had to be identified.

Ways and means of raising the necessary amount of finance required to meet the housing needs of the country, are being fully explored, he told Parliament. He explained that his ministry was working closely with the Botswana Housing Corporation (BHC) to provide home ownership schemes to introduce more economic housing rentals and a comprehensive national housing plan embracing all these issues.

Mr Mothibamele further said: "We are talking about large amounts of finance to provide the extra serviced land for housing, and our concern is how we should meet the country's housing needs, whilst remaining responsive to our financial constraints."

He however explained that before the government embarked on this "very complex and ambitious programme, we must face realities and try by all means to overcome the ever-worsening debt management problem facing our councils at this time.

BOTSWANA

AGRICULTURE BUDGET INCREASED TO SUPPORT ARABLE FARMERS

Gaborone BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS in English 15 Mar 85 p 2

[Article by Mmonlemang Madikwe]

[Text]

**GABORONE:** The Ministry of Agriculture is to embark on a new irrigation programme which will contribute substantially to correcting the country's food deficit by the end of the Development Plan Six period.

This was said in Parliament this week by the Assistant Minister of Agriculture, Mr Geoffrey Oteng when presenting the development budget for the Ministry totalling more than P16 million.

The budget, Mr Oteng explained, represents an increase of more than P3 million, the bulk of which will go towards the support of arable farmers who have been subjected to severe drought over the past three ploughing seasons.

Mr Oteng said that the

irrigation development programme will start with a study of some predetermined areas of the north to establish the suitability of those areas.

The Assistant Minister, who said that they were planning to create an irrigation unit in the Ministry, disclosed that a horticultural programme will also be launched during the 1985/86 fiscal year.

The Arable Land Development Programme (ALDEP), he explained will continue in the Sixth National Development Plan period. Mr Oteng also noted that the recent restructuring of the programme from a grant/loan scheme to a grant/down payment one had significantly improved project implementation.

He told MPs that as a result of the Botswana's proneness to drought, the Ministry of

Agriculture planned to develop the Grain Strategy Reserve project. Under this project, he said, the Botswana Agricultural Marketing Board would progressively procure food stocks for storage in strategic depots until a grain reserve of at least 30 000 tons was stored.

Mr Oteng informed the House that the expansion of the Botswana Agricultural College had been successfully completed and that all that remained was the improvement of livestock teaching facilities, which, he said, will be started during the next financial year.

He also informed the MPs that most projects under the Department of Animal Health have been completed and thus expenditures for the Department have been reduced. **BOPA**

CSO: 3400/54

BOTSWANA

SECOND BATCH OF CHINESE DOCTORS ARRIVE

Gaborone BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS in English 25 Mar 85 p 4

[Article by Tarcisius Mudongo]

[Text]

FRANCISTOWN: A team of 10 medical officers and one supporting officer from China started work at the Jubilee Hospital here recently to replace the original Chinese team which is scheduled to return home on April 1.

Members of the new team are two surgeons, two physicians, two anaesthetists, one paediatrician, a radiologist and an acupuncturist.

Before the team came to Francistown, it conferred with the Minister of Health, Mr Patrick Balopi and were briefed about the working conditions in the country.

The team also had a familiarisation tour of the Princess Marina Hospital and medical stores in Gaborone, according to the principal medical officer at Jubilee Hospital Dr V.R. Sayana.

In Francistown, when welcoming the Chinese team, Dr Sayana requested his staff to give the new team the same support which they have been extending to the outgoing Chinese team.

"Communication, even

though would for months be a problem between the team and you, let the patients and work not suffer," Dr Sayana exhorted.

He told a small ceremony that members of the team had more than twenty years experience in the field and as such he did not expect any difficulty in the teams' day to day work.

The medical officer said that there was still a need for one or more gynaecologists for the hospital to ease the situation at the hospital.

The other speaker was the Matron of the hospital, Mrs Badani Moleele who lauded the Chinese government for the help she was offering Botswana by making her doctors available to Botswana.

She said even though Botswana was faced with the shortage of doctors, the situation was not desperate because of the presence of Chinese doctors. On his part, the hospital administrative officer, Mr C. Mokotedi explained the regulations under which the Chinese team would be expected to work. **BOPA**

CSO: 3400/54

BOTSWANA

MASIRE TALKS TO RAPPORT ON APARTHEID, NKOMATI

Gaborone BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS in English 25 Mar 85 p 1

[Article by Kwapeng Modikwe]

[Text] GABORONE: The President Dr Quett Masire has said that he was looking forward to the days when South Africa could play a meaningful role in the development of the Southern African region and the continent.

Dr Masire said this in an interview with Mr Johan Strydom, a journalist of a widely read Afrikaans paper in South Africa - the Rapport last week in Gaborone.

The President said that while he entertained hope for the future, he feared for the worst and that "this fear is not lessening." He explained that he was hoping for the best because "where there is life, there is hope."

Dr Masire told Mr Strydom that the best South Africa could do for all Southern African countries was to eliminate apartheid and talk to all citizens of South Africa on equal basis.

He regretted that the changes which have so far been effected in South Africa were not what he and the rest of the leaders of Southern African countries had hoped for. As of now, said the President, "the majority of the population is still left out."

Talking about the possibility of dialogue

between South Africa and that country's liberation movements, the President said that "in jail and outside jail, South Africa must invite black leaders to come and discuss the future of their country."

The President suggested that any move on talks between Pretoria and liberation movements should be accompanied by a "bottom line." He said that something which did not exist when the black leaders were jailed must be offered.

Dr Masire reminded his interviewer that most South African black leaders were in jail not because they advocated violence. "They started with passive resistance, talking,"

Responding to a question regarding the alleged ANC's refusal to accept Pretoria's offer, Dr Masire said that he was not aware that Pretoria had ever made an offer to the ANC. "But," said Dr Masire, "I am aware that Pretoria has recently made conditional offer of release to certain people who are in jail, and those are not the ANC. The ANC is an organisation," he said.

On the question of the "Nkomati Accord," the

President accused South Africa of not honouring the accord because to date "elements favourable to Renamo itself still operate and use South African facilities."

The President also told Mr Strydom that Botswana was not interested in signing a peacetreaty with South Africa because there was no need to do so. He explained that both countries have lived together peacefully during the colonial era and todate and therefore a sudden peace treaty would not alter the two countries' relations.

President Masire reiterated Botswana's long standing policy of not allowing her soil to be used as a springboard for attacks against neighbouring countries.

He however, conceded that since Botswana was an open society unlike South Africa, where people carried passes wherever they were, it was possible for some elements to sneak through.

If arrested, such people were tried by the courts and if convicted they serve their sentences and later are deported to the countries of their choice, explained the President. **BOPA**

BOTSWANA

## RURAL ELECTRIFICATION STRONGLY RECOMMENDED TO SPEED DEVELOPMENT

Botswana DAILY NEWS in English 25 Mar 85 p 1

[Article by Baps1 Mphusu]

[Text]

**PARLIAMENT:** Members of Parliament have made a strong call for the electrification of rural areas as another way of attracting big business ventures and employment creation in those areas.

Speaking during the debate on the recurrent and development estimates of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water Affairs, Members of Parliament felt that rural electrification could help speed rural development since water was already available.

The Minister for Presidential Affairs and Public Administration, Mr Ponatshego Kedikilwe endorsed the view that rural electrification was one of the programmes that must be vigorously pursued. He said that rural development could only be anchored if there was a form of energy, both electrical and solar power.

The Minister expressed fear that there seemed to be some danger that rural electrification would die, and suggested if the question was that of lack of funds, the government should divert some funds to this end. He saw rural electrification as one attempt to arrest the rural-urban migration

because it would lead to the upswing in business and recreation of activities that needed electricity.

Mr Kedikilwe also urged the government to look seriously at other sources of energy apart from petroleum powered generators. He suggested for instance that windmills and solar power equipment should be made more readily available.

He argued that Botswana's energy security had reached a crisis point because the national bill on petrol, diesel and paraffin was increasing every year. According to him, from 1980 to 1983, the government energy bill was over P300 million.

He described this as a crisis which seemed not to be receiving enough attention, adding that the amount consumed in Botswana was very large, while the commodity itself was affected by all sorts of factors including galloping inflation.

Mr Kedikilwe added that because of this uncertainty facing this form of energy, it was high time that the government looked seriously into other sources of energy.

The Member of Parliament for Okavango, Mr Joseph Kavindama called for the

electrification of villages like Gomare and Shakawe to attract big businesses there. He pointed out that big businesses which could create employment would not be attracted to rural areas unless there was an added dimension to make life more comfortable in rural areas which can only be brought about by provision of electricity.

A suggestion was also made by the Assistant Minister of Local Government and Lands, Mr Obed Chilume that the Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) and the Electrical Department should extend their services to the rural areas. He said the services of these two were vital for the creation of rural industries.

Mr Chilume quarrelled with the current programme of exploration of gas and oil deposits. He said this was taking too long. He indicated the discovery of any of the two in the Kgalagadi district could open that area to the rest of Botswana because better roads would be constructed.

The Minister of Agriculture, Mr Daniel Kwelagobe picked up on the question of transformers and the depletion of fire wood in rural areas.

Mr Kwelagobe said that women were now travelling up to 10 kilometres from villages to collect firewood. He added that the gravity of this matter was illustrated by the little sticks these people bring home as fire wood.

He urged the Minister responsible for energy to make compliments to organisations such as the Kweneng Rural Development Association (KRDA) which were engaged in reforestation programmes to fight this problem. He described the depletion of firewood as a serious problem which needed urgent attention.

On transformers, Mr Kwelagobe argued that in areas where the BPC did not install them, people who wanted to connect electricity to their business undertakings were made to buy the transformers for themselves. He said prices of transformers had risen to

P6 000. Mr Kwelagobe said it was saddening that after the transformer had been installed at the customer's own cost "it ceases to be your property and becomes a BPC's property."

According to the Minister, other people who did not contribute to its purchase would then be connected cheaply, while the person who bought it was repaying the loan. He termed this a generous contribution to a government parastatal, and appealed to the minister to look into the problem seriously. He said this is a mistake.

The Assistant Minister for Agriculture, Mr Geoffrey Oteng complained that the BPC had a tendency of cutting off power supply during the weekends. He said this inconvenienced many people operating businesses like butcheries, hotels and petrol stations.

On water, Mr Oteng said that it was embarrassing to talk of shortage of water in Ramotswa when that village supplied Gaborone with water.



BOTSWANA

# P11M ALLOCATED FOR RESUMPTION OF DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAMME

Gaborone BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS in English 25 Mar 85 p 2

[Text]

**PARLIAMENT:** Eleven Million Pula (P11 million) is to be provided for the continuation of the drought labour-based relief projects to promote employment and boost the economy, the Minister of Local Government and Lands, Mr Lesedi Mothibamele told Parliament on Monday.

The Minister explained this when presenting the recurrent and development estimates of his ministry totalling P102 284 060 for the 1985/86 financial year.

He also said that it was proposed to spend P564 000 and P1 384 000 to provide for the provision of adequate storage and distribution facilities and to enable the Department of Food Resources to be in a state of preparedness so that it could quickly respond and ensure immediate human relief in the event of future emergencies.

"Furthermore, to bring relief to some of our less fortunate people, it is proposed to spend P2 600 000 to meet the requirements of the drought affected vulnerable group beneficiaries, and this will supplement the costs of food

to the remainder of the supplementary feeding programme," he said.

Mr Mothibamele however, stated that given the likely continuation of food relief because of continuing drought in most parts of the country, it was expected that more funds would be required to extend the relief programme to 1986.

Earlier he had noted that due to the uneven distribution of rainfall most of the country was still drought-stricken. For these areas, Mr Mothibamele explained, his ministry proposed to continue with the existing human relief measures. He said that in areas where the drought was nearly over the ministry would embark on a post drought recovery programme focusing on human rehabilitation and the stimulation of agricultural production.

On a different subject, the Minister told the House that Botswana was now faced with serious environment problems like developed countries.

He mentioned deforestation, overgrazing of land, insufficient water resources and the inherent problems

concerned with the disposal of human waste and industrial effluent as some of the problems to be tackled.

To foster a greater awareness of the environment, Mr Mothibamele said an interministerial co-ordinating environment group had been established, and it had already recommended declaration of a "Keep Botswana Clean Day" and a "National Tree Planting Day."

For 1985/86 under environmental management activities, the Minister said it was proposed to spend P35 000 on new projects to provide for the proper utilisation and conservation of natural resources.

Describing this as a current and national problem, he requested Members of Parliament to help his ministry to spread "this important message and help Botswana to overcome the ills of atmospheric pollution, litter, and badly-planned infrastructures which have resulted in 'eye-sores' for many countries in the world today; and make our country a good, safe and happy place to live."

**BOPA**

CSO: 3400/54

BOTSWANA

BRIEFS

AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH NORWAY--The Vice President and Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Mr P.S. Mmusi and the Norwegian resident Representative, Mr A. Eik, signed an umbrella agreement to assist in the development and further improvement of the Health Services in Botswana this week. According to a Press release issued from the V-P's Office the terms and procedures in this agreement apply to new projects in the field of health. The new projects are still to be agreed upon between Botswana and Norway. The terms and procedures will also apply to the development of rural and health services in Botswana. On the one hand, Norway will make available to Botswana a financial grant not exceeding P14,75 million to finance these activities and on the other hand Botswana's contribution will among others include the planning, administration and implementation of the programme and cover all expenses that may be required over and above a grant for a successful implementation of the programme. [Text] [Gaborone BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS in English 21 Mar 85 p 1]

BMC TO HANDLE ZIMBABWE'S BEEF SALES--Lobatse--The Botswana Meat Commission in London has won a tender to handle all Zimbabwe's beef sales to Europe. This was disclosed in a press release from the BMC in Lobatse yesterday which stated that after several years of negotiations the commission's European subsidiary had been awarded a seven-year contract to manage all Zimbabwe's beef sales to Europe. The BMC has won this tender in the midst of a strong competition put up by many of the leading European import-meat marketing agents. The agreement which was ratified this month by the Zimbabwean Government is a major recognition of the Botswana Meat Commission's knowledge and expertise in the marketing of beef in Europe and above all should be seen as one of the major benefits arising out of the cooperation between SADCC member states. Exports from Zimbabwe, which will initially amount to their ACP Quotas of 8 000 tonnes per annum, are expected to start later this year and will be under the same ACP arrangements as those applicable to Botswana beef exports. [Text] [Gaborone BOTSWANA DAILY NEWS in English 15 Mar 85 p 1]

CSO: 3400/54

COMOROS

BRIEFS

POST-COUP ARRESTS--Paris, 18 April (AFP)--Mohamed Monjoin, political secretary of the Paris office of the Democratic Front (FD, Comoran opposition party), said in Paris on Thursday that 400 to 600 people, mainly FD activists, had been arrested within the space of a week following the coup attempt in Moroni at the beginning of last month by members of the presidential guard. At a press conference, Mr Monjoin accused Comoran President Ahmed Abdallah of using this coup attempt as an excuse to "hatch a plot against the FD and the opposition in general." The FD "has always opposed coups," Mr Monjoin added, saying that all prisoners were being detained in Moroni under very bad conditions. According to the FD official, South Africa and the United States "are aspiring to replace France in the Comoro Islands, and strongly support the regime of Ahmed Abdallah and the mercenaries." On its part, Mr Monjoin said, the French Government gives "active support to the mercenaries." [Text] [Paris AFP in French 1732 GMT 18 Apr 85 AB]

CSO: 3400/61

CHAD

# POPULAR SUPPORT FOR HABRE SEEN GROWING

N'Djamena AL-WATAN in French 23 Mar 85 p 1

[Editorial by Mahamat Saleh Younous: "The People Mobilize"]

[Text] "We are struggling to preserve Chad for the Chadians and to ensure that it returns to peace, achieves its unity, and lays the foundations for economic, social, and cultural progress. We want true national independence for Chad. We would like for the country to be respected both internally and externally" (Hissein Habre, February 1979).

I allow myself to take history as it comes, being aware that the present is a graduated stage between a recent or distant past and an unlimited future.

After all, this constant concern to strengthen the unity of Chad's daughters and sons so as to safeguard real and well-founded solidarity concerning noble and sacred principles--peace, unity, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty--is not something that started yesterday. Unity exists. It can never ever be challenged. Peace goes hand in hand with territorial integrity, which goes along with national sovereignty, and it is national sovereignty which determines the prosperity of the people.

From Sarh and Doba to Moundou, I experienced nothing but reunions among Chadian brothers and sisters. And I am strongly convinced that the same is true elsewhere in our prefectures and in our various social strata.

I could not forgive myself if I failed to go back a little way to describe, no matter how briefly, the welcoming atmosphere that existed everywhere that the presidential delegation went. There was celebration, and celebration pure and simple. Mingled with the sound of drums were emotion-filled voices singing patriotic songs for national salvation to welcome the messenger of peace and the delegation accompanying him. I leave it to the inhabitants of Sarh, Doba, and Moundou to appraise and comment on the symbolic significance of the drops of water that refreshed us. It is hardly necessary to say that I was struck by the particular attention with which, despite the intense heat, those crowds (in Sarh, Doba, and Moundou) listened to the supreme fighter for unity and independence.

The overwhelming majority of the people have been made aware and are mobilized behind their leader to defend the homeland. Victory by the Chadian people is certain. As for that minority consisting of our brothers who have been deceived and deluded by the enemies of peace in unity in Chad, we say to them that there is still time to return with honor to the fraternal arms waiting to embrace them. Because it is inconceivable to consider oneself indispensable in or because of an unsettled situation desired by the enemies of the mother country and still claim to possess any patriotism. Each of us has the duty to see to it that the dignity and honor of the legacy bequeathed by our ancestors are not compromised.

That legacy is none other than unity achieved by surpassing oneself in cohesion and solidarity in the face of all challenges. We call to order all those who dare refuse to have anything to do with the principle of national sovereignty and seek to interfere in our affairs. Chad is a country of welcome and respectful hospitality, but it wants to be respected. Chad is for the Chadians and will remain the possession of the Chadians.

Comrade El Hadj Hissein Habre is not a northerner but a Chadian.

Militant comrades, wherever you are, the work of peace undertaken since 7 June 1982 and the solemn commitment made by the comrade president during his official visit to the prefectures of Moyen-Chari, Logone Occidental, and Logone Oriental are the words of command to all of us for achieving national independence in unity.

11798

CSO: 3419/365

ETHIOPIA

STATE PLANNING, COLLECTIVIZATION SPUR AGRICULTURAL DISASTER

Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 18 Jan 85 p 9

[Text] The agreement signed some days ago on the shipment of food from Ethiopia to Egypt has also been the topic of a discussion in the Federal Government. In a statement, the federal minister for economic cooperation pointed out that the Ethiopian-Egyptian trade agreement covers only products the domestic population does not consume at all or only to a small extent.

The products, traditional Ethiopian exports, include tropical fruit as well as coffee, meat and livestock, which the starving are unable to consume anyway. Rather, Ethiopia's starving population needs more milk products. This is also what the donor countries are focusing on in their food assistance, State Minister Alois Mertes of the Foreign Office said in parliament.

The catastrophic situation in Ethiopia can also be attributed to government policies which do their part in reducing the agricultural production by an annual average of 5 percent. After the monarchy was ousted in 1974, the large latifundia owned by the church and the imperial family were distributed among small farmers, each of whom received only a few hectares. The rest was combined either into state farms or agricultural production cooperatives. That is, although the land continues to be privately owned, the machinery is the property of the cooperative.

Only State Farms Are Being Supported

The official policy aims at promoting the state farms, which make up only about 4 percent of the cultivated land, at the expense of the other owners of land, by providing them with disproportionately large allotments of seeds, fertilizer and machinery as well as with generous credits. On the other hand, smaller projects that are of major importance to most farmers, e.g., irrigation ditches, small dams and silos, have been neglected up until now.

Most farmers, especially those in the remote provinces, produce only as much as they need for a living. They are not interested in selling their surplus at the extremely low prices set by the government. Only on the central high plateau, part of the crop can be sent to the cities. In addition, although 60 percent of the total area lends itself to cultivation, only 14 percent is actually farmed.

## Collectivization Continues

Apparently, the government is recognizing the mistakes it has made. The 1984/85-1993/94 ten-year plan published last year aims at promoting agriculture to an extent that would ensure food self-sufficiency by the end of the plan. Of total investments of \$15.6 billion, 22.5 percent are earmarked for the agricultural sector--industry will get 45.5 percent and trade and social services 11.6 percent.

The annual growth rate of agriculture is estimated at 4.3 percent (the planned annual growth rate of the gross domestic product is 6.5 percent, of which the agricultural share will decline from 48.3 percent in fiscal year 1983/84 to 39.1 percent by the end of the plan). The trend toward collectivization is planned to continue. In the early 1990's, state farms are expected to constitute 50 percent of the land under cultivation.

It is doubtful that the plan can be carried out in its present form. Economic experts believe that many goals have to be put on the back burner. For one thing, funding has not yet been clarified. Although the government is making attempts to attract foreign capital, the regime's pro-Soviet course is sure to deter Western investors.

In addition, the civil war in the north is eating up more than one third of all government spending. In fiscal year 1983/84, out of total expenditures of \$1.7 billion, some \$600 million had to be channeled into defense and national security. For the plan to be successful in the agricultural area, the drought would have to come to an end. Also, hopes to attain food self-sufficiency are being jeopardized by the large population growth rate of 2.8 percent per year.

7821

CSO: 3420/41

ETHIOPIA

BRIEFS

ETHIOPIA-DJIBOUTI TRADE PROTOCOL--Ethiopia and Djibouti have signed a trade protocol and cooperation agreement for development that will be effective throughout 1985, to further strengthen their existing trade relations. The two countries reached agreement on these common issues when Comrade Wole Chekol, Workers Party of Ethiopia Central Committee member and minister of external trade, completed his working visit to Djibouti. In his statement on arrival here, Comrade Wole pointed out that the cooperation agreements signed were based on the friendship and cooperation of the two countries and would contribute greatly to the development of their people, and will expand their developmental infrastructures. [Text] [Addis Ababa in Amharic to Neighboring Countries 1600 GMT 24 Apr 85 EA]

HUNGARIAN MEDICAL, COMMUNICATIONS AID--The Hungarian government has donated communications equipment worth 1 million birr to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission [RRC]. The Hungarian youth organization has also donated 21 cartons of medicine. The Hungarian government's gift was handed over to Comrade Dawit Wolde Giorgis, WPE [Workers Party of Ethiopia] Central Committee member and RRC commissioner, by Comrade Dr Gabor Nagy, Hungarian deputy foreign minister, while the donation from the Hungarian Youth Association was handed over by Comrade Getachew Roble, WPE Central Committee alternate member and chairman of the Revolutionary Ethiopia Youth Association. [Text] [Addis Ababa Domestic Service in Amharic 1600 GMT 26 Apr 85 EA]

CSO: 3400/94



GABON

#### ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGNERS ANALYZED

Dakar AFRICA in French Mar 85 pp 27-30

[Article by Jean-Pierre Challard: "Can We Get Along Without the Foreigners?"]

[Text] Precisely what had happened? In his colorful, direct language, speaking to soldiers used to cruder turns of speech, President Omar Bongo demanded that that corps, represented by Gen Andre Nzong, demonstrate more firmness, more vigilance and more vigor in order to compensate for laxity and corruption.

To the general astonishment, the speaker condemned the practices of maraboutism of West African nationals.

Little by little, the chief of state finally brought up the illegal activities of foreigners in Gabon. Small shops abound in the capital, owned by different foreigners, without any license fees or taxes being paid into the treasury.

"They are bleeding the Gabonese economy," the president exclaimed. He then reviewed the somewhat unorthodox practices resorted to by some businessmen to get rich by taking advantage of the lack of organization of the administrative departments.

It would appear that one phrase lit the powder keg: "The gendarmerie will be largely rewarded. Of all that you find, you will have 10 percent of the profit and of anything in the way of illicit dealings as well." It was a promise heard on television, published at length by the government daily L'UNION, and that did not fall on deaf ears.

#### Prostitution

In his long diatribe against the sordid and parasitic manifestations of the foreign colony in Gabon, President Bongo would one after the other turn his wrath on the beggars, criminals, prostitutes and dishonest merchants.

Unlike in Islamic countries where the *zaakat* (alms) is the duty of a good Muslim, begging did not exist in Gabon a few years ago. It is not part of the mentality of the Gabonese to beg for manioc or clothing for the simple reason that the country abounds in agricultural resources and that family and village solidarity is still very strong.

In his reflections condemning new urban mores, President Bongo then condemned prostitution, once limited to the parking lots of the big hotels. For a year or two, these "asphalt flowers" have been growing right downtown, outrageously made up, exposing their anatomy in extravagant getups, hailing passing cars at night as if appealing for help!

On the seashore, they are called "Katangaïses," probably because most are Zairian, but it was quickly noticed that the young Gabonese women were following the trend, reaping in the money with ease and in luxury. Whence the furor of Gabonese authorities and the warning freely given to the ambassadors of African countries that their nationals would be deported without further ado to other artificial paradises.

One of the speaker's digressions on the ladies of small virtue, addressed in barracks language ("five or six soldiers one after the other"), made the public shudder.

#### Lebanese

The Syrian-Lebanese community took the worst of it, as usual, in the comparisons with foreigners. They get rich too fast, "One wonders how," selling dresses more cheaply than in Paris and in building buildings. This time, the Middle Eastern businessmen did not flinch, preferring to interpret the incriminating phrases as lampoons aimed at the other communities.

President Bongo wondered why "one could find a Lebanese where a Gabonese should be selling tomatoes," those "who should be building buildings." In this connection, it is rightly noted that the Lebanese community now has 15 buildings and 350 houses and apartments. Such figures are impossible to verify because as wise businessmen, they do not talk about their wealth.

For his part, Madjed Rihaan does not conceal his success. He fled Lebanon in flames, selling all his property in order to invest in Gabon. He started with the Boulangerie de la Paix, a foot away from the tragic destiny of his country, toiling day and night, sinking into the bags of flour, overcome with fatigue and exhaustion, at dawn.

Pushed by a fierce determination to succeed, he worked like a mule for years, saving every penny. Then fortune knocked at his door. He opened a small supermarket in the Louis district and built a five-storey building (no elevator) in the same area, naming it after his daughter Linda.

He then put up (only?) a second building near the Nombakele district which he named after his second daughter Habiba. Greying at the temples, elegant and affable, he smokes Havana after Havana all day long, his way of proving his financial success. From time to time, he will throw a few million CFA francs into roulette at the casino, a way of forgetting the countless worries of his daily lot.

"I invested all my money in Gabon because I have confidence in this country," he will tell anyone who wants to hear him, convinced that he has a place in Gabon.

Never has he thought that he is taking the place of a Gabonese merchant because the economy is liberal and competitive, because any hard worker will find his place in the sun.

Hassan Choucair recalls that 33 years ago, "there were only about 20 Lebanese with our wives, children and baggage." In 1985, there are at least 600 Lebanese nationals who engage in all manner of activities: retail or wholesale merchants, doctors, teachers, engineers, haulers.

His father had land in Lebanon. Nor did his family emigrate empty-handed to Gabon. One often forgets to say so, they complain. But what do the Lebanese do to get rich so systematically and so rapidly?

Is it true that the Lebanese smuggle their goods through the port, without paying duty? Hassan Choucair frowns: "Even a mouse cannot get out of the port without paying," he says drolly, "the control is so strict now."

But what about the customs fraud in 1979? Naturally, that Gabonese by birth says smiling, there are bad apples in any nationality. Four merchants were kicked out of Gabon after the affair, including Daher, Mrouet and Chaban. "Four out of 600!" clarifies Hassan Choucair. Actually, there were more, if one considers the whole brood surrounding every head of household.

It would appear that there is now a committee of surveillance to keep all fellow countrymen on the right path. "You are ruining our reputation," they spit at the guilty party before taking coercive measures against his activities. If need be, he is denounced outright to the Gabonese authorities to get rid of him!

A television technician, Loutfi Farran explains the way the Lebanese get rich, how his brothers manage to sell at a lower cost than the European and even African stores.

The European who establishes residency, he begins his exposition, needs an air-conditioned car to get around, a spacious villa for his family. He pays a European cashier to distribute and collect his bills. He hires a chauffeur-delivery man to haul his goods. He pays servants at home and at the store. He goes to spend his money in France at least twice a year.

"We Lebanese do all those operations ourselves," he says. In other words, the boss himself goes to bed at midnight and gets up at 6:00 in the morning. At the same time, the wife cares for the children, does the cooking and the housework. As soon as there are profits, the Lebanese builds four walls and a roof to house his store, warehouse, garage and finally, his apartment. He pays no rent. It is really elementary....

#### Gabonization

In the Lebanese circuit, there are no wages to pay; only a few unskilled African laborers. Purchases are made directly by telex, from manufacturers or embassies. Contact with the plant makes it possible to obtain wholesale, rock-bottom prices. Transport, insurance, duties, sales: Every phase is carefully watched to cut

costs. Thus, the lowliest product goes to the consumer at the lowest price compared with that of competitors.

The second event, which began on 4 February 1985 and ended on 8 February, was more peaceful, more intellectual, stricter. Actually, the colloquium on the Gabonization of jobs tried to provide a response to that vast uncertainty: How can one control the entire production apparatus and jobs? How can one do without foreigners without endangering the country's economy? How and in what proportion is this "cultural and technological revolution" conceivable?

For Minister Jules Bourdes Ogouliguende (Higher Education and Scientific Research), who presided over the opening session of the colloquium, "replacing the foreign workers who help make up for our shortage of qualified personnel, must be only temporary.

"Unfortunately, one has to observe that this effort has not been accompanied by the planned replacement and instead of being limited in time, the use of foreign labor has continued and even increased as the years have passed."

This former minister of labor and employment, who knows his subject matter inside and out, concludes that there is an unemployment of nationals that benefits foreigners, "proving the bad will of certain employers," who constantly increase their often exaggerated demands for diplomas, certificates and professional references.

An order of April 1981, recalls Bourdes Ogouliguende, nevertheless proclaimed Gabonization as an essential part of the policy of economic and social development. He thus explains the spirit of the letter: "It is not the expression of any egoism, xenophobia or micronationalism. It is rather the normal and inevitable conception of officials whose unavoidable duty it is to serve the higher interests of their people."

This continuing concern of Gabonese officials for eradicating the accusation of racism and xenophobia is a leitmotiv. In his speech, Minister Jean-Francois Ntoutoume Emame (Commerce and Consumption) states: "It is in no way a matter of the pure and simple substitution of Gabonese for foreigners, which would be a simplistic and unrealistic creation marked by racism."

For Ntoutoume Emame, it is better to speak of a "contract of trust between the state and investors in order to ensure the training and integration of nationals at all levels of the country's economic life."

In this context, what is the role befalling foreigners and what is the future of their investments? The following paragraphs taken from the minister's speech shed unequivocal light on those zones of darkness, if there are any. After defining nationalization, he is more explicit:

"Nationalization is the foundation of a socialist or collectivist regime. Such is not the case of Gabon.... Democratic and concerted progressivism tries, on the contrary, to stimulate productivity and institute social justice. Even at the height of what Gabonese leaders labeled "uncontrolled capitalism," any idea of nationalization was firmly discarded and condemned.

However, Ntoutoume Emane quickly adds, "an increase in the productivity of enterprises in our country brought about an increase in profits, which are massively transferred abroad because of the great amount of exogenous labor used."

Membership in the franc zone promotes such transfers across the borders and the investment code also legally authorizes such transfers of funds. But, the speaker said, "such a drain is harmful to the national economy in medium-range and long-range terms. It runs counter to our efforts aimed at mobilizing local savings that is indispensable to investment."

#### Imbalances

And yet, one must not throw all the blame on the foreigners. It is a secret to no one that many wealthy Gabonese send their monies to other safer havens, to investments guaranteed of longevity and security, to such an extent that the chief of state urged prominent officials to build and invest in their native provinces first.

Some wealthy persons, responding to that presidential address, put nearly all of their assets in schools, restaurants, record stores, hotels. Others are buying into partnerships in fishing boats, airline companies, businesses, computer firms.

Gabonese legislation has made the status of government employee and that of merchant compatible so that the creation of a class of Gabonese entrepreneurs will be encouraged. Whence the creation of a ministry for small and medium-size enterprises.

Far from throwing out foreign businessmen, Gabonese legislation tries to encourage joint ventures, partnerships in which the entrepreneur, the artisan and national manufacturer can learn from contact with the expatriate partner. For this purpose, one can scarcely do without foreigners.

Furthermore, if one is to believe Fabien Ombouma, high commissioner to the minister of professional training and promotion of handicrafts, the expatriates have a fine future ahead of them because of flagrant imbalances on the Gabonese labor market.

A plethora of persons trained for administrative careers, a shortage of technical personnel, low skills levels, the absence of nationals in the crafts (bakers, mechanics, shoemakers, carpenters, and so on), a lack of initiative and even interest in business management on the part of fellow countrymen.

It is this long-range task that will be tackled by the Ministry of Professional Training: ensuring gradual and specific substitution in fields previously abandoned by the Gabonese. An increase in the number of training centers, such as the new Basile Ondimba in Libreville, will fill that structural gap.

President of the National Council of Gabonese Employers, Dr Eloi Rahandi Chambrier has a private clinic that he set up with his own hands while holding political office previously. In his practice are many expatriate specialists and doctors. In his entourage work both African and European aides.

"There is no future in the modern world for a country living as an autarchy or in splendid isolation. Gabon, following the example of other developed or developing countries, is working to master its economy, the sine qua non condition of its independence."

Based on these two ideas, while realizing the weight of expatriates in the economic activity of Gabon, one should "gradually replace expatriate workers and upper-level personnel by nationals, based on their training and competence."

In this "deliberate approach, Gabonization is not the egotistical expression of a xenophobic reflex, but rather, an essential factor of development, balance and harmony between the different communities that make the prosperity of Gabon."

#### Denigration

President of the Gabonese Trade Union Confederation COSYGA), Martin Allini protests "outward Gabonization," a practice that results in the creation of double posts while preserving the reality of responsibilities of expatriates, who either become technical advisers, charges de mission or representatives.

Within such a context, he says, the Gabonese framework engenders scorn, insubordination and disobedience. Sometimes, instead of training his counterpart, the expatriate engages in campaigns of denigration to form the image of the other as incompetent and irresponsible.

What do the expatriates think of their future in Gabon? "A country belongs to its natives," one French technical adviser to a ministry unhesitatingly replies.

"Foreigners who are not indispensable must leave the country," he adds. "Furthermore, there are no jobs. The Gabonese have to accept the jobs of street sweepers, divers, and so on."

Another French national, a merchant who has spent a third of a century in Gabon, is happy with the more friendly than professional relations he has formed with the Gabonese community. No one questions his presence and his business is going well, but, he warns, the Gabonese has difficulty fraternizing and is reticent when he does not know the other.

This is confirmed by Minister Alexandre Sambat (Employment and Labor). "No country is self-sufficient in terms of the active population," he says.

"Gabon, involved in a race for development, is seeking knowledge, technology and experience. We have never campaigned against foreigners. We have only specified that when a post can be filled by a Gabonese, we must Gabonize." Given equal competency, the post must naturally go to a national.

#### How Many Foreigners?

How many foreigners are now living in Gabon? Statistics are very imprecise in this domain. In 1983, Gabonese authorities estimated that the foreign population totaled some 72,600 persons, distributed as follows:

Equatorial Guineans, 25,000; French, 22,000; Cameroonians, 23,000; Nigerians, 9,600; Togolese, 8,700; Beninois, 8,300; Malians, 6,300; and Senegalese, 5,400.

A simple calculation shows that the total already exceeds 108,300, when the official total shows only 72,600 immigrants. But there are no clear criteria between refugees and immigrants, temporary and permanent residents. The General Delegation for Refugees, in reporting its estimates to the High Commission on Refugees (United Nations), listed 60,000 Equatorial Guinean refugees before the coup d'etat of 4 August 1979 that ousted Macias Nguema. What is the real situation today? No one can say precisely.

It would appear that only the French nationals have precise figures. According to Consul General Jean Gallon, the number of French officially registered on 1 January 1985 is 15,563 for all Gabon except Port-Gentil. For that city, the figure is put at approximately 4,400 persons, which represents a substantial drop in the French population.

Between 1983 and 1984 alone, says Gallon, there is a statistical gap of 1,500 French children who left Gabon, while the last French prisoner left prison on Saturday, 9 February 1985, after serving his sentence.

The number of American citizens is growing with the establishment of Amoco, an oil company, and unlike those who came to Gabon before, the new arrivals never ask the question of whether Gabon can get along without them.

11,464

CSO: 3419/363

GUINEA

FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR POSSIBLE IRON ORE MINING

AB221225 Paris AFP in English 0751 GMT 20 Apr 85

[Text] Monrovia, 20 April (AFP)--A feasibility study on developing iron ore deposits on the Guinean side of Mount Nimba is expected to be completed in June, World Bank officials said here Friday. The 500,000-dollar study, co-financed by the World Bank, will examine ways of sustaining production by Liberian American Swedish Minerals Company (Lmco) on the Liberian side, as well as the cost of investing in a new mine for Guinea's Societe des Mines de Fer de Guinee Pour l'Exploitation de Mont Nimba (Mifergui-Nimba).

The study, which analyzes three possibilities, involves the combined production from Lamco and Mifergui. The first of these is a continuation of Lamco's production of 8 million tonnes a year with New Guinean production [word indistinct] million tonnes, while the second puts Guinean production at 8 million tonnes and Liberian at 6 million. The third possibility is a smaller operation which envisages production of 6 million and 3 million tonnes for Liberia and Guinea respectively. Guinea will be using Lamco's existing railway and port infrastructure in Liberia for mining of its ore.

According to the officials, Lamco will sustain its annual 8-million-tonne production level until the end of 1989 following renewed production at the Teokadeh mine at Nimba which made an operational profit of 50 million dollars last year. However, after 1989, a substantial new investment will be needed to continue production.

Preliminary results of the study put the cost of developing new facilities for an annual production of 14 million tonnes at [word indistinct] million dollars.

On 1 April this year, the National Iron Ore Company (NIOC) mine on the Mano River, near the border with Sierra Leone, was shut down due to lack of buyers. The mine's output of low-grade ore for speciality steels was believed too uneconomic in the face of recent technological break-throughs.

The company, which is 85 percent state-owned, 5 percent by the local Liberian Mining Company (LMC) and 10 percent by private U.S. and Liberian interests, embarked on a 200-million-dollar rehabilitation programme in 1983 to raise production from 1.75 million to 3.25 million tonnes a year. The work was completed in 1984 by the Canadian firm Met-Chem, a subsidiary of United States Steel. At the moment, Mifergui and Lamco, both 50 percent state-owned, have potential ore buyers in Africa, Romania, Spain, Yugoslavia and Japan.



GUINEA-BISSAU

BRIEFS

FINANCIAL BACKERS END MEETING--Bissau, 19 April (AFP)--Nearly half of the 20 priority projects presented by Guinea-Bissau to financial backers, and for which no finances have been found up till now, have been approved, it was learned Thursday night from informed sources after the Bissau roundtable conference. These priority projects, which range from rehabilitation of health centers to mineral exploration, forestry and fishing as well as food processing industries, are contained in the 1983-86 4-year development plan of Guinea-Bissau. The total amount involved in financing these projects is estimated at \$21.1 million, it was learned from the same sources. The financial backers also agreed to supply the additional \$61.6 million needed by the Guinea-Bissau authorities to finance other projects that have been partially financed. Guinea-Bissau's financial backers demanded that the economic and financial stabilization program currently going on in the country, should be continued for a few more years in order to consolidate the results already obtained. Bartolomeu Simons Pereira, Guinea-Bissau's minister of economic coordination, planning and international cooperation, said the positive results obtained at the roundtable conference constitutes a sign of Guinea-Bissau's credibility "Through its efforts and sacrifices," in the eyes of the international community. [Text] [Paris AFP in French 1050 GMT 19 Apr 85 AB]

CSO: 3400/62

KENYA

ALLEGATIONS, ACCUSATIONS AGAINST M'MBIJJEWE CONTINUE

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 12 Apr 85 pp 14-15

[Text]

MORE allegations were made against the beleaguered minister for health, Mr. Gilbert Kabeere M'Mbijjewe, in parliament last week. Two Meru MPs, Mr. Mathew Karauri (Nyambene South) and Mr. Julius Muthamia, (Meru South West) without naming him directly, accused M'Mbijjewe of having influenced the nomination of six out of eight Meru county councillors from his constituency after the 1983 general elections. The two MPs, who were contributing to a motion tabled by the minister for local government, Mr. Moses Mudavadi, said in future the minister should ensure that councillors were nominated equitably from as many constituencies as possible. They said of the eight councillors nominated to the Meru County Council in 1983, six were from M'Mbijjewe's Meru Central constituency. Consequently, they argued, the loyalty of the six councillors should be expected to be to the person who influenced their nomination and not to the council or the government through the DC, who usually makes recommendations on council nominations. Mudavadi, who was in the house when the two MPs made the allegations made no response.

Another allegation made against M'Mbijjewe by Muthamia was that the minister had approached Mudavadi with a view to having the Meru County Council dissolved when the council declined to approve a request from M'Mbijjewe for the allocation of 26,000 acres of land in the district. Muthamia

claimed that there was written evidence to the effect that M'Mbijjewe had approached Mudavadi with the recommendation of the council to be dissolved but when the MP for Meru North West, who is the Meru Kanu branch chairman, Mr. Jackson Angaine, and other Meru leaders petitioned the minister (Mudavadi) over the recommended dissolution, the idea was dropped. Again Mudavadi who was in the house refrained from telling the house whether or not M'Mbijjewe had approached him with a recommendation to dissolve the Meru County Council. It is in record that sometimes in 1982/83, the council was reported as having been placed under a committee to investigate its affairs, but the investigating committee was recalled even before it had started the investigations.

The charge in parliament that M'Mbijjewe wanted the council dissolved and placed under a commission comes in the wake of reports from Meru that a prominent Meru leader, who has so far not been named, had illegally allocated himself 26,000 acres of land and was demanding those living in the land to vacate it. The chairman of the council, Mr. Eliphas Njue, who was the origin of the reports, was reported in the March 17 edition of *The Sunday Nation* as having said that although the land in question was trust land under his council, it was "grabbed" without the council's consent. Njue told a Kanu rally that the land was in Igembe

Division at Antubetwe Kiongo Location and the prominent leader had flown to the location in a plane following which he ordered survey beacons to be placed around the area he acquired. The MPs and councillors who attended the rally pledged to ensure that no one was evicted from the land. A council meeting was subsequently convened to discuss the issue and it was resolved that the council should oppose the acquisition. According to the county council clerk, Mr. Cornelius Mawira, the council has not received any application for the lease of the land which falls under five co-operative grazing schemes, leave alone ever having discussed its acquisition by an individual.

The allegations about the nomination of councillors and the 26,000 acres of land are part of the series of what M'Mbijewe views as a campaign by the six Meru MPs, led by Angaine, to tarnish his

reputation in the district as well as nationally with a view to eventually having him removed from Kanu and dismissed as a minister. Only last week, the minister had to make a lengthy statement in parliament to exonerate himself from allegations that he had been bribed with shs.2.4 million in order to award a tender for the supply of drugs to a Nairobi pharmaceutical manufacturing company. The six Meru MPs have supported Angaine in his bid to have M'Mbijewe ousted from the party and have pledged to have Angaine elected Kanu branch chairman for life. Although differences between Angaine and M'Mbijewe have been simmering since the 1983 elections, they became worse early this year when M'Mbijewe declared that he would oppose Angaine for the Meru branch Kanu chairmanship. ■

CSO: 3400/049

KENYA

EDITOR CALLS FOR SOLUTION IN SOUTH SUDAN

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 12 Apr 85 p 1

[Letter from the Editor by Hilary Ng'weno]

[Text]

LAST week's ouster from power of President Gaafar Numeiry of Sudan came as no surprise to observers of the Sudanese scene. General Numeiry had developed an untenable policy of confrontation with virtually all groups that mattered in the country. In the South he was conducting an unnecessary civil war against black Sudanese fighting for a constitutionally guaranteed autonomy which Numeiry had swept aside. In the North, Numeiry was at loggerheads with intellectuals and professionals as well as Muslim fundamentalists, the latter despite his introduction of the Sharia law and promulgation of Sudan as an Islamic republic. The only group which seemed to support Numeiry was the army, and even they turned against him when the only choice they had was to shoot upon thousands of demonstrators calling for Numeiry's resignation in the wake of International Monetary Fund-imposed economic strictures that sent prices of essential commodities soaring overnight. For many Sudanese, Numeiry's departure must have been received with relief and the new government's pledge to return the country to democracy is most welcome. But such pledges are easy to make in the euphoria that often follows coups against unpopular regimes. The real test will come later when the new regime is forced to deal with the implications of its pledge. Then there may be the usual pretexes for postponing a return to civil and democratic rule. Such a development would be most catastrophic for Sudan. In particular, it is important for the new regime to address itself swiftly to the festering wound in the South. That civil war must be brought to an end now, and an honourable and permanent arrangement worked out for ensuring that the people of southern Sudan are integrated into Sudanese national life and given a meaningful opportunity to share both in the burdens as well as the benefits of a truly united Sudan..

*Hilary Ng'weno  
Editor-in-Chief*

CSO: 3400/050

KENYA

## MOI EXTENDS PARTY MEMBERSHIP DRIVE BY ANOTHER MONTH

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 5 Apr 85 p 9

[Text]

AS March came to a close, there were no signs that the Kanu membership recruitment drive would end as scheduled. The secretary general of the ruling party, Mr. Robert Matano, had announced that the drive would take three months after which the date of elections would be set but the various Kanu branches in the country were still busy calling on members of the public to register even when there was only one week left. President Daniel arap Moi gave the first hint that the recruitment period may be extended when with only a week to go, he called for an intensification of the drive. The president said that the drive was going at a rather slow place and directed that there should be a full scale mobilisation of the provincial administration, Kanu officials, politicians and the other leaders for the exercise. He made no mention of the deadline and by saying that other development projects would not be given priority until the drive was completed, stopped short of saying that the drive would go on.

He confirmed this expectation last week when he extended the recruitment period by one month. The president was officiating at the graduation ceremony of

General Service Unit (GSU) policemen on Friday when he announced that he was extending the period to give the public time to plant crops during the current rains. Many district branches must have welcomed the decision. Only a few days earlier, the Kitui branch had appealed to the party headquarters to extend the period on the grounds that the public needed more time to register and be educated on the role of the party. A stronger reason may, however, be found in the disclosure by the branch chairman, Mr. Kitili Mwendwa, that the branch had registered 56,000 members of the 160,000 membership target. That is less than half of the target and there is no doubt that many other branches may feel that their registration performances have been unsatisfactory.

The reason President Moi gave for the extension was that people needed to be given time to plant, which means that the exercise may slow down for a while. This could make it harder for some districts to meet their targets before the end of this month, though some observers feel that the targets should not dictate the duration of the exercise since the main issue is for the country to hold the long overdue party elections as soon as possible. ■

CSO: 3400/050

KENYA

## MPS DISCUSS 'FOREIGNER' ROLE

### Favoritism in Land Alleged

Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 11 Apr 85 p 5

[Text] The Ministry of Lands and Settlement was accused of favouring some foreigners by issuing them land and property leases to the disadvantage of the indigenous wananchi.

The Ministry of Health will assist Nduru Health centre acquire land for further expansion subject to the need to expand the centre and the availability of funds.

Giving the assurance yesterday, the Minister for Health, Mr Kabeere M'Mbijjewe said at present there was no immediate need to acquire some of the land bordering it for expansion.

He was answering South Mugirango/Wanjare MP Mr Reuben Oyondi who wanted to know whether the ministry will help the health centre and if so when.

Mr James Mbori (Kasipul Kabondo) said it was shameful to allow such a thing to happen in Kenya 20 years after independence.

The members was contributing to a motion urging the government to introduce a crash programme to survey, demarcate and issue title deeds to all unsurveyed land and that all markets and towns be surveyed and plot titles deeds issued.

Mbori cited Oyugis market where the Asians owning property have been issued with leases but the Africans had not.

Urging the ministry of lands and settlement to keep up with the times, the member said land ownership was a very sensitive issue.

Failure to issue title deeds or leases will retard the pace of development as financial institutions readily accepted title deeds as security for loans, the MP said.

Contributing to the motion, Lurambi North MP Mr Joshua Angatia said the sooner the demarcation was done, the better so that title deeds can be issued to land owners.

He urged the ministry to speed up the demarcation exercise.

### 'Force Foreigners To Sell Shares'

Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 11 Apr 85 p 5

[Excerpt] An Assistant Minister for Environment and Natural Resources, Mr Martin Shikuku, called on the Minister for Commerce and Industry to introduce a bill forcing foreign companies to sell shares to local people.

Referring to the House of Manji, Shikuku said that proprietors had promised during the official opening of the factory in 1980 that they would allow wananchi to buy some shares in the company.

He recalled President Daniel arap Moi had thanked the company and said he hoped it would not be necessary for the government to introduce a law forcing them to open doors to those willing to buy its shares.

He wondered why it had taken Kenya 22 years after independence to buy shares from these companies.

CSO: 3400/048

14 May 1985

KENYA

## STUDENT LEADER MWANDAWIRO SENTENCED

Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 10 Apr 85 pp 1, 22

[Article by Edward Rihnaa]

[Text]

**A FORMER University of Nairobi student leader, Julius Mwandawiro Mghanga, was yesterday sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment by a Nairobi court for convening four illegal meetings at the university's, Great Court and the university's sports ground.**

Mwandawiro was also fined shs. 5,000 or serve two months' imprisonment in default for taking part in an unlawful assembly on February 10, at the university sports ground.

Three other students, Mohamed Khamis Mazrui, Evans Motende Gefenga and Harry Maina Ndigirigi who were jointly charged with taking part in an unlawful assembly were also fined shs. 5,000 each or serve two months' imprisonment in default.

Patrick Litunya Lumumba, a dental student who was also jointly charged with the others with taking part in an unlawful assembly and failing to disperse from an unlawful assembly was acquitted by the senior resident magistrate, Mr. S. E. O. Bosire, for lack of evidence to support conviction.

All the convicted students were acquitted on charges of failing to disperse and refusing to obey police order to do so.

After convicting the accused, the magistrate said the background leading to the present prosecution case was outlined in the judgment.

He said the consequences of the events have not been outlined by the prosecution. Bosire said after the events of February 10, the University of Nairobi was closed indefinitely.

He said the closure of the university has led to a loss of both valuable time and pecuniary loss to the government as lecturers had to continue to earn their salaries since it was not their fault the campus was closed.

Bosire said in sentencing the accused he will deal with two categories. He said as regards Mwandawiro, he (Mwandawiro), incited other students to boycott lectures for he had been expelled and was unlawfully present at the university seeking support from other students.

Bosire said those were circumstances which showed that had it not been for his involvement, perhaps the students would not have boycotted lectures.

He said Mwandawiro had one previous conviction of illegally wearing an army uniform although the previous conviction was not directly relevant.

The magistrate said he had noted the mitigating factors put to the court by the defence counsel asking for a non-custodial sentence but ruled against them.



Boire said that taking all the facts and circumstances into account he had sentenced Mwandawiro to serve 12 months' jail on four charges of convening an illegal meeting at the university campus and university sports ground.

He ordered the sentences to run concurrently. He further fined him shs. 5,000 or two months' jail in default for taking part in an unlawful assembly.

In regard to Mazrui, Getenga and Ndigirigi, the magistrate said their role in the meeting held on February 10, was minimal. He added that they had been in custody for two months and believed that they had learnt a lesson.

The magistrate said a custodial sentence in the circumstances of the case regarding each of them would be "too harsh".

Mr. B. M. Mbai for Mwandawiro told the court that his

client was married with two young children. He said his father died in 1967 and left him with four brothers and two sisters. He added that the family was awaiting Mwandawiro to finish his studies.

Mbai said by the time Mwandawiro had been expelled from the university he had spent 18 years in school. He said it had been borne from the evidence that vice-chancellor Prof. Mungai and Prof. Mbithi were not in the office from the time Mwandawiro was expelled and had gone to the university to confirm his expulsion.

He said his client was remorseful and urged the court to give a non-custodial sentence.

Mr. Moses Wetangula for Mazrui told the court that his client committed the offence out of anxiety and had gone to the sports ground to hear the

address by Prof. Mungai.

He said Mazrui was a strict Muslim who prayed five times a day and asked the court to give him non-custodial sentence saying he had been in custody for two months.

Mr. Murtaza Jaffer for Ndigirigi told the court that his client was the second son in a large family. He asked the court to give him a non-custodial sentence saying Ndigirigi had been in custody for two months.

Mr. Charles Okari O'Nyamwamu for Getenga told the court in mitigation that his client was a second year law student at the University of Nairobi and that he comes from a home where he is a first born.

He said his father is married to three wives and has five brothers and four sisters. O'Nyamwamu said Getenga's father is aged and looked upon him to support the family.

KENYA

## WORK PERMITS REQUIRED FOR PROFESSIONAL EXPATRIATES

Nairobi THE WEEKLY REVIEW in English 12 Apr 85 p 15

[Text]

THE ninety-day period, which the minister for state in the office of the president, Mr. Justus ole Tipis, gave certain non-citizens of Kenya in specified professions to apply for entry or work permits expired on Wednesday. According to legal notice number 12 of January 10, 1985, the minister revoked section 18 of the immigration act which exempted foreigners in some professions from applying for work permits and gave them 90 days within which to apply for them. Most of the affected professionals are foreigners resident in Kenya since the 1940's and 1950's who qualified as permanent residents and were therefore exempted from applying for entry permits (otherwise known as work permits) by section 18 of the immigration act because of their professions. The majority of the affected foreigners are working in long established legal, accountancy and auditing firms which are majority foreign owned.

According to the schedule published in the legal notice, the affected professions include: the architectural industry, with its attendant architects, planners, engineers, draughtsmen, and quantity surveyors; the legal profession, including law clerks, advocates, executive officers and office managers working in law firms;

the accountancy profession including all accountants, chartered or certified, auditors, audit supervisors, tax consultants and financial controllers; the engineering profession, including all categories of engineers and supervisors in the profession; all commercial artists, graphic designers and cinema owners; the farming industry including farmers, all types of growers, wholesalers, retailers, importers and exporters of agricultural produce; the import-export industry and the general traders, dealers in optical, electrical and electronic instruments, including laboratory and scientific equipment and related professions.

One profession that members of parliament have been critical of for employing foreigners is the legal profession. As late as at the close of the last session of parliament, MPs were taking the attorney general to task demanding to know how many foreign advocates were registered to practice in Kenya. The feeling among local legal practitioners is that long-established but foreign-owned legal firms have the lion's share of the legal business in the country. Most foreign-owned legal firms have expatriates who have practiced in the country for many years as partners and locally incorporated legal firms would like their licenses cancelled in

order to create room for them. Indeed, since the establishment of the faculty of law at the University of Nairobi and the School of Law, many Kenyans feel there is no case for the continued licensing of foreign lawyers to practise in Kenya because many lawyers, some of whom find it difficult to get good employment have been trained at the school and at the university. The same sentiments are expressed when it comes to the licensing of foreign accountants and auditors since Kenyan auditors and accountants, have been trained at the University of Nairobi while many others have successfully completed the Certified Public Accountants (CPA) examinations.

The order by Tipis for the foreign professionals to apply for work permits, according to the principal immigration officer, Mr. Milton ole Ncharo, was a move to monitor and make an accurate census of expatriates in the country.. Whether it will lead to more Africanisation of the professions remains to be seen. ■

CSO: 3400/049

KENYA

BRIEFS

RAINS WASH BRIDGES AWAY--Several bridges in Macalder division of South Nyanza district have been washed away following torrential rains in the area. Dozens of roads connecting major trading centres have been rendered impassable. The main road connecting Firibe, Bande, Othoo and Migori township is now impassable after Adela bridge was swept away.--KNA [Text] [Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 11 Apr 85 p 3]

BORDER TALKS WITH ETHIOPIA--Addis Ababa, Thursday--Kenyan and Ethiopian border officials have held two days of talks in the southern Ethiopian town of Neghele to boost cooperation in border control and to curb illegal cross-border traffic and smuggling, according to reports here last night. The official Ethiopian News Agency said the talks were held from Tuesday between the commissioners of Kenya's Mandera and Wajir districts and officials of Ethiopia's Borena sub-province. The officials also discussed identity cards carried by nationals of both countries, the reports added, without going into details on the extent of the problems relating to cross-border traffic or smuggling. (AFP) [Text] [Nairobi DAILY NATION in English 5 Apr 85 p 8]

MYSYOKA WINS KITUI SEAT--Mr Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka was on Tuesday night elected MP for Kitui North. Musyoka, 31, and a lawyer polled 12,736 votes, defeating other two contestants Mr Justus Mulei Vele, who received 7,037 votes and Dr Justus Kitonga who managed 3,331 votes, 473 ballot papers were spoilt. 23,847 votes representing 32 percent of the 74,277 registered voters were cast. Announcing the results, Kitui District Commissioner Mr Justmore Maghasi, who was the returning officer, hailed the manner in which candidates and their supporters conducted themselves. Maghasi, who had earlier inspected polling in several stations said it was gratifying to note that not a single incident of misconduct was reported since campaign started. In an interview with KNA at Mutonguni polling station, Maghasi observed that the orderly manner in which wananchi behaved was a sign of political maturity, adding that democracy had prevailed throughout the exercise. The DC thanked all election officials for their dedication which contributed to the success of the by-election. [By Charles Kulundu and KNA] [Text-] [Nairobi THE KENYA TIMES in English 11 Apr 85 p 1]

CSO: 3400/051

14 May 1985

LESOTHO

## RADIO COMMENTARY HAILS RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA

MB242010 Maseru Domestic Service in English 1600 GMT 24 Apr 85

[Station commentary: "Focus on Lesotho-Romanian Relations?"]

[Text] Last week a five-man delegation from the People's Republic of Romania arrived at Leabua Jonathan International Airport on a mission to Lesotho. The objective of the mission was to exchange views with senior officials of this kingdom on various aspects of development relations between the two countries.

Diplomatic relations between Lesotho and Romania are particularly warm and are a translation of an essence between two countries in the Eastern Bloc and a country in the tip of Southern Africa [as heard]. Development cooperation between two countries are essentially an expression of uniform subscription to perceptions on major international issues and an affirmation of common outlook on strategies for the development of the betterment of the human condition.

Lesotho and Romania are both relatively small countries with limited resources. That notwithstanding, they share an identity of perspectives about the best ways of developing their economies. It is on this basis that bridges which are viable have been forged between the peoples of the two countries, and healthy contacts established between the governments of Lesotho and Romania.

Distance has been shortened between Romania, on the fringes of the Eastern Bloc, and Lesotho, in the eastern perimeters of Southern Africa. At the level of relations between heads of government, the right honorable the prime minister, Dr Leabua Jonathan, has established cordial and personal relationships with President Nicolae Ceausescu. To give concrete form to personal relationships with President Nicolae Ceausescu. To give concrete form to personal relations, students of this kingdom have found places in Romanian academic institutions, and there is clear evidence that prospects are present for enhancing friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

In previous commentaries over Radio Lesotho we have forecast on increasing friendship between Lesotho and various countries in Africa, in Europe, in the Americas, in Asia, and in the Middle East.

The objective of Motlotlehi's government in diplomatic relations is to seek friends and not create enemies. A situation that confronts Lesotho demands

that Basotho should broaden relations with as many nations as possible. The requirements that have been dictated for Lesotho by history and by geographical situation have set an agenda that every government in Lesotho of whatever political direction can ill afford to ignore.

Lesotho is a nonaligned country that does not pursue any ideology. True, Lesotho is neither a communist country nor a purely capitalist one. The nation has its own traditions and customs. Basotho believes in certain freedoms and liberties. The nation has set limits on obsession about commitments to pursue about advancing purely ideological objectives. That having been said, Lesotho does not seek quarrels with other nations solely on the grounds of opposing political perceptions. Lesotho does not seek friends purely because of ideological attractions.

What the nation has sought is to make friends in both the capitalist, the non-aligned, and the communist world, quite simply because the current status of the international community represents all these worlds. It would be shortsighted to pretend that there is a homogeneity of political view in the world. It would be an [word indistinct] of absurdity to pretend that in today's world of interdependence countries can afford to ignore each other and one another simply because of differences in political outlook.

For small countries in particular, the best defense against the vagaries of poverty and underdevelopment is expansion of friendship and membership of international organizations. This is intended to provide a preface to relations with Romania. There are a series of agreements that have been entered into between the two governments that lend substance to the policies of Motlotlehi's government and friendship between the peoples of the two countries. The nation should know that Basotho should give meaning to development cooperation between Lesotho and Romania.

There are three basic agreements which the Romania delegation visited Lesotho to discuss with government officials with a view to their implementation. The first agreement deals with economic, industrial, and technical cooperation and provides for collaboration in agriculture, industry, geology, mining, oil, power and other industrial ventures.

Another agreement on technical cooperation is in the field of agriculture, food industry, and forestry, and in terms of the agreement Romania has agreed to assist Lesotho in the improvement of crop husbandry relating to maize, wheat, sunflower, and other crops; the creation of mechanization centers to service the agricultural sector; poultry development to give [word indistinct] to production and processing, and encourage hatcheries, rearing plants, [word indistinct] plants, improvement of egg circles, and technical assistance to livestock-poultry division; the development of the forestry sector and the development of various agro-industries such as canning plants, maize flour mills, sunflower oil plants, grain storage and silos, and animal feed plants.

An additional protocol on trade exchanges provides for Romanian sale to Lesotho of cars, tractors, micro buses, and building materials, and the purchase of Lesotho raw skins, wool, and mohair.

These [word indistinct] of development cooperation between Bucharest and Maseru reflects the forward looking policy of Motlotlehi's government in the promotion of Lesotho's interests and in strengthening friendship between Basotho and other peoples.

Above all these concrete relations between Lesotho and other states are an eloquent testimony of a leadership that is enlightened and bears the mark of statemanship. Lesotho is fortunate that it has leaders that are sensitive to the demands of the country and its people. This nation should be proud that its leaders do not set ceilings on capacity to make friends for Lesotho, and that there are no political or ideological thresholds or barriers on expansion of relations with other states.

CSO: 3400/61

LESOTHO

LEABUA JONATHAN ASSURES KING OF SUPPORT

Lesotho WEEKLY in English 15 Mar 85 p 1

[Text] King Moshoeshe II has been assured of Basotho's allegiance and continued confidence in the throne as it has guaranteed their freedom of worship and customs.

The assurance was made by the Prime Minister, Dr Leabua Johathan in Maseru on March 12, at the celebrations to mark the 25th year of King Moshoeshe II's ascension to the throne.

"We will always respect the throne inspite of our petty political differences," he said.

He said that as long as His Majesty keeps his distance from the political rubble, Basotho will remain a happy people as his intervention would be needed in cases where the laws of the country are not respected.

Dr. Jonathan asked the nation to continue praying for the health and prosperity of the Royal family.

Referring to King Moshoeshe I, the Prime Minister said if he had the religious authority he would refer to him as a saint,

because of what he had done to mould the Basotho nation into what it is today. He asked King Moshoeshe II to safeguard the religious heritage of Basotho.

Later that day a prayer service was held at Matsieng conducted by various church leaders in the country.

In their message the church leaders recalled the great deeds of King Moshoeshe I "who was never proud or arrogant towards his subjects, never stiffly unyielding in his negotiations with foreigners."

They recalled how he had never permitted anyone to be put to death

even for the most serious crimes, remarking that the death of a murderer would not restore the life of his victim.

The church leaders implored all who wield power in the country, in the service or in opposition to the government, to bear the examples of Moshoeshe constantly in their minds.

They expressed the hope that legislators will give consideration to Moshoeshe's attitude towards the death sentence.

The church service was attended by chiefs, ministers and christians from various church denominations.

CSO: 3400/53



LESOTHO

PAC REJECTS CLAIMS ON REFUGEES

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 4 Apr 85 p 3

[Text]

THE banned Pan African Congress has rejected claims by the Lesotho Government that its six refugees killed during the recent attack had "engaged in a patrol of the Lesotho Security Forces" when they met their death.

This emerged after a PAC delegation held talks with the Lesotho Ministry of Foreign Affairs following the tragic incident in the Mountain Kingdom three weeks ago.

Since the fatal shooting of the six cadres the Lesotho Government has been engaged in

talks with the PAC and the two groups have agreed that there was a need to improve relations on the basis of mutual trust and confidence for the benefit of all.

The organisation said all six had been killed, there was nothing the PAC could do about the incident. It also expressed serious doubts that they were armed when they met their fate.

The PAC delegation led by Mr Joe Mkhwanazi, their administrative secretary, leaves Lesotho today for their headquarters in Tanzania.

CSO: 3400/53

MOZAMBIQUE

PORTUGAL TAKES STEPS TO LIMIT RENAMO ACTIVITIES

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 27 Mar 1985 p 5

[Text] The secretary-general of RENAMO, [Mozambique National Resistance] Evo Fernandes, who is to be found "somewhere in Europe", will not enter Portugal in the near future for fear that a warrant for his arrest will be carried out, said the spokesman for the movement in Europe, Jorge Correia, yesterday to the NP [Portuguese News]. Correia added that the warrant could be issued within the context of a criminal indictment recently issued against those in charge of RENAMO in Lisbon.

As DL published at the time, in a first hand report, the brother of a Portuguese RENAMO co-operative killed in Mozambique by RENAMO has brought charges in which Evo Fernandes, Jorge Correia, and Paulo Oliveira are being charged with responsibility for the death. The judge for the case can now request their detention for a period of 45 days, renewable for the same amount of time.

According to Jorge Correia, the fact that no action has yet been taken against him is based on the desire not to "scare away the big bird", (an allusion to Evo Fernandes). The spokesman for RENAMO added that a judge's decision to detain the incriminated parties, who are of Portuguese nationality, would be based not upon the existence of legal evidence, but upon political motives."

On another issue, Jorge Correia labeled as "speculation" the news that his organization would be ready to set up an office in Paris as an alternative to Lisbon. Correia was commenting upon information obtained by NP from diplomatic sources according to which RENAMO was planning to transfer its Lisbon structure and people to Paris.

The proposed transfer supposedly arose, according to the same sources, as a result of the pressures exerted by the Portuguese authorities to limit, or even to do away with, the activities of the Mozambican rebels in Portugal.

12857  
CSO: 3442/247

MOZAMBIQUE

BRIEFS

UDF'S SOLIDARITY WITH PEOPLE--The secretary for information of the United Democratic Front, a South African antiapartheid organization, has sent a message of solidarity with the Mozambican people. The message states that the people of South Africa want to tell the Mozambican people that we are inspired by their struggle for independence, and by the efforts made by the Mozambican people to defend at all costs the gains achieved in the struggle for national liberation. We hope, the message continues, that the armed bandits threatening the people's independence will be defeated, and that the Mozambican people will be left alone by the South African Government, which does not represent us, the South African people. The message also states that the policy pursued by the South African Government, which threatens Mozambique's independence, has no support whatever among the South African people. [Text] [Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 0800 GMT 18 Apr 85 MB]

RANAMO HITS OUTSIDE INTERVENTION--The RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance] movement of Mozambique says that other countries are intervening militarily in the Mozambican civil war to prop up the Frelimo government. In a statement released in Lisbon, RENAMO says that it will strike at any forces supporting the government of President Samora Machel. It has also vehemently condemned the intensified internationalization of the 8-year-old civil war in Mozambique. [Text] [Johannesburg International Service in English 0630 GMT 19 Apr 85 MB]

UN POWER ASSISTANCE--A cooperation agreement to reestablish the high tension powerlines supplying electricity from South Africa to Mozambique was signed in Maputo today between the Mozambican Government and the UN Development Program. The agreement was signed by Antonio Branco, minister of industry and power, and (Eric) [name indistinct], UNDP representative in Mozambique. The repair work on the powerlines, which were destroyed by a storm last month in Moamba District in Maputo, will cost \$1.5 million, which has already been financed by the Italian Government. The powerline repair work, which also includes rebuilding 31 pylons destroyed by the storm, has already begun and will last 3 months. [Excerpt] [Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese 1030 GMT 20 Apr 85 MB]

CSO: 3400/62

NAMIBIA

ACTION PROGRAM FOR NEW TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 28 Mar 85 p 1

[Text]

**THE MULTIPARTY** Conference has announced a programme of action for a new transitional government which includes new arrangements for the use of the surplus capital and certain facilities held by representative authorities.

The action programme also includes the transfer of the Tintenpalast from the White Administration to a new government and the abolition of mandatory racial classification.

Announcing the MPC's proposals for a transitional government, Conference spokesman, Mr Moses Katjuongua, said there would have to be new arrangements concerning the use of surplus capital and certain facilities such as educational institutions held by Representative Authorities which were underutilised.

This is viewed by observers as a reference to the R170-million surplus of the White Administration and its severely underutilised Windhoek Col-

lege of Education.

The announcement raises the possibility that the College facilitates a non-racial Namibian University or could be used by the non-racial Academy.

The MPC's programme of action includes requests for the continuation of South African budgetary aid until independence, and for agreement on the roles of the SWATF, the SADF and the SWA Police.

Mr Katjuongua said the MPC would also demand agreements on the future of Walvis Bay, trade and railways.

There would have to be agreement that SA would not negotiate on behalf of Namibia in negotiations concerning Resolution 435.

The MPC also wanted the shares in Rössing Uranium held by the Industrial Development Corporation to be transferred to the transitional government, and for Swakor to be controlled exclusively by Namibians so it could develop the Kudu gasfields for the benefit of the Namibian people.

NAMIBIA

UK PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION VISITS, SAYS MAJORITY SUPPORTS SWAPO

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 2 Apr 85 p 9

[Text]

**LONDON —** There is no evidence that South Africa is getting ready to withdraw from Namibia, or even preparing for the territory's independence, according to a British all-party parliamentary delegation.

And the delegation, which visited Namibia in February, says it found "very significant and almost certain majority support for Swapo among blacks, even among those who detest violence and are generally apolitical."

Reporting yesterday on their visit, the delegation (Lord Kennet, SDP Foreign Affairs spokesman, Tory Robert Rhodes James, and Labour's Donald An-

derson) call on the British Government to propose effective measures to bring further pressure on South Africa to withdraw.

### **Tragedy**

They describe the situation in the territory as "a human tragedy to which the West should now give much higher priority."

The delegation alleges that the South African Army "harasses the population with no apparent motive but intimidation." It calls for the release of all detainees, and for the Koevoet unit to play no part in the transitional period before independence. They urge British

firms to take no part in assisting military conscription of Namibians.

The delegation noted that apartheid was still rife in Namibia — health and education were segregated and so was most public transport. The condition of agriculture is described as "pitiable".

It says it did not find much acceptance of the Multi-Party Conference. "It represents a smaller section of opinion than the last "internal" government. The MPC's proposals this week for an internal constitutional settlement before elections would clearly give them a greater legitimacy than they merit."

CSO: 3400/56

NAMIBIA

ORGANIZATION OF NEW INTERIM GOVERNMENT DETAILED

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 28 Mar 85 p 3

[Text]

THE NEW government planned by the Multiparty Conference is to have an eight-member Cabinet, a National Assembly of 62 members and a 16-member Constitutional Council headed by the Judge President.

At yesterday's news conference to release details of proposals for a transitional government, MPC spokesman, Mr Moses Katjuongua said three Cabinet seats would go to the DTA.

One each of the remaining seats would go to the other parties in the MPC, the Labour Party, the National Party, the Rehoboth Free Democratic Party, a Swanu faction, and Swapo D.

There would be eight Deputy Ministers who would be divided among the parties in the same way.

All the Ministers and Deputy Ministers would be

members of the National Assembly.

The DTA would be allowed 22 members of the 62-member Assembly and the other parties would be allocated eight members each.

There would also be eight standing committees corresponding to the portfolios of the Ministers.

All Bills would be discussed by the Standing Committees before they were debated in the National Assembly.

A Speaker would be elected from the members of the Assembly, but he would not be a member of a Standing Committee.

Mr Katjuongua said the MPC had, after much heated discussion, decided how the government bodies would take decisions.

Decision-making by the Cabinet and National Assembly would be by simple majority unless it was decided that another method such as consensus should be used to deal with a particular issue.

Chairman of the DTA, Mr Dirk Mudge, said ad-

ministrative issues would be dealt with by simple majority but constitutional changes such as amendments to Proclamation AG8 which defines the powers of the Second Tier Authorities, would not be dealt with by ordinary majority.

Mr Katjuongua said anyone who believed that decisions of the government would infringe their individual or group rights could get legal opinion to have the decision tested against the MPC's Bill of Fundamental Rights and Objectives.

A final appeal could be made to the Constitutional Council.

Mr Katjuongua said the DTA would have six representatives on the Constitutional Council and the other parties two each.

The Cabinet would have the right to appoint additional members.

Decisions of the Constitutional Council would be by consensus, but if no agreement was being reached decisions could be taken by a two-thirds majority.

CSO: 3400/56

NAMIBIA

INDIAN MPS TOUR OPERATIONAL AREA

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 25 Mar 85 p 3

[Text]

**KATIMA MULILO:**  
Indian MPs on a "fact-finding" tour of the Operational Area in Namibia said yesterday they had gained new insight into the "terrorist" threat to South Africa and the need for continued South African military presence on the border.

A group of about 20 MPs from the House of Delegates visited the area with the Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, his deputy, Mr Adriaan Vlok, and the Officer Commanding the South West African Territorial Force in charge of operations in border zones, General George Meiring.

The MPs, from the majority National People's

Party and opposition Solidarity, said they wished to make it clear conscription — a burning issue in the Indian community — was not an issue and was not even raised during the three-day tour.

Mr George Thaver, Chairman of the MPs standing committee on defence, told Sapa they had been given full opportunity to "see for ourselves".

He said they had gained the clear impression that the military presence in the border areas was not only serving as a deterrent, but also helping to uplift the local blacks, including primitive Bushmen.

"We found achievements in this respect particularly outstanding and inspiring and we are agreed that the SADF on the border was doing wonderful work." Sapa

CSQ: 3400/56

NAMIBIA

LABOR PARTY CALLS FOR NON-RACIAL SPORT

Windhoek THE WINDHOEK ADVERTISER in English 2 Mar 85 p 3

[Text]

**COLOURED MEC** and member of the Labour Party, Mr Reggie Diergaardt, has said he will fight in the frontline to keep Namibia out of the international arena until sport in the country is fully multi-racial.

In the Coloured Legislative Assembly this week, Mr Diergaardt also said he was against foreign disinvestment in South Africa and Namibia and called on those advocating disinvestment to reconsider.

Regarding sport, he said it should be used as an asset to break down the walls built by "other practices" and to build bridges.

He said this should not be left until organisations such as the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (Sanroc) and the South African Council on Sport (Sacos) were established in Namibia.

Mr Diergaardt said merit should be the only criterion for sport teams.

The backs of black sportsmen were being used as a vehicle by which Namibia could gain entry into international sport.

He said he would join the frontline of those fighting to get Namibia accepted in international sport once a policy aimed at non-racial sport was adopted.

Mr Diergaardt referred to the withdrawal of the Western Suburbs rugby club from the Central Sub-union because of alleged discrimination in rugby, particularly at school level.

He said in 1982 he had discussed with the then Chairman of the SWA Schools Rugby Sub-union, Mr Jan Brand, the possibility of setting up a single non-racial subunion for schools.

Mr Brand had rejected this suggestion and said there should be separate sub-unions for each population group, but a co-ordinating board could be appointed.

Mr Diergaardt said such separation had not been

acceptable to him.

He added it was contradictory that the Administration for Whites, which has a policy of segregated sport, should be admitted to the SWA Rugby Board while the Board is a supporter of non-racial sport.

Mr Diergaardt said a sport policy "which aimed at the establishment of non-racial sport could ensure the country's admission to international sport and even result in other breakthroughs overseas."

Turning to the disinvestment campaign, Mr Diergaardt said those who wanted to change the South African system through disinvestment should realise that the people they wished to help would be hurt most.

This was already being illustrated by the present economic situation in which black and brown people were the first to lose their jobs.

He said the supporters of disinvestment should reconsider their campaign.



SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

BRIEFS

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN ECONOMY--The government of Sao Tome has opened some sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, some commerce, hotels and livestock, to private investment--according to an official communique released yesterday in Sao Tome. Resolutions passed by the Council of Ministers of Sao Tome and Principe also provide for the creation of special conditions for the deposit of remittances from immigrants at the Bank of Sao Tome for the private fishing sector. In the commercial sector, the Sao Tome government decided to annul all authorizations of importation that were previously awarded, and to publish a new law which retains for the state the importation only of "consumer goods of prime necessity," while it leaves to the private sector the importation "of other merchandise." In the case of agriculture, the government decided that, with regard to the numerous rural properties that are presently owned by state companies, but are insufficiently utilized, they will give free title or lease arrangements on those properties to rural people. In the hotel sector, the Sao Tome government decided "to offer to the private sector, on a lease arrangement, the country's most important hotel facilities, so that these establishments can become points of tourist attraction and of efficient service for the population at large." In livestock, the communique from the Council of Ministers referred only to "the creation of conditions under which every family will again be able to have its farm animals." [Text] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 23 Mar 85 p 20] 12857

MORE TOURISM SOUGHT--A publicity program for tourism for Sao Tome and Principe is going to be launched in Europe this year, especially in Portugal. The program will depend for the timing of its launching upon when a four-star hotel, which will be built in Sao Tome with Yugoslavian assistance, enters into operation, probably in September. As part of an overall plan for tourist development in the country, which will be implemented in the next few years, another hotel will be built on the island of Principe, and an inn in Sao Tome will be expanded. The plan, which was developed by Yugoslavian techniques, characterizes the ideal type of tourism for Sao Tome as being of high quality, and as being an extension of what has already been started by other countries on the Gulf of Guinea. The attraction of tourist movement from the Portuguese marketplace is helped by the existence of a regular air connection, instituted by TAP a year ago, between Lisbon and Sao Tome. The archipelago of Sao Tome and Principe brings

together conditions that are generally considered to be exceptional for the development of tourism, which serves as a good source of income. The establishment of tourist locations and hotels for the country will be done with the cooperation of Yugoslavia, which also guarantees technical assistance during the construction of the new facilities. [Text]  
[Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 23 Mar 85 p 9] 12857

CSO: 3442/247

SENEGAL

# DEPENDENCY ON FOREIGN BUSINESS RAPPED

Dakar WAL FADJRI in French No 24, 25 Mar-8 Apr 85 pp 6-8

[Article by Hassan Toure: "The Art of Managing a Deficit"]

[Text] In its concern for helping the government of Senegal, the International Monetary Fund has ordered a halt in hiring in the administrative sector. Nevertheless, as it does every year, the university continues to turn out ever increasing numbers of graduates in the different disciplines, who join the labor market. The psychosis of chronic unemployment then takes control of minds. To ward off disaster, a proposal of so-called unsalaried employment is made at the urging of what is termed unsalaried employment is made at the urging of the National Guarantee and Insurance Company (SONAGA). First comes the sigh of relief, but the reality of production finally proves the grave inadequacies of an employment plan drafted outside the socioeconomic context of our country, which has not prevented the government from embarking upon the third phase.

Our parents certainly did not foresee the bankruptcy of the Senegalese Government when they sent us to school en masse with the sole thought of one day seeing us become "somebody," of winning our place in the sun. How many sacrifices they made to prepare those who, it appeared, constituted the hope of the future! How much time we spent at the books in order to assure ourselves of a better future, to enter the circle of society's "haves." All hopes, but disappointment as well, for an entire generation that now aspires, diploma or skills in hand, to enter active life. In the administration, no hope of openings. The National Guarantee and Insurance Company (now SONABANQUE) turned some into bakers, others into merchants, carriers, and so on. After the first stupor passed, one realized that there was not a single job, even for one with a master's.

The operation was salutary, with the government working to promote another breed of businessman with co-management as the main motivating factor. In some companies, there are two or three university graduates; four in others. It is true that the operation, in addition to the insertion of the graduates, makes it possible to create other jobs and helps the government absorb unemployment to some extent. The companies are set up in such a way that every member is head of a given sector.

Thus it is that the technical department will oversee all mechanical problems for the smooth operation of the automobile pool, if there is one, or the machine tools. The administrative head and finance officer must also put their experience into practice. At such levels, university graduates get along fairly well and the difficulties they encounter are rather linked to their environment and SONAGA which, in the opinion of some we met, applies very high interest rates on loans granted and does not take the decreasing scale of taxation into account, although they try to make their monthly payments. The rates are on the order of 18.90 to 20 percent. Optimism is not often the tone of meetings with university graduates.

Seynabou Ndiaye (SCOA [West African Trading Company]-Yakaar): "We cannot be optimistic, although some think that we are the most secure. Transportation is very uncertain and involves too many risks, especially accidents, police harassment, the crowding of main lines (Grand-Dakar, and so on). We cannot say whether these investments will be viable. Receipts do not cover expenses, whether it be a matter of administrative, personnel or maintenance expenses."

The same is heard among bakers, who often deal with competitors of the stripe of the Lebanese-Syrians. "The circuit," according to Amadou Gaye of the Medinatoul Mounawar Bakery at Gueule Tapee, "is saturated."

This is the case even though the government said it would issue no more authorizations and although one observes a plethora with more and more Lebanese in the circuit. Every bakery unit is in principle not to exceed 15 outlets. Unfortunately, the Lebanese-Syrians have over 20 and set up their stands alongside our bakeries. Furthermore, there are now over seven bakeries managed by university graduates instead of three, without counting semi-official financing. We have the impression that the Lebanese-Syrians are in cahoots with the administration in throwing a monkey wrench into the works." The government does not issue them the import-export card that would have enabled them to buy flour at a lower cost, unlike in the case of the Lebanese. Control of the Bongard ovens also remains the monopoly of a Lebanese, Hussein Yassine, who sells them at a higher price. Why this middleman?

#### Great Obstacle

One has to admit that the price of flour is high and the financial charges for a bakery many. Economic control also, according to our "master bakers," creates many difficulties, often confiscating their balance.

The fishing sector remains the most uncertain. While it is true that transportation remains a quantifiable element with well-established elements, such is not at all the case for the cottage fishing sector. There can be no question of determining the quantity of fish to take and at what price it is to be sold, that price "often being the object of fluctuation." Freezing the fish remains the greatest obstacle, with the "mafia" that controls the port cold storage facility where big outfitters control everything.

With the third phase, there will be, in addition to sectors already existing, market gardening, printing, a chalk manufacturing plant, a plant distributing the products of the Food Technology Institute and others.

And yet, the jewelry trade is the most original of the projects. According to Mamadou Seck, one of the managers of the jewelry store of the university graduates (SOBIDES), "we submitted our proposal to SONAGA, which backed it. We have two shops and have as a source of income our rolling mill, which we make available to other jewelers in exchange for a given price per gram of metal rolled, and the proceeds of our sales depending on the number of tourists. We asked the government to facilitate the promotion of our products and to permit our participation in the big international fairs in order to market our art objects. We also want to have show windows in certain major hotels and on the main streets, but to date, we have received nothing from the authorities, who remain totally silent."

In all the sectors of Operation University Graduate that we probed, we met young people determined to work but with largely inadequate means. They only manage unprofitable activities because they encounter difficulties they cannot solve by themselves. The operation in itself is nothing more than long-term credit with high interest rates and no assistance.

Government backing is more necessary than ever if one does not want to find all the university graduates in the street.

#### Transportation

The transport sector also faces difficulties in connection with the replacement of its automobile pool with the same advantages as in the past. In this sector, Renault, with the R9 and the SG2, and Mercedes have divided up the market. The amount of payments varies from one car to another. For the R9, one pays 125,000 francs a month; for the SG2, 260,000 francs; and for the Mercedes, 201,000 francs.

The Transporters Union grumbles: "Why does the government grant the university graduates privileges that other Senegalese do not have? Are there super-Senegalese?" Of course not, but if it cannot find them paying jobs, the government can certainly grant them privileges.

11,464

CSO: 3419/364

SENEGAL

MOTIVES FOR AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT, MILITARY AID EXAMINED

Dakar WAL FADJRI in French 25 Mar-8 Apr 85 pp 4-5

[Article by M. Fall: "Fighting a Fictitious Enemy"]

[Text] Of all the French-speaking countries of Black Africa, Senegal is the one that has received the most development aid from the American Government. Nor is such aid without strings attached, as the Americans willingly admit, deeming that their interests would be gravely threatened if the political and economic situation of the nations of West Africa continued to deteriorate.

The purpose of American aid to development and military assistance is, according to Washington, to "contribute to the long-term development of those nations, promote their political stability" (obviously threatened by Libya), "ensure continuing access of the United States to raw materials (Nigerian oil, Guinean bauxite, and so on), ports and airports (such as Yoff) and other facilities of strategic importance."

One can therefore understand why, despite the presence of the French Army on our soil, the United States is interested in Senegal, to the extent of granting assistance amounting to \$4 million (some 2 billion CFA francs) for 1986 "to resist Libyan subversion." This is an increase in military cooperation between Dakar and Washington, cooperation that has already enabled some 30 Senegalese soldiers to receive training from the American armed forces.

American military aid comes at a precise time when relations between Dakar and Tripoli are beginning to thaw, especially following the visit to Senegal by Abdel Salam Ali Triki, head of Libyan diplomacy. If Senegal were truly threatened by Libya, the latter would certainly not have been received by Abdou Diouf. But the most curious thing about this whole story is that Dakar is not at the root of this military assistance to fight "Libyan subversion." Washington has decreed once and for all that the entire African continent is threatened by "Libyan adventurism" and that the African nations must be helped to confront it, in spite of themselves, if need be.

One may legitimately think that Washington uses the excuse to replace France, which, because of its colonial past, enjoys military privileges in the French-speaking nations of Africa. The example of Chad is enlightening in this connection, when the United States humiliated the French by unveiling, by means of their observation satellites, the "presence of Libyan soldiers in Chad" when Paris was claiming the contrary.

Whatever the case, the Senegalese Government can now rub its hands in glee. To receive \$4 million at such a time to face a threat that exists only in the imagination of the Washington strategists is a windfall. Thanks to Qadhdhafi, the empty coffers of the Senegalese Government will be fattened by 2 billion francs. Long live the unpredictable colonel who frightens the American super-power so much!

11,464

CSO: 3419/364

SENEGAL

POSSIBILITY OF SALVAGING SENEGAMBIA EXPLORED

Dakar AFRICA in French Mar 85 pp 34-35

[Article by M. M.]

[Text] "A playoff between Senegal and Gambia! I wouldn't go to that for all the gold in the world. I'm packing my bags this very evening." My Senegalese colleague, who writes for an economic magazine published in Dakar and is an avid soccer fan, was visibly mortified as we left the second round of semi-finals, between Senegal and Cape Verde, in which the Lions had qualified at the expense of a Cape Verdian team noisily supported by the Gambian spectators at Independence Stadium in Bakau, a suburb of Banjul. His remark summed up the general feeling in the small Senegalese colony which for several days had been attending the various soccer games being played as part of the Seventh Amilcar Cabral Tournament. Besides the Senegalese, Gambian, and Cape Verdian teams, the other contestants in those games were the national teams of Mali, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Mauritania.

The Senegalese reporter denied being a disgruntled fan jealous of the resounding semifinal victory by Gambia's Scorpions over a scarcely recognizable Malian team which, only a few days earlier, had held Senegal's national team at bay with only nine players (two Malian players had been ejected from the game for misconduct)! But he said he was sickened by the attitude shown toward the Senegalese by the Gambian spectators from the start of the tournament. At times, that attitude of aggressive hostility almost took on the features of a "hunting down of Senegalese" in which brawls were a common occurrence.

In fact, it was open season on the Senegalese who had confidently come to make a bid for a third-time title as champions of Zone II, which would have enabled them to take the Cabral Trophy for good, and also to commemorate with their terrible Gambian "relatives" the 20th anniversary of the independence of their partner in the confederation. With provocations, insults, threats, and repeated acts of intimidation, Independence Stadium was the scene throughout the tournament of a spectacular anti-Senegalese demonstration that was taken up by practically every circle of people in the Gambian capital, all of whom are rejecting more and more openly a confederal plan which has practically no champions left. We were witnesses to--and often the targets of!--numerous demonstrations of anti-Senegalese feeling that frequently bordered on hate-filled hysteria.



Quite obviously, the Seventh Amilcar Cabral Tournament is turning out to constitute a huge resonance chamber for the anti-Senegalese feeling that stirs a large percentage of the capital's young people. And the fact that that feeling literally exploded during what was supposed to be the "festival of youth" owes nothing to chance. The organizers of those mob demonstrations and of that permanent agitation no doubt took advantage of the presence in Banjul of several dozen foreign reporters to indulge in wide-ranging anti-Senegalese propaganda and, along with it, a nationalist demonstration whose virulence did not fail to impress our foreign colleagues.

According to information gathered in circles close to the Gambian opposition, the demonstrations in Banjul carry the stamp of MOJA [Movement for Justice in Africa], a movement of Gambian intellectuals who inspired the abortive coup d'etat in August 1981 that was headed by Kukoi Samba Sanyang. Sanyang is now a refugee in Cuba, but he reportedly makes frequent trips to Mali (this would explain the "chill" between Banjul and Bamako). That assertion is reinforced by the fact that on the day before the celebration marking the 20th anniversary of Gambia's independence, a tract by that illegal movement was secretly circulated calling on the population to boycott the various ceremonies and threatening to blow up the official reviewing stand. Another confirmation was the arrest of a young Swedish woman carrying a cassette that had been recorded, in Ayatollah Khomeyni fashion, by Kora Sall, one of the leaders of the "Ramadan putsch," in which he called on the Gambian population to revolt against the "Senegalese occupation troops."

If in fact there ever existed any sentiment in favor of confederation, the "Senegambian" idea has manifestly lost ground today, even among the traditional and customary chiefs, whose zeal for confederation had been stirred up by the bestowal of money running into the millions and of medals. While Banjul does not seem overly alarmed, Dakar is no longer concealing its impatient nervousness. There is a growing impression in Senegal's capital that the Gambians are taking the Senegalese for a ride, and more and more voices are being raised both in the government and in the Socialist Party, which is the party in power, to denounce the lack of good will on the part of the Gambian partner, who seems to be dragging his feet.

The Senegalese chief of state, President Abdou Diouf, finally proclaimed: "We must move ahead, because we can no longer retreat." In a speech delivered last 1 February on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the confederal pact, the head of the Senegalese Government and chairman of the Confederal Executive did not mince words, and they scarcely concealed a degree of irritation at the unwillingness of the Gambians to move on to the stage of negotiating draft protocols relative to the economic and monetary union in pursuance of article 2 of the pact. In his view, that union is the "principal test of the finishing touches."

It is true that the Senegalese and Gambians signed three protocols last year in the fields of information, telecommunications, and transportation after setting up a Confederal Assembly and a council of ministers for the confederation and also deciding to integrate their armed forces and security forces (but of the six strategic zones established, only the Banjul zone is operational!).

But meetings by the technical committees on economic and monetary union continued to drag on, and the agreement to establish a free trade zone starting in July 1985 has not erased growing Senegalese skepticism as to the Gambian partner's intention to bring things to a quick and successful conclusion.

Unfriendly

"It is therefore imperative that we progress more quickly with these negotiations in 1985 than we did in 1984." Was that desire on the part of the Senegalese chief of state, ardent to say the least and accompanied by a sort of formal demand stating that "there can be no rupture, respite, or inadequacy between the various phases" of the integration process, perceived as a veiled threat directed at the Gambian authorities? Not likely. In any case, the fact that even in his most minor official speeches over the past few weeks, President Dawda Kairaba Jawara has increased his references to the "independence and territorial integrity" of Gambia might make one think that he does not intend to let anyone force his hand.

By celebrating the 20th anniversary of his country's independence with very exceptional splendor that included a guest of such importance and weight as General Buhari, the master of Gambia's Nigerian big brother (in circles close to the Senegalese Government, that invitation was seen by some as an unfriendly act, to say the least, toward Senegal), and after resuming relations with Libya without consulting Dakar, President Jawara--who made practically no mention of Senegambia in his address--no doubt wanted to indicate to the Senegalese "fiance" that there would be no "forced marriage."

In the confederation's capital, where there is an increasing feeling of having been taken in by a partner who gives the impression of no longer wanting to keep his commitments after profiting greatly from the "gifts" that Dakar placed among the wedding presents, there is no intention of letting it go at that. There is said to be determination in Senegal to thwart the growing influence of Gambia's powerful business lobby, whose interests are threatened by the prospect of economic and financial integration. Such integration would deal a death blow to the smuggling which, year in and year out, costs Senegal nearly 20 million CFA francs.

To revive the political will of Gambia's leaders, Senegalese authorities are discreetly encouraging contacts between Senegalese union organizations and Gambian workers, who are organized very little or not at all and who, being tempted by the prospect of very sizable wage increases as a result of economic union, would therefore be its ardent supporters. The maneuver is obvious: it is a question of exerting pressure on Banjul in all areas to make it come to terms. The expected result is far from assured, and the political risks being incurred are real. But for President Abdou Diouf, who is risking his personal credibility and that of his government in this affair, there is apparently no alternative. But the Senegalese chief of state, who is now criticized by some of his compatriots for not having taken advantage of the attempted coup d'etat in August 1981 to settle the Gambian "problem" for good, is making it clearly understood that union will come about only with the voluntary and conscious support of Senegambia's peoples and in accordance with republican legality.

11798

CSO: 3419/365

SENEGAL

WORLD BANK AID CONDEMNED

Dakar WAL FADJRI in French No 24, 25 Mar-8 Apr 85 pp 5-6

[Article by Youssoupha Ndiaye and Idrissou S. Biodan: "The World Bank's Bitter Pills"]

[Text] We thought that the factors of the "recovery of our economy" would stop with the injection of funds, a shift toward higher prices and stricter management of government assets, all measures taken upon the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. But given the fact that the recovery fits into a long-term process accompanied by other measures, it is more reasonable to think than to believe.

"The medium-range financial adjustment program" presented in Paris by Senegalese negotiators: Shaykh Hamidou Kane, Mamoudou Toure and Bator Diop, on 13 and 14 December of last year, received the approval of our international financial partners only because the government had accepted in the main the other measures dictated by the World Bank. The first gesture marking the agreement was the granting of 200 million francs to our country.

One of the first measures taken by Senegal to manifest its good will to behave as an attentive and devoted pupil was to ease the rehabilitation of private enterprise, which resulted in the closing of unproductive national companies (particularly SONAR [National Oilworks Supplies Company] and the STN [expansion unknown]). At the same time, certain departments of these companies were returned to the private sector, as in the case of seed now managed by the oilworks. Having shut down its companies with plethoric and useless personnel, the government is gradually freeing its shares in the parapublic units to the benefit of private international capital.

Recruitment

The rehabilitation of private enterprise goes hand in hand, for capital, with the liberalization of labor legislation. To encourage private capital to invest in our country is to give it the possibility of playing the game of competition for an accumulation of profits. This competition obeys certain rules: meeting the conditions of effectiveness and competitiveness and relaxing the prices of products and wages for better exploitation of the worker. But the most important condition established by the World Bank experts concerns the elimination of restrictions and penalties relating to the layoff of the so-called unproductive and surplus workers. Along with exploitation, arbitrariness.

This last measure must certainly be the most difficult to implement for Diouf. The preliminary condition would be for the trade unions, and more particularly, the CNTS [National Confederation of Senegalese Workers], to be docile to the point of being unpopular. Or, on the contrary, that all dissident trade unions be liquidated. In the first case, despite "its responsible participation," the CNTS cannot cut itself off from its rank and file without encouraging the emergence of strong trade union confederations in the opposition. Actually, the CNTS is so wracked by rival factions that it can exist only by taking an occasional stand contrary to government directives. In the second case, if the workers' scape goat is eliminated, verbal violence may degenerate into physical violence.

Even if it is difficult to apply, Diouf will do so in order to "respect his commitments." Within this framework, he has made a wager: first of all, to institute unity within the CNTS before 1 May and then, after its national congress, force it to integrate totally in the PS [Socialist Party] and therefore, make no decision until after obtaining the green light from the party. Diouf wants to muzzle the CNTS. Will he succeed? The rank and file will not easily follow its leaders to the sacrificial altar.

The other measures aimed at rehabilitating our economy are an increase in all public rates -- SOTRAC [expansion unknown] has already done so -- a gradual introduction in health care costs (already done) and education, while there must be a decrease in the number of public employees starting with fiscal year 1986-1987. In other words, once this fiscal year has begun, there will be no more recruiting in our administration, except in dribs and drabs. Extensions will be done away with and all those who retire will not be replaced. The only posts to be filled with replacements will concern resignations or deaths. For the latter, the training schools be be appealed to first. A special team including Jean Collin has been set up for thorough control of hiring.

The austerity of the IMF is therefore followed by the harshness of the World Bank. One teased our wallet; the other takes it away. Arbitrary action and unemployment are the two corollaries of the recommendations of the World Bank, while the IMF sows want and revolt.

11,464

CSO: 3419/364

SEYCHELLES

DISCUSSIONS HELD WITH AUSTRALIA ON TRADE

Victoria SEYCHELLES NATION in English 20 Feb 85 p 1

[Text]

THE strengthening of shipping and commercial links between Seychelles and Australia was the subject of talks in Victoria last week between government and parastatal officials and a trade representative from the Australian High Commission in Nairobi.

Mr Dermot McManus, the Senior Trade Commissioner and Commercial Counsellor at the High Commission in Kenya, explained at the end of his talks on Friday that because Australian goods had to be shipped to Seychelles via Singapore, they took some time to get here and freight costs were high. As a result, Australia's share of the Seychelles market

had declined in the face of faster and cheaper competition from other countries with good shipping ties with the islands.

**Direct link**

The possibility and viability of setting up a direct shipping link between Seychelles and Australia were therefore key subjects in the talks Mr McManus had with local officials.

Australian exporters were especially keen to increase trade between the two countries, Mr MaManus said, now that the Republic's tourism industry was recovering so well.

But unfortunately for Seychelles, Australia either pro-

duced itself the goods the Republic exported or could obtain them more cheaply and quickly from the closer Pacific islands.

In 1983 Seychelles imported R7.7 million worth of goods (1.3 percent of total imports) from Australia compared to R11.8 million (1.8 percent) in 1982 and R16.3 million (4.1 percent) in 1978.

The Australian goods imported in 1983 included beef, mutton and meat products, butter, cheese and other dairy products.

On the other hand, Australia imported only R6,000 worth of goods from Seychelles in 1983.

CSO: 3400/052

14 May 1985

## SOMALIA

## ETHIOPIAN REBELS ATTEND SOMALI TRADE UNION MEETING

EA251104 (Clandestine) Voice of the Broad Masses of Eritrea in Tigrinya  
0400 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] Mogadishu: An Eritrean National Trade Unions delegation led by Comrade Wolde Mikael Abraha, EPLF Central Committee member and secretary general of the National Trade Unions of Eritrea took part at the SDR trade union celebration which started on 13 April. The Eritrean National Trade Unions delegation met and held discussions with (Mahmoud Shire), deputy chairman of the Trade Unions Federation of Somalia, (Hasan Guble), head of foreign relations of the trade unions and other union officials.

During the meeting delegates of the Ertrean Trade Union briefed officials of the Somali Trade Union on the prevailing situations and developments of our revolution and on the struggle being waged by the workers of Eritrea. For their part, the deputy chairman of the Federation of the Somali Trade Union and head of foreign relations praised the heroic struggle being waged by the workers of Eritrea and led by their organization, the Eritrean National Trade Union, and expressed their support for the just cause of the Eritrean people. They also pledged to strengthen relations between the Somalia Federation of Trade Union and Eritrean National Trade Union. The delegation led by Comrade Wolde Mikael Abraha praised the various roles the Somali trade unions are playing in the development of the nation.

CSO: 3400/61

SOMALIA

TRACTOR, WATER PUMP PLANT CONSTRUCTION

Mogadiscio HEEGAN in English 12 Apr 85 p 6

[Text] Mogadishu, Thursday--The Minister of Commerce and Industries, Jaalle Abdallah Mohamed Fadil, has earlier this week laid the foundation stone for the new tractor's and water pumps assembly plant which will be constructed on the western suburb of Mogadishu.

The factory, which will be jointly constructed on contract by the Somali Indian Ocean Company and the German K.H.D. Deutz, will cost about 16 million Somali Shillings and 4 million D.M.

In a speech he delivered at the foundation laying ceremony, Jaalle Abdallah Mohamed Fadil spoke about the importance of this factory in raising the economy, particularly the agricultural production and added that this type of factories motivate the people engaged in production to increase productivity.

Jaalle Fadil urged the private companies to simulate these two companies and invest in projects that will play part in boosting local production.

The West German Ambassador also spoke at the ceremony and said that the cooperation between the two companies reflects the good relations between the two countries, Somalia and West Germany.

The plant, which occupies an area of one square kilometer, will have a capacity of assembling 600-1000 tractors per year which is intended to meet the Somali Farmers' demands for agricultural equipments.--SONNA

CSO: 3400/60

SOMALIA

BRIEFS

RSA TIES DENOUNCED--An organization calling itself the Somali Progressive Group has accused the government in Mogadishu of offering landing and airspace facilities to South Africa. In a message to ZIANA, the group said the unprecedented, unholy alliance between Somalia and South Africa demonstrates the decadence of the Barre and Botha regimes. It said the move is regrettable, because it is in defiance of world campaigning to isolate the Pretoria regime. The group expressed support for South African liberation movements and SWAPO of Namibia. [Text] [MB301443 Harare Domestic Service in English 1115 GMT 30 Apr 85]

MOGADISHU-NAIROBI PHONE LINE--The SDR minister for posts and telecommunication, Dr (Abdullahi Osobleh Siad), said today that direct telephone and telex links between Mogadishu and Nairobi were officially inaugurated today. Dr (Abdullahi Osobleh Siad) added that the telephone and telex link between Mogadishu and Nairobi will be via the satellite earth stations in the two capitals. [Excerpts] [Mogadishu Domestic Service in Somali 1115 GMT 23 Apr 85 EA]

CSO: 3400/62



SOUTH AFRICA

PLAN TO ESTABLISH STABILITY THROUGH HEGEMONY ANALYZED

Bonn AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE (Supplement to DAS PARLAMENT) in  
German 23 Mar 85 pp 2-20

[Article by Winrich Kuehne: "South Africa and Its Neighbors: Stability  
Through Hegemony ?"]

[Text] Winrich Kuehne, LL.D., born in 1944, is a staff member of the Policy and Security Institute of the Science and Policy Foundation at Ebenhausen near Munich. His publications include the following: "Sowjetische Aussenpolitik im suedlichen Afrika--eine Bedrohung fuer den Westen ?" in Polaritaet und Interdependenz [Soviet Foreign Policy in Southern Africa--A Threat to the West in Polarity and Interdependence]; "Beitraege zu Fragen der internationalen Politik" (Band 1 der Reihe Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, hrsg. von der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen) [Studies on Issues of International Politics, vol. 1 of International Policy and Security series published by Science and Policy Foundation, Ebenhausen] Baden-Baden, 1978; "Schwarzafrika und die Sowjetunion. Die Politik der Sowjetunion in Afrika. Bedingungen und Dynamik ihres ideologischen, oekonomischen und militaerischen Engagements" (Band 10 der Reihe Internationale Politik und Sicherheit) [Black Africa and the Soviet Union. The Policies of the Soviet Union in Africa. Conditions and Dynamics of Soviet Ideological, Economic and Military Involvement, vol. 10 of International Policy and Security series], Baden-Baden, 1983. "UN-Sanktionen und Hoffnungen auf 'friedlichen Wandel'. Handlungsmoeglichkeiten der westlichen Staaten gegenueber Suedafrika" in Vereinte Nationen [UN Sanctions and Hopes for 'Peaceful Change.' Political Options of Western Nations Vis-A-Vis South Africa in United Nations], 4/1983. "Suedafrika und seine Nachbarn: Durchbruch zum Frieden ?" [South Africa and Its Neighbors: Breakthrough toward Peace ?], Baden-Baden, 1985.

## I. Introduction

In the spring of 1984, relations between South Africa and its neighbors started to move. On 16 March, South Africa's Minister President Botha and [Samora] Machel, the president of the People's Republic of Mozambique, signed the Nkomati accord, "a good neighbor and non-aggression pact." A few weeks earlier, on 16 February, South Africa reached an agreement with the People's Republic of Angola, another of socialist-oriented frontline states, in the Zambian capital of Lusaka on cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of its troops from southern Angola.<sup>1</sup>

World public opinion reacted to these agreements generally and the Nkomati accord in particular with a mixture of surprise, relief as well as uncertainty as to their long-range significance for war and peace in southern Africa. Could one really lend credence to Botha's and Machel's words as they claimed before the international media that the agreement represented a breakthrough to peace and was a high point in the history of southern Africa? And yet no careful observer could fail to note that both men portrayed the conclusion of the agreement in their own country as representing a meaningful continuation and a success of their policy thus far.

Now, a year after the signing of the treaty, the hopes for peace have given way to a far more sobering assessment. To be sure, collaboration between the Pretoria and Maputo governments in economic and security matters has improved and direct South African military incursions have ceased. The goal which Machel in particular was after, however, is not one step closer: to secure peace inside Mozambique and thus set the stage for economic recovery in the country. The dissident movement RNM, also referred to as RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance] has not cut down on but has increased its violent attacks and acts of sabotage inside the country. It was reported as long ago as the summer of 1984 that the movement was active in nine or ten provinces of the country and was on its way toward isolating the capital. For this reason, Jacinto Veloso, the minister in the president's office for economic affairs, issued a warning in December 1984 to the effect that Mozambique would no longer feel bound to the Nkomati agreement, if the security situation did not improve and outside support for the RNM did not cease.<sup>2</sup>

On the Atlantic side of southern Africa, i.e. in Angola and Namibia, developments have been equally sobering. Negotiations for an armistice between the Pretoria and Luanda governments initiated with American diplomatic assistance have not brought about the hoped-for independence of Namibia. On the other hand, the violent activities of the UNITA, the former liberation movement,<sup>3</sup> have increased. Only a few weeks after the conclusion of armistice agreement, UNITA expanded its activities in

in spectacular fashion, carrying the war into the major cities of Angola. Even though the real center of UNITA activities is located in southeastern Angola, acts of sabotage were committed for the first time in the oil-rich province of Cabinda in the north of the country in July 1984. And, contrary to the provisions of the agreement, South Africa's troops are still stationed north of the Namibian border. This military revival of UNITA has dashed Washington's hopes of improving the climate for a step-by-step withdrawal of the Cubans and for Namibian independence as provided for in UN General Assembly resolution 435. In fact, the United States has gotten caught in a trap of its own making by linking the withdrawal of the Cubans with the independence of Namibia. Following 4 years of "constructive engagement," the Reagan administration is not substantially closer than were the Europeans and the Carter administration in the 4 years between 1976 and 1980 when they tried to obtain Namibia's independence from South African domination in violation of international law without linking the two issues.

In the spring of 1985, the question is no less urgent than it was in February and March of 1984 what the long-range goals of the Pretoria government really are with regard to these agreements in the context of its regional foreign and security policies. Are these goals which lead one to expect a truly peaceful coexistence among the peoples of southern Africa? Even at this point there are no simple answers to this question.

## II. Changes in Power Relationships

The foreign policy of every country is determined by an interaction between external and internal factors. That is a basic tenet of political science which requires no further discussion. But once one gets into the matter of stating hard facts as regards the actual foreign policy practices of a particular country, one must do a detailed analysis of the internal and external mix--and that, as a rule, turns out to be far from easy.

Now as to the regional foreign and security policy of the Pretoria government, it is determined to a very uncommon degree by domestic policy considerations--not so much from the economic point of view but rather from a political one or more correctly, from the standpoint of racial policy. That is a consequence of the vast power differential which exists between South Africa and its Black neighbors for historical and other reasons. This power differential makes it possible to project internal problems to the outside in a comparatively unhindered fashion.

During the sixties and seventies, it seemed as if this imbalance of power might be righted through the appearance of international actors on the regional stage whose power far exceeded that of the Republic of South Africa. The Soviet Union and its allies must of course be named in the first instance. The transformation of Mozambique and Angola into social-

ist-oriented republics in the mid-seventies and the Cuban-Soviet intervention in the civil war in Angola were therefore a big shock to the White minority regime in South Africa in the sense that the power relationship within the region---psychologically rather than military---was irrevocably seeming to shift to the disadvantage of the White minority regime. In view of the spiritual weakness and historical obsolescence of racial policy, it was now clear that the regime could only guarantee its continued existence, if it pursued power politics marked by harshness and efficiency.

From the point of view of those interested in continued White supremacy---who are not only to be found in South Africa by any means---the fact that an end to White minority rule has been averted at least in the medium term is due to the adroitness of Minister President Botha and the military in recognizing this state of affairs and in devising the so-called "total national strategy" and energetically implementing it. They were helped by the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies are finding themselves in a defensive position in all of Black Africa today and are hard put to preserve the territorial gains they achieved in southern Africa during the mid-seventies.<sup>4</sup> The leaders of the frontline states in particular are aware of the fact---which some Western politicians have yet to realize---that the Eastern option is of not of sufficient substance to keep South Africa's regional military superiority from achieving its goals through a mixture of brute force, subversion, economic pressure and diplomacy. Thus, in spite of the vast size of its military machine, a superpower must bow in this instance to a military power of merely regional significance---not the least reason for this being that it is paralyzed in its global options for action by the other superpower. But the reverse is also true: the United States and its European allies have also been unable or have not been truly willing to keep South Africa from destabilizing its neighbors. But one must also take into consideration that the hopes of the young nations for rapid social and economic consolidation have not been fulfilled. Because of this, they are faced with a great deal of internal uncertainty and vulnerability which allows the Pretoria government to exert correspondingly great pressure on these regimes.

On a variety of occasions, Botha has left no doubt whatever about the fact that his policy is based on this very view of the regional power situation and that he therefore has no intention of allowing the international community to demand a shift in this policy---even less so, since these demands are only verbal in nature. When he visited Bonn in June 1984, Botha made this perfectly clear when he said: "This is our region and we wish to play a stabilizing role in it."<sup>5</sup> The only question is what kind of stability he had in mind.

### III. Internal Determinants of Foreign and Security Policy

More clearly than any of his predecessors, Botha has recognized that white rule in South Africa cannot simply continue along the same lines—even internally—if it is to survive for the next several years and decades. His well-known challenge to the whites shortly after assuming office to "adapt or die" was an allusion to this.

The primary characteristic of the policies pursued by his government thus far is to combine small "reform measures" with a hardening of the overall political line. In other words, it is not a matter of introducing reforms aimed at abolishing white rule but at modernizing it and making it more efficient. In the process, individual measures may well constitute a de facto reform of existing apartheid regulations by doing away with discriminatory barriers in the life of blacks and whites. The most important example of this was the legislation adopted on the basis of the so-called Wiehahn Report in 1979 dealing with labor unions and labor law. This, if one will, excessive trend which characterizes Botha's internal modernization policy does not amount to a reform policy aimed at granting comprehensive political participation to the black population. This has not been properly recognized in West often enough. During a debate on constitutional reform in 1981, Minister President Botha was asked by opposition leader Van Zyl Slabbert whether the whites' right to self-determination amounted in practice to their supremacy to which Botha unequivocal answer was: "In this country, yes!"

This statement of Botha's, which doubtless continues to be at the heart of his policies, explains why the old "grand apartheid" policy is being adhered to more resolutely than ever under his rule. Its aim is to deprive the roughly 25 million South African blacks of their citizenship as time goes by in order to bring about a fundamental change in the numerical relationship between blacks and whites. Four homelands—Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and the Ciskei—have already been granted "independence"—with bitter consequences for more than eight million black South Africans. Overnight, they lost their South African citizenship and became "foreigners"—at least according to South African law. Only if one visits South Africa and talks to blacks who have been affected in this way, can one appreciate the consequences which this change has often had on their struggle for existence.

The Pretoria government has plans for the establishment of more "independent" homelands in addition to those already mentioned—the goal being, as former cabinet minister Conny Mulder once said, to reach a point where there will no longer be any black South Africans. Under those circumstances, the question of their full participation in the political process will also have been "resolved." By then, as the Pretoria government likes to put it, the blacks will exercise their "right to self-determination" in the homelands although these account for only about 13 per-

cent of South Africa's territory while the proportion of blacks to the total population stands at more than 70 percent and although South African statistical projections indicate that even then more than 50 percent of the blacks will be living in "white" South Africa and will make up more than 70 percent of its labor force.

South Africa will thus be transformed into a "guest worker nation" of gigantic proportions---not to mention the economically desolate and politically despotic conditions in some of the homelands. The homeland policy is made complete by the constitutional reform of 1983-84, i.e. the co-optation of the roughly 2.9 million "coloreds" and more than 800,000 Asiatics into the South African political process. This constitutional reform is therefore not to be interpreted as a first step in the direction of integrating all segments of the South African population; but rather it constitutes the conceptual crowning touch of Botha's racial policies. The constitution is designed in such a way that the two groups could not outvote the ruling National Party---either separately or in conjunction with the white opposition.

This leaves no doubt about the fact then that the situation of the blacks as regards their political equality has continually worsened over the past several years. In addition to the ever-present political discrimination, they are now faced with the loss or threatened loss of their South African citizenship with all the dire consequences that entails. The forcible resettlement of black families, communities or even entire townships doubtless constitutes that particular element of this policy which reflects the devastating and inhuman consequences in the most immediate way. More than three million have already become its victims; another two million are yet to follow.

Against this backdrop, it is understandable that black resistance and the struggle for liberation has increased rather than decreased. As long ago as the summer of 1976, the student riots in Soweto---which then spread like wildfire into most other black townships in South Africa---gave the signal for a new resistance phase. The government, to be sure, remained in control; but a great number of black youths left the country and joined the liberation movements operating from outside the country---particularly the African National Congress (ANC). 2 or 3 years later, in the late seventies, armed attacks in South Africa began to increase. Given the length of time it takes to train for guerilla combat, the start of this phase was fairly predictable in advance. In late 1981, Defense Minister Malan acknowledged a 200-percent rise in acts of sabotage in South Africa, stating that a second guerilla front had been opened up against South Africa---in addition to the struggle by the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO). There followed the spectacular attacks on SASOL I and SASOL II, two coal liquification facilities, on the heavily guarded Koeberg reactor and air force headquarters in Pretoria.



Although this escalation of violence posed no immediate threat to white predominance, it did lead to profound uncertainty among the rulers and the white South African population--along with the reawakening of union activities since the early seventies--with regard to the chances of the apartheid system to survive. Foreign policy developments in the region added to this feeling of uncertainty. After Mozambique and Angola rid themselves of Portuguese rule in the mid-seventies and Zimbabwe shook off the rule of the British settlers in the early eighties, the "ring of liberated nations" surrounding South Africa had closed. At the same time, Cuba, the Soviet Union and the GDR greatly expanded their presence in southern Africa. The white minority regime was now faced with a second wave of decolonization of an intensity which had not been expected.

#### IV. Botha and the Military

It is certainly no accident that Botha, who previously held the post of defense minister and has had close ties to the military since that time both personally and in terms of their technocratic way of thinking, should take over as South Africa's leader at a point when the chances of survival for white minority rule seemed to be seriously endangered. His policy of modernizing this rule and making it more efficient has concentrated on security issues. "Total national strategy," conceived and begun under his predecessor Vorster, now became the mainstay of official policy. It would help defend against the "total onslaught of terrorism and communism" against South Africa, i.e. against the white minority regime. This has not, as is sometimes assumed, led to a comprehensive "master plan" by the Pretoria government, carefully coordinated in terms of timing and tactics, to guide South Africa's future domestic and foreign policy. What was done, however--either as a continuation or modification of already existing security strategies--was to develop and implement a rather well thought-out plan (at least as regards its basic elements) for the defense of white minority rule and its socio-economic system.

In terms of organization, Botha and the military have worked out a comprehensive "national security management system" to help implement the "total national strategy." Its top control and coordination authorities are vested in the State Security Council (SSC) and the secretariat subordinate to it, directed by General von Deventer. The SSC's powers of decision-making, control, coordination and information reach into virtually all areas of social and government life which either are or may in some way become relevant to the defense of the white minority regime. This includes the armament industry, arms procurement as well as energy policy, agriculture and education.

It goes without saying that the establishment of such a comprehensive system not only has but must have a profound effect on the constitutional situation in South Africa--although this is not the place to deal with this matter in detail. We might limit ourselves to noting that careful study of the new constitution would show that the SSC and its functions adapts without much difficulty to the shift in the internal distribution of power from parliament to the president and his advisers as provided for by that constitution. Under the old constitution this would not have been quite so easy.

On the basis of this system, primarily constructed during the late seventies and early eighties, a security strategy was worked out (and/or old security strategies were modified) which is characterized by a very consistent series of defense perimeters designed to protect the white system from the inside out.

1. In the inner defense perimeter, i.e. "white" South Africa, the inhabitants--aside from the police--should provide for their own defense both in urban and rural areas. In a sense then, they constitute the first line of defense. The units of the South African Defense Force (SADF) are earmarked solely as a reaction strike force in case of major incidents or in the pursuit of guerilla units in view of their limited personnel strength--82,400 men in 1983. South African military men are afraid that the SADF would be unable to take on any other assignments because it would soon be overtaxed in the face of the ANC's "area war" strategy of launching attacks all over the country at once.

2. The first of the outer defense rings is formed by the homelands. A look at the map shows that they surround the industrial heartland of South Africa, the Witwatersrand region, rich in raw materials. From a military point of view, the decision to grant "independence" to the homelands was by no means non-controversial. The independence of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei alone increased the length of South Africa's frontiers by 4,930 kilometers. Some South African security experts therefore viewed it as a serious mistake to entrust the defense of South Africa's borders to blacks. But Botha and the military did not share these reservations, since the homelands policy plays a key role in their political plans for a "solution" of the racial question. For that matter, they are relying on the fact that the homeland leaders either appointed and/or paid by them will support the security strategy of the Pretoria government in the absence of any other alternative and that the additional borders do not in this sense constitute a threat.

The homeland "elites" depend on "white" South Africa economically as well as for their security and very survival to such an extent that they will not be in a position to renege on their allegiance to the Pretoria government. In fact, they are also fighting against the ANC, the UNC (United Democratic Front) and the independent labor unions so that they do not have to share power with other blacks. (This structural constraint also



applies to Gatscha Buthelezi, the chief minister of Kwazulu, even though he himself may view his own policies as being resolutely opposed to the apartheid policy of the Pretoria government.)

Botha's homelands policy, in other words, is a classic example of a subtly conceived structural security policy which reduces the need for direct military presence and force with the resultant loss of security policy control over the "glacis." Its crowning touch is the conclusion of non-aggression pacts such as were signed with the four "independent" homelands immediately after they became independent. An additional advantage of this policy is the fact that black military units may now be raised in the homelands but that the blacks cannot justify any claim to full citizenship rights in the Republic of South Africa on the basis of their "defense contribution."

3. The second defense ring comprises South Africa's black neighbors. In this regard, the Pretoria government has two primary goals in mind: defense against any guerillas infiltrating from the outside and an end to their support on the part of the frontline states. Following the Israeli example to some extent, an offensive anti-guerilla strategy is pursued to achieve this end. Based on this strategy, the SADF has continuously been expanding its military actions--first against Angola and later against Mozambique, Lesotho and other neighboring countries. The underlying idea behind the offensive anti-guerilla strategy is not merely to wait for the guerillas to stage an attack but instead to attack them along their infiltration routes and in their training and jumping-off camps. "Cross-border operations" are about 10 times as cost-effective for the South African armed forces "in terms of human lives," says SADF chief General Geldenhuys, than "playing a waiting game."

But there is even more at stake than that. South African military men have carefully studied the theory and practice of guerilla warfare. They therefore know that it is a military problem only in a limited sense and that mere military containment of guerilla activities is not enough to safeguard white political supremacy. The saying that a conventional army that fails to win loses and that a guerilla army which does not lose wins has turned out to be inexorably true many times throughout the history of Africa.

The strategic conclusions to be drawn from this experience are obvious and have in fact been drawn by South Africa's political and military leaders: the ANC must be defeated both militarily and politically. This requires in the first instance that it be banished from the region--with the concurrence of the neighboring countries. This has been and still is the primary goal of the policy of pressure and destabilization conducted by the Pretoria government over the last few years. This was done first of all in the following ways: direct military attacks on ANC installations (or those of SWAPO in Angola) and other objectives in the neighboring countries; support, training and outfitting of resistance and dissident

groups such as RENAMO; the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA); UNITA and the so-called Super-ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union); and finally, taking advantage of the great economic and infrastructural dependence of the neighboring countries on South Africa, particularly in the transportation sector.

The goal of banishing the ANC from the region was closely tied to another objective of the Pretoria government which is to keep the regimes of the neighboring countries weak. In the aftermath of Zimbabwean independence in 1980 and the great popularity which the model devised there came to enjoy in Western countries as an example for South Africa as well the Pretoria government concluded that strong, well-functioning black regimes in its proximity constituted a threat to its own claims to supremacy. The international demand for black majority rule in South Africa would have to be countered by the reality of more or less miserable black rule in the frontline states. The many internal problems besetting these nations provide the Pretoria government with a great many opportunities for action along these lines.

#### V. Botha: Stability Through Hegemony ?

Without a doubt, South Africa's security strategy is being implemented far more subtly and efficiently today than it was in decades past. A major contributing factor to this has been a strong shift toward thinking which is no longer oriented on Old Testament ideology but on technocratic cost benefit and efficiency criteria. It is no accident that Botha has surrounded himself with a half dozen military men in leading positions who display great professionalism in technocratic-strategic thinking.<sup>6</sup>

But this efficiency is unable to do away with two structural weaknesses in South Africa's security strategy. In much the same way as the Israeli armed forces, those of South Africa have acquired a fine reputation during the recent past for being able to wage "Blitzkriegs," i.e. for their ability to bring limited military actions to a successful conclusion in a relatively short time by means of energetic action and the targeted use of equipment. But the old weakness still remains—namely that the SADF—because of its limited manpower—can under no circumstances engage in longer-lasting military confrontations with more than one neighboring country simultaneously. The arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council in October 1977 has, if anything, strengthened this imperative even though South Africa's own armament industry (ARMSCOR) has since been expanded tremendously under government leadership. But there are certain areas, decisive for waging a successful offensive war (such as weapons systems and electronic equipment, particularly in the air force), where resupply in the course of a conflict of longer duration is not assured. Some of the aircraft and helicopters in use in the SADF are obsolete and it is unclear how they are to be replaced. For another thing, the strategy

of destabilization runs directly counter to the fundamental interests of the South African economy and of a number of multinational corporations in stability and in functioning infrastructures in the neighboring countries. It is against this very infrastructure that the attacks by the RNM and UNITA have been directed with the aim of weakening the economy and the regimes of these countries.

Botha is neither able, nor willing to ignore these interests of the business community in the availability of markets in black Africa. To be sure, security considerations have the highest priority in the context of the "total national strategy." Botha left no doubt about that in the 12-point plan he made public in 1979. But of course both he and the military men are aware of the fact that their long-term strategy depends in large measure on a well-functioning economy. For another thing, the business community and its managerial component which thinks along technocratic efficiency and cost benefit lines just like the military has become one of the mainstays along with the military of the "pragmatic oligarchy" dedicated to the modernization of white rule which has marked the Botha presidency. At several major conferences with economic leaders—particularly at the Carlton II Conference in October 1981—Botha did make it clear that the preservation of white supremacy continues to be the first priority of his policy but that he—more so than his predecessors—is aware of the importance of the business community's interests and takes these interests into consideration.

Soon after he took office therefore plans were laid designed to rectify the fundamental contradictions of South Africa's regional policies. Going back to ideas first broached during the Vorster era, Foreign Minister Botha in a speech in Zurich in March 1979 acquainted world public opinion with the plan for a "constellation of states of southern Africa" for the first time. This CONSAS concept sounded quite ambitious. Seven to 10 countries south of the Zambezi and Kunene rivers were to become CONSAS members. Although CONSAS was conceived in the first instance as a community of "moderate" regimes united in their awareness of the "communist threats" to southern Africa, membership by so-called Marxist states was not ruled out in principle. These countries would be welcome on condition that they accepted the "existing state of affairs" in southern Africa—where the term "existing state of affairs" clearly referred to the white minority regime in South Africa. But this was the very thing the frontline states were not prepared to do and they therefore rejected the CONSAS plan. Instead, they announced their own alliance shortly thereafter, calling it "Southern African Development Coordination Conference" (SADCC).

In his statements regarding CONSAS, Botha pointed out time and again—as long ago as the late seventies and early eighties—that the conclusion of non-aggression pacts was a major element of the plan. And in late 1980, he did not leave the slightest doubt about the fact that there was only one way for the neighboring countries to make South Africa relax its pressure and its reprisals and that was by putting an official end to their support of the ANC guerilla fighters and by their readiness for close cooperation with South Africa in economic and security matters on the basis of a non-aggression pact. In his 1984 New Year's message, he used sharper language to voice this threat yet once more. He warned all neighboring states which still provided sanctuary to "terrorists" that South Africa had not yet made use of all the weapons in its arsenal by any means. For this reason it was in their interest to decide in favor of the path of cooperating with South Africa.<sup>7</sup> In March 1984, the treaty with Mozambique was then concluded at the signing of which Botha solemnly declared: "I have a vision before me of how the nations of southern Africa work together in all fields of human endeavor—a true constellation of states working for the welfare of all on the basis of mutual respect."

This statement of Botha's was hailed by South African and international business leaders including the FRG. In view of their interest in an improvement of the climate for investments and trade relations in southern Africa their approval was not surprising but it revealed a rather large measure of shortsightedness—because by giving their approval, they are supporting, even if unintentionally, a policy which many of them at least officially oppose; namely the homeland policy and the concomitant expatriation of all blacks. Like many Western politicians, they erroneously conceive of the constellation project solely as an instrument designed to improve economic cooperation in southern Africa. But Botha never concealed the fact that his goal in promoting CONSAS is not only to enhance cooperation in the field of economy and security but to use it to solve the fundamental political problem of "white" South Africa, i.e. the acceptance of his racial policy—and in particular the homeland policy—by the black neighboring countries. In other words, both the constellation and the non-aggression pacts are instruments to preserve white supremacy in South Africa. The urban blacks, as Botha said in 1980, would participate in the constellation not via South Africa but via their "national states," i.e. the homelands.<sup>8</sup>

Without a doubt Botha is more resolved than any of his predecessors to lead "white" South Africa out of isolation by this means. And contrary to past practice, this is not to be achieved in the first instance via the Western capitals but via the capitals of the frontline states. Brand Fourie, South Africa's ambassador in Washington and the grey eminence of the South African diplomatic corps, said in March 1984: "The way to our recognition leads through Africa!" This indicates that a fateful shift of emphasis in the foreign policy of the Pretoria government has taken place. Both Black Africa and the West did not notice this until relatively late.

## VI. The Nkomati Treaty

The official designation of the 16 March 1984 Nkomati treaty between the Republic of South Africa and Mozambique as a non-aggression treaty is misleading. The treaty text itself deals only in passing with non-aggression issues in the usual sense, e.g. a mutual declaration on the renunciation of the aggressive use of the armed forces of either signatory in case of conflict. Its real purpose is to prevent reciprocal "subversion" and "interference in the internal affairs" of the other country. A good two-thirds of the treaty provisions are concerned with these matters. In actual fact therefore, the treaty is an anti-subversion pact.

Most press reports concentrated on two aspects of the treaty in particular: its significance from the standpoint of security policy, i.e. the fact that both sides not only agreed to lend no further support to "terrorist" and "subversive" elements using the territory of one signatory to launch acts of violence on the territory of the other but also to exercise effective control over this. Shortly after the treaty signed, some 800 members of the ANC were accordingly asked by the FRELIMO leadership to leave Mozambique and South Africa sent 1,000 of the RENAMO guerillas it has supported until that time across the border to Mozambique—but allegedly fully armed.<sup>9</sup> If this story is true, then the Pretoria government was guilty of a serious violation of the treaty shortly after its signing. But the Maputo government did not file any charges against South Africa in this regard.

Regarding the control of guerilla movements, the treaty even specifies (under paragraph 5) that "acts of propaganda" and (under paragraph 3/2f) that radio broadcasts capable of activating violent resistance in the other signatory country must be prevented. A closer look reveals that these and other provisions raise far-reaching questions for the Maputo government, e.g. with respect to Mozambique's membership in the liberation committee of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and also with respect to approval of UN General Assembly resolutions which term both the armed struggle inside South Africa and its support from outside as permissible. Neither can really be reconciled with the spirit and the letter of the treaty and the Maputo government must take into account that South Africa will one day raise this issue.

As regards its political significance, the Nkomati treaty goes far beyond security and economic matters. At its core is the question of the political-legal legitimacy of the present South African system and its policies on the one hand and the withdrawal of legitimacy from the support for the resistance and the liberation struggle of the black population on the other—which, in fact, is the underlying aim of the constellation strategy. Just a few days after the signing of the Nkomati treaty, Louis Nel, South Africa's deputy foreign minister, declared publicly: "If the Marxist government of Mozambique is prepared to accept us as a legitimate negotiating partner, why should anyone else still try to boycott us?"<sup>10</sup>



In the Nkomati treaty, the white minority regime first succeeded in dealing with a frontline state—a socialist-oriented one and one which is viewed as being particularly committed to the anti-racist liberation struggle—in having its position prevail in the form of a binding agreement to the effect that South Africa not only is to be legally accepted as a national entity but that the present regime is a legitimate one in principle and that therefore any outside support of resistance against this regime must be construed as subversive and illegal interference in the internal affairs of that country. From a legal point of view, this has far-reaching consequences for dealing with resistance and liberation movements which the Mozambiquan leaders may not have been aware of in their entirety. Chester A Crocker, the Reagan administration's under secretary of state for African affairs, however, expressly pointed out these consequences. He said that the Nkomati treaty represented a breakthrough with regard to the application of OAU principles to southern Africa.<sup>11</sup>

To gauge the import of this statement, one needs to know that he was above all referring to the non-interference injunction and that this injunction is being applied in an especially strict manner because of the ethnic diversity throughout the countries of Africa and the conflicts arising from it. But almost all OAU members are agreed on the fact that the provision does not apply to the national, anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle for liberation in southern Africa—because by international consensus, apartheid does not simply constitute a "tribalist" problem but a "crime against humanity," as stated in the UN General Assembly resolutions.

Accordingly, the international community is called upon to support the struggle against this system with all means at its disposal—even to the extent that this struggle is being waged by violent means. To classify the Pretoria government's racial policy as a crime against humanity does not raise questions regarding South Africa's nationhood, as some have erroneously maintained, but it does raise questions regarding the legitimacy of the regime in power in matters of racial policy. Under the circumstances, support for black liberation movements and resistance groups in South Africa does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of that country in violation of international law. That, at least, is the consensus of opinion among most Third World countries, the East Bloc and the Scandinavian countries. As for the Western industrial nations, they have always only adhered to it with reservations—particularly as regards the legitimacy of armed struggle.

In line with Crocker's statement, the Nkomati treaty, on the other hand, all but equates the racial issue with the ethnic problems of Black Africa. But Crocker did not make it sufficiently clear in his interview that this provision contained in the Nkomati treaty merely had "inter partes" validity under international law, i.e. other countries as well as the international community are not bound by it.

But the South Africans did not have too difficult a time during the negotiations in convincing the Mozambiquans to accept the provision. FRELIMO itself had an overriding interest in obtaining "airtight" treaty language on the interference issue in order to have the RNM activities cease by cutting off South African aid to the organization. This, after all, was and still is Mozambique's best hope of extricating itself from its catastrophic economic situation. Mozambique had already indicated its readiness to the Pretoria government in 1982 to conclude a treaty. To get the Maputo government to agree to this had been the very aim of South Africa's destabilization strategy. Naturally enough, this fact was not mentioned by Machel after the treaty was signed. Whether on tactical grounds or based on conviction, he felt it more opportune to celebrate the treaty as a victory of the hard-headed socialist policy of FRELIMO. This stand becomes the more understandable, if one realizes that Machel may actually be convinced that Botha is pursuing a reform policy which aims at a gradual dismantling of white domination and increased political participation on the part of the black population. For another thing, he did not receive sufficiently strong help from any quarter—the East, Europe, the United States or Black Africa—so that he had no other choice than to sign the treaty. For that matter, the Mozambicans did manage to get the South Africans to agree—possibly with some help from the United States—to a semi-diplomatic ANC presence in Maputo, consisting of some 10 people. Their freedom of movement, however, is minimal—provided Mozambique intends to adhere strictly to the treaty provisions.

#### VII. Nkomati: A Model Treaty ?

The Pretoria government will only have succeeded in breaking out of its isolation vis-a-vis the frontline states, however, if other countries decide to follow Mozambique's lead. The non-aggression pact with Swaziland (which is not one of the frontline states), kept secret for 2 years, is of only minor significance in this context. Angola and Zimbabwe, on the other hand, are indeed of strategic significance; although the Pretoria government's pressure has thus far been concentrated on Lesotho and Botswana, two of the weaker nations. As yet, both of these nations have been able to withstand the pressure and have not acceded to the Pretoria government's call for the conclusion of an actual treaty although they have both—as has Zimbabwe—for some time adopted a position regarding support for the ANC which by and large conforms to the provisions of the Nkomati treaty. Since they pose no military threat to South Africa, as they have credibly maintained, there is no reason for them to conclude a non-aggression pact with the Pretoria government. And as regards the longer-range effects of the constellation concept, Seretse Khama, the late president of Botswana, said on the occasion of the establishment of the SADCC in 1979: "We would be bundled together with Bantustans."

Will the frontline states be able to maintain this position in the face of South Africa's firm resolve to reorder relations in southern Africa? A relatively short article such as this cannot provide a complete answer to this question but let us briefly point out some important trends:

If one compares the communiques of the at least once-a-year meetings of the presidents of the frontline states, then the 1984 communique as compared to those in 1982 and 1983 demonstrates a marked willingness to accommodate the Pretoria government's position with regard to the struggle for liberation. On the one hand, the communique tends to focus more once again on peaceful means of change in South Africa and on the other hand there is strong emphasis on the statement that the struggle of the black South Africans must be carried on "inside their own country." But in contradistinction to the Nkomati treaty the communique still upholds the principle of supporting the armed struggle for liberation.

The distinct shift in position is also reflected in the statements of some of the political leaders of the frontline states since the spring of 1984. Just a few days after the announcement of the armistice agreements between Angola and South Africa in February 1984, Zambia's President Kaunda—though by no means in agreement with all other frontline state presidents—indicated that he could think of other far-reaching changes in this connection, if the Namibia question could be resolved. "The independent African nations are expectantly looking forward to the time," he said, "when they...might welcome South Africa at the OAU conference, at the SADCC conference as soon as South Africa has proved that it pursues honorable purposes with the withdrawal of its troops from Angola and the granting of independence to Southwest Africa."<sup>12</sup> And in interviews in the fall of 1984, both President dos Santos of Angola and SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma let it be known that they were prepared to regard the racial conflict in South Africa as an internal matter of the Pretoria government, if a reasonable solution for the Namibia issue were found.<sup>13</sup> In other words, a certain apathy with regard to active support for the South African struggle for liberation cannot be overlooked.

But since these statements were made the doubts in the Pretoria government's "honorable intentions" on the part of the leaders of the frontline states have been on the increase once again and they have stated them publicly. The Angolan and Mozambican governments are said to have agreed at a meeting in late 1984 to re-adopt a more resolute position vis-a-vis the Pretoria government in view of the fact that expectations tied to the Nkomati treaty and the Lusaka agreement have not been sufficiently fulfilled. Earlier, Jacinto Veloso issued the following warning, as mentioned above: "If the attacks by the bandits do not stop, the Nkomati treaty will be in jeopardy."



### VIII. National Unity Governments

How to explain that RNM activities have increased rather than declined since the signing of the Nkomati treaty ? It is difficult to come up with an unequivocal answer to this question because there is a great deal of uncertainty both with regard to the political nature of the RNM, the level of support it has among the Mozambican population and its sources of outside support. To some extent at least, this uncertainty is based on the fact that the RNM is a product of a hard-to-penetrate "grey area" of international politics—an area in which the political and economic aspirations of internal and external players, the activities of the intelligence services of a variety of countries, illegal international arms traders and criminals appearing in political guise tend to overlap in odd ways and carry out their ambitious games. It is hard to shed light on these proceedings—but let us offer a few hints at this point:

The RNM was established by Rhodesian intelligence at the time of the Smith regime for the fight against ZANU, the Zimbabwean liberation movement operating primarily from Mozambican soil. ZANU later became the ruling political party in Harare under the leadership of Robert Mugabe. Like South Africa in the case of Namibia, the Rhodesian leadership countered the gradually escalating struggle for liberation by destabilizing the country which was providing aid to the guerillas. When Zimbabwe achieved independence, the South African intelligence services took over the RNM in time. It was provided with a headquarters and camp sites in South Africa and proceeded to improve both the state of its military training and the quality of its equipment. This soon had practical consequences. As of 1981, RNM acts of sabotage in Mozambique constantly increased and were characterized by a hitherto unfamiliar professionalism. The latter fact was attributable at least in some instances to the direct use of South African commandos.

By now, the RNM guerilla and sabotage units are said to have grown to some 15,000 men. It is highly likely that the rebels trained and equipped by South Africa continue to constitute the hard core. But in contrast to former times, they now appear to enjoy a certain level of support among some segments of the Mozambican population. Serious mistakes on the part of FRELIMO with respect to agricultural policy—particularly the preferential treatment accorded to state farms as against small, family-owned farms—have resulted in great disillusionment about FRELIMO policies in the countryside. The RNM slogans thus are falling on more fertile soil and famine is making "volunteers" join the guerilla forces.

Numerous observers agree that RNM continues to receive outside support.<sup>14</sup> There are reports of nighttime airdrops of supplies by unmarked aircraft, the unloading of weapons along the coast and supply flights by foreign helicopters. A high-ranking member of the RNM, who fled South Africa, publicly stated in late 1984 that South Africa was systematically violat-

ing the Nkomati treaty.<sup>15</sup> The government of Mozambique hesitated for some time about directly accusing the South African government of violating the agreement. But on 25 December 1984, at a public meeting outside Maputo, Machel is reported to have accused the South African government for the first time of being in violation of the treaty.<sup>16</sup>

There are two possibilities with regard to South Africa's adhering to the treaty. On the one hand, insofar as the support emanates on South African soil it is really being given without the knowledge and consent of the South African government. That was the widespread view during the weeks and months which followed the treaty signing. Today, 1 year later, it seems less convincing because as we mentioned earlier and as Geldenhuys, himself a South African, confirms in his exhaustive study of South African foreign policy the control function over security matters is so well organized and centralized within the political and military leadership of South Africa that private organizations could not supply the RNM with weapons without being detected for any length of time, if the Pretoria government were intolerant of it, if it did not in fact consent to it.<sup>17</sup> AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL magazine therefore is quite certain that South African military intelligence (SAMI) is more or less directly involved in these activities. The head of SAMI is General Pieter van der Westhuizen, one of Minister President Botha's closest advisers.<sup>18</sup>

The "Portuguese wing," however, has caused some confusion regarding South Africa's responsibilities. These are groups either located in South Africa or in Portugal hoping to regain property which they lost as a result of Mozambican independence in the event of an RNM victory.

There are several indications pointing to the fact that Portuguese, South African as well as other groups are today engaged in a division of labor arrangement with the Pretoria government as regards support for the RNM. The author's impression is that most American experts on South Africa also share this view. For the Pretoria government, this division of labor is something of a tightrope act because its aim is to keep these groups under control within the context of South Africa's own strategic objectives. This probably is rather difficult in the case of the "Portuguese wing" and its restorative aims. In the recent past, there have therefore been a number of warnings by the South Africans to the effect that the RNM is not to endanger the objectives pursued by South Africa under the Nkomati agreement.

If one accepts the thesis of a kind of division-of-labor effort, then that raises the question of what the Pretoria government's interest might be in jeopardizing a treaty document the success of which not only is an important prestige issue for Machel but also for South Africa's own policy. There are two conclusions to be drawn from this:

Treaties can be interpreted in all sorts of ways, depending on who is in charge in Maputo. Without a doubt, it would be advantageous for the Pretoria government to have a direct power lever there, if FRELIMO were to be part of a different power and government structure from the present one—and those are exactly the demands the RNM is raising. The RNM is not satisfied with being incorporated into the present structure under FRELIMO leadership—which is what Machel is offering—but it calls for real power sharing. To Western ears, this sounds like more democracy and stability; but given past experience with multi-party systems in Black Africa, one may assume with some certainty that this would not result in more but rather in less stability—at least for the next few years. South Africa, which acted as an official mediator at a meeting of RNM and FRELIMO representatives in Pretoria on 3 October 1984, would therefore almost be forced to assume the role of a guardian of the internal political stability of Mozambique. The statement made Foreign Minister Botha after the meeting therefore calls for South African troops to supervise the truce agreed to by FRELIMO and the RNM.

Such a guardian role for the Pretoria government is a precondition for the realization of Botha's hegemonial constellation concept. The Nkomati treaty, to be sure, does represent a breakthrough in this direction; but it does not satisfy Pretoria's demands entirely with regard to its black neighbors—above all the demand most crucial for Botha's racial policies in the long run, i.e. acceptance of the homelands policy and the concomitant expatriation of the blacks. Machel left no doubt during the negotiations and after the treaty signing that he is not willing to agree to this. On the other hand, the Pretoria government's policy toward the so-called BLS states (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) leaves no doubt about the fact that South Africa has already made this acceptance a major element of its regional policy.

In calling for a "government of national unity," the goal is not so much more unity in Mozambique as more influence for South Africa. This becomes even more plain when one takes a look at the Pretoria government's policy toward Namibia and Angola. In these two instances, both Botha and some institutions closely tied to the military have been calling for "governments of national unity" for some time but this has not been the subject of official discussion at the talks with the contact group and/or the United States with regard to an implementation of UN Resolution 435. Instead, Foreign Minister Botha has stressed—following the American line—that the South African government should not interfere in the internal affairs of Angola and pay no heed to the disputes between the UNITA and the MPLA. But by establishing a linkage between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, South Africa has gained a lever in order to press for a discussion of this point—without openly breaking its promise regarding implementation of Resolution 435 (which does not link Namibia's indepen-

dence to the Cuban withdrawal or to a reconciliation between the UNITA and the MPLA). By enlarging support for UNITA, the Pretoria government can make it virtually impossible for the Cubans to withdraw, thereby blocking progress on the Namibia issue while making UNITA participation in government an inescapable fact. But this, i.e. more support for UNITA, is exactly what has happened in the opinion of most observers.

As we mentioned earlier, both Machel and dos Santos have reaffirmed that they are not prepared under any circumstances to give in with regard to the RNM and the UNITA. But what can they actually do? Angola certainly is in a better position in this regard than Mozambique despite the fact that its economy is in shambles in many parts of the country and particularly in the south as a result of the long war. The Soviet Union is still prepared to supply the MPLA with large quantities of weapons—even with modern ones; not the least reason for this being that the MPLA can pay for the weapons in hard currency which it earns from its oil exports from Cabinda province. But the Luanda government knows that as long as the conflict for Namibia and along with it South African support for UNITA continues, there is no hope of rebuilding the economy of the country. Exactly how strong UNITA will be without South African support is a moot point. From the political point of view, it can surely look back on a more significant tradition than the RNM.

Machel's position, on the other hand, seems almost hopeless. Even more than before the signing of the Nkomati treaty, he is at the mercy of South African predominance today. To be sure, he does receive large amounts of economic aid from Western countries, particularly from the United States. But this is nowhere near enough to bring about a turnaround with regard to the activities of the RNM. And it seems as good as certain that the U.S. Congress will not approve the \$1.15 million in military aid promised to Mozambique by the State Department recently. The only hope Machel has under the circumstances is that the Pretoria government will decide one day to move energetically against the RNM and the groups which support it in order to present the Nkomati accord as a shining example of its "policy of peace" in southern Africa—the more so, since public opinion in the United States is becoming increasingly critical of the policies of "white" South Africa. In that sense, Machel is justified in pinning his hopes on a dilemma faced by South African policy in this regard.

For the time being, however, the South African leaders are quite adamant in their statements that they will not let themselves be turned into a "football" of opinions and trends in the United States—because from their point of view these are fundamental questions affecting the long-term preservation of white rule which call for very tough power policy actions. Only deeds by the Washington government and its allies could force a change; but not mere moods prevailing in the United States.

It is conceivable therefore that Machel will be forced at some undetermined future date to take the step he meant to avoid by signing the Nkomati agreement, i.e. of letting the RNM participate directly in the exercise of power in Mozambique on the basis of South African mediation. If he decides not to do this, then there are three possibilities.

First, he reestablishes close ties to the East Bloc and calls on Cuban and Soviet troops for help. There are two reasons why this is not a very likely eventuality: Moscow probably would not respond to such a call for help because the military risks vis-a-vis South Africa and the United States would in no way be offset by any possible gains. In addition, the Afghanistan, Ethiopia and Angola involvements are enough of a drain as it is. And Machel himself knows well enough that such a call for help would not bring his country one step closer to economic consolidation.

Second, the Pretoria government decides to come to Machel's aid by initiating a major push against the RNM, at least in the southern parts of the country. Such a decision would be based on a realization by South Africa—influenced in part by the United States—that saving the Nkomati model is more important than RNM participation in the Maputo government. Although this is more likely than the first scenario, the South African military establishment would not gladly opt for such an intervention.

Third, Machel and the FRELIMO decide on a return to the bush in order to carry on the fight against an RNM government supported by South Africa in the tradition of the struggle for liberation. Above all Mozambican military men, unhappy with the Nkomati agreement, were said to have considered such a possibility prior to its signing. Historical experience does not speak for the fact that a government, once in power, would decide on such a move. It would be presumptuous, however, to make some final judgment about this from the European perspective.

## IX. Prospects

This study of South Africa's foreign and security policy has given at least some indication of the fact that the Pretoria government has been pursuing a dual strategy in the region for a number of years which consists of pressuring and destabilizing its neighbors on the one hand and demonstrating a readiness to negotiate on the other. Generally speaking, however, this readiness to negotiate does not reflect a willingness to make concessions but is a firm component of the strategy aimed at defending the white minority regime, i.e. of the "total national strategy." Influential experts close to the South African military establishment have never left any doubt about this: "Negotiations are an integral part of, if anything, an indirect strategy."<sup>19</sup> This view of the negotiating process on the part of the Pretoria government has never been understood by some Western media representatives and politicians—and the consequence has been that frequently false and far too



optimistic forecasts regarding a successful conclusion of the Namibia negotiations were made. It was Defense Minister Malan who pointed out in a public statement in 1982 that South Africa would not yield to time pressure on the Namibia issue but would work for a **lasting solution in its own interest.** This point of view still applies today.

Another point which is often not seen clearly enough in the West is the vast difference in the interpretation of the phrase "stability in southern Africa" on the part of South Africans and people in the West. Some time ago, Michael Clough and Robert Price, two American experts on South African policy, had already noted the following: "The problem faced by the Reagan administration is...that it is probably fundamentally in error as regards South African intentions...South Africa may be interested in regional stability; but it is stability of a very special kind. It is looking for stability under conditions which guarantee the system of white rule."<sup>20</sup> Our remarks on Botha's constellation concept confirm the conclusions of the two Americans. CONSAS is a corset into which the region is to be forced on the level of relations between nations; but unrest, eruptions of violence and other types of instability will be no less virulent under this system than any other in the past.

Even the Pretoria government would probably admit by now that this statement is by and large true because the security policy pursued over the past several years has not been marked by success throughout. In the medium term, to be sure, the power base of the white minority regime has been strengthened.<sup>21</sup> But the psychological aftereffects of the Nkomati agreement which the Pretoria government had hoped for have been rapidly dissipated. Internally, the blacks' will to resist has not waned although many of them view Nkomati as a serious defeat. The protests have increased on an unexpectedly wide front and with surprising intensity. "One can scarcely recall any year in which the South African authorities were less in control of the situation."<sup>22</sup>

This clear rejection of Botha's policies has had far-reaching consequences internationally and has rapidly devalued the Nkomati accord along with the continued RNM actions in Mozambique as representing a "model for peace." In the United States in particular, this rejection served to mobilize an atmosphere regarding South Africa already made tense by the failures of "constructive engagement." Nobel Prize winner Bishop Tutu was turned into a symbolic figure and a strong bond between the will to resistance in South Africa and the frustrations in the United States.

This is a dangerous development for the policies of the Pretoria government—and it is being recognized as such. Perhaps never before has the South African business community, in the throes of the worst recession since World War II, spoken out so clearly against basic aspects of

the racial policy (e.g. expatriation, forced resettlement, passport legislation, etc.) not the least reason being an effort to neutralize the after-effects of the [Sen Edward] Kennedy visit and to take the wind out of the sails of the disinvestment campaign going on in the United States. This tactical aspect to the contrary notwithstanding, it has taken a public position that will have to be measured against its future statements and actions. And even Botha felt constrained to use more constructive language in his 1985 opening speech to parliament in Capetown regarding treatment of the black population. But, as distinct from the business community, he made sure to leave the basic outlines of his policy intact. For the time being, both he and his advisers feel fairly certain that the anti-South African sentiments in the United States constitute a merely temporary upsurge of emotions which has to be weathered like a kind of hailstorm. But if South Africa does remain an issue in the United States which has practical consequences and if the major European powers, including the FRG, join hands in this fight, then the Pretoria government will have to consider changing its policies.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. This article is based on a comprehensive study of the regional foreign and security policy of South Africa published in January 1985. Cf. Winrich Kuehne, "Suedafrika und seine Nachbarn: Durchbruch zum Frieden ?" [South Africa and Its Neighbors: Breakthrough toward Peace ?] Baden-Baden, 1985.
2. Cf SWB ME/7828/B/3, 17 Dec 84.
3. UNITA="Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola" [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola].
4. Cf Winrich Kuehne, "Die Politik der Sowjetunion in Afrika. Bedingungen und Dynamik ihres ideologischen, oekonomischen und militaerischen Engagements" [The Policies of the Soviet Union in Africa. Conditions and Dynamics of Soviet Ideological, Economic and Military Involvement], Baden-Baden, 1983.
5. Cf Deutsche Welle, African monitoring service, 7 Jun 84.
6. These are some of the men referred to: Defense Minister Magnus Malan; Constand L Viljoen, commanding general of the SADF; Jan Geldenhuys, senior army command officer; Andre J von Deventer, head of the SSC secretariat and Pieter J Coetzee, chief of the South African police. Cf James M Roberty, "Managing the Security Power Base in South Africa" in SOUTH AFRICA INTERNATIONAL, vol. 15, No 2, Oct 84, pp 56-65.

7. Cf e.g. Botha interview in INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 18 Dec 83 and monitoring service (Africa), 2 Jan 84.
8. Cf Deon Geldenhuys, "The Constellation of South African States and the Southern African Development Co-Ordination Council: Towards a New Regional Stalemate," Braamfontein, 1981.
9. Cf AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, Political Series, No 1, 31 May 84, p 7249.
10. Cf AFRICA NOW, Mar 84, p 37.
11. Cf THE GUARDIAN, 20 Jul 84.
12. Cited from African Monitoring Service, 24 Feb 84.
13. Cf President das Santos interview in WASHINGTON POST, 28 Nov 84; Sam Nujoma interview in LEADERSHIP S.A., vol. 3, No 1, 1984.
14. Cf in particular Gillian Gunn, "Post-Nkomati Mozambique," CSIS Notes, No 38, 8 Jan 85; AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, vol. 25, No 25, 28 Nov 84.
15. Cf SWB ME/7820/B/3, 7 Dec 84; African Monitoring Service, 21 Jan 85.
16. Cf AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN, Political Series, 1-31 Dec 84, p 7468.
17. Cf Deon Geldenhuys, "The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making," Johannesburg, 1984.
18. Cf AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, vol. 25, No 25, 28 Nov 84.
19. Cf M Hough, "National Security in the RSA" in ISSUP PUBLICATION, No 9, Jun 81, p 1ff.
20. Michael Clough, "United States Policy in Southern Africa" in CURRENT HISTORY, vol. 83, No 491, Mar 84, pp 97-100, 115-137; Robert Price, "Pretoria's Southern African Strategy" in AFRICAN AFFAIRS, vol. 83, No 330, Jan 84, pp 11-32.
21. Cf Klaus von der Ropp, "Afrikas Sueden im Zeichen der Pax Pretoriana" [Southern Africa Under the Pax Pretoriana] in AUSSENPOLITIK, No 4, 1984, p 704ff.
22. Cf THE STAR, International Airmail Weekly, 1 Oct 84.

9478

CSO: 3420/53



SOUTH AFRICA

BUTHELEZI URGES BOTHA DECLARATION OF INTENT

MB230905 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] The chief minister of Kwazulu, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, says the state president, Mr P.W. Botha, should make a declaration of intent with black leaders, which will challenge both black and white political parties to sell positive change to their respective constituencies. Chief Buthelezi was commenting in Ulundi on Mr Botha's latest remarks on freehold rights for blacks outside the national states and black citizenship.

The Kwazulu leader said it was quite clear to him that until Mr Botha accepted the responsibility of campaigning in black society for support for his reforms, and until black leaders campaigned in white society for support for their points of view, both black and white political leaders would remain in a political straight jacket. Chief Buthelezi said it was the state president's unwillingness to state clearly what his reforms were aimed at in terms of final national objectives that made it impossible for responsible black leaders to embark on new ventures with him.

Referring to black local authorities, Chief Buthelezi said that the government had the mistaken impression that the involvement of blacks in these authorities was an indication that they accepted the constitutional future of South Africa. He said that it was this impression that made it impossible for the most important black leaders to take part in the development of the black urban councils, because they were founded on a policy which excluded more than 80 percent of the population of the country.

Meanwhile, the chairman of the Association of Urban Councils, Mr Steve Kgame, has said that blacks must stop prescribing how political change should be accomplished in South Africa. Mr Kgame was reacting to the latest resignations of black town councillors, which brought to more than 150 the number of councillor resignations. Recently, 5 councillors have been murdered, 109 injured, and the houses of at least 70 burned down.

CSO: 3400/61

SOUTH AFRICA

DETAILS ON PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES GIVEN

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 14 Apr 85 p 4

[Article by John MacIennan]

[Text]

PRESIDENT P W Botha's tricameral system of limited power-sharing depends heavily on the "consensus" MPs find behind the closed doors of the standing committees which consider all new legislation.

So far, the system has not faced any really big tests because the legislation referred to the committees has not been contentious. As one wag put it:

"The Government has not dared ask the new boys in the new system to consider new legislation until they have completed their apprenticeship."

The big leap into the unknown provided two imponderables: How would MPs of all parties react when asked to work together, and what could be expected of representatives who had not been to Parliament before?

The Conservative Party's Chief Whip, Jan Hoon, gives an answer to the first. He grew up in the Karoo, his childhood was spent playing with coloured children on the farm, and he now breeds cattle in the far outback of Kuruman.

His party rejects power-sharing and is dedicated to ensuring survival of the white man.

Yet there he was, for several hours a week, discussing legislation with Indian and coloured MPs from the House of Delegates and House of Representatives — not to mention the CP's arch-enemies — the Progressives and the Nationalists.

Mr Hoon, who sits on the committee for constitutional development and planning, allows that it all occurred in a "reasonably good spirit".

He defends his presence at these forums on two grounds.

"We have to guard the interests of the white man and we have to put our standpoint on separate development to people of colour and convince them it is solution for peace.

"We want to show them we are honest on this road to self-determination and that we respect them for what they are."

In this process, he says, "We are nurturing mutual respect".

There is no fraternisation between the CP and MPs of colour outside the committee rooms. Asked if they ever go out for a well-earned lunch together, Mr Hoon replied with a categorical "No."

He is at pains to point out that CP members are not the racial ogres he claims the Nats make them out to be.

In fact, he says, when he objected because Indian members failed to turn up and the committee was short of a quorum, Nat members urged him to "donder die koelies". This language and racism is foreign to his party, he says.

He does not resent the presence of Indian and coloureds on the various committees.

"I can't blame them if they are here to fight for their people."

However, he does blame the Government, and especially President Botha, for creating a situation "where the interests of whites, Indians and coloureds collide".

On some committees the issue of quorums has arisen frequently because attendance has caused greater burdens on the smaller parties, especially on the House of Delegates.

The issue so irked the CP that one member raised it in debate, noting that senior officials and businessmen had flown from the Reef to discuss matters with a committee only to find that there was no quorum. Naturally, the State had to pay for the officials' air fares and accommodation.

Ray Swart of the PFP, who sits on the committees handling co-operation/development and justice, sheds some light on the technical problems the committees face.

Take, for example, the Development Trust and Land Amendment Bill, dealt with by his committee. It relates to land apportioned to the Development Trust and is based on the Land and Trust Act of 1936 which provides for the occupation of land by blacks.

This was old hat to the old hands. But the new coloured and Indian members had to do thorough homework before they were able to make any meaningful contribution.

Mr Swart estimates that "homework" on such a Bill — and this would include discussion with the relevant party working group before the member went into committee — could take as much as six hours.

He makes the point that the system is largely untested because the committees have dealt mainly with amendments to existing legislation.

He finds the system useful in that it allows members to consider the opinions of depart-

mental officials and the legal draughtsmen while studying new legislation.

The real test of the Government's sincerity, he says, will come when the committees are expected to find consensus on politically contentious matters and to give and take.

Mr J N Reddy, leader of Solidarity, the opposition party in the House of Delegates, and member of the committees on public accounts, finance and transport services, is frankly pleased with the way things are going.

"We have come here for the first time and we have had to find our feet. I think the large number of Bills which has gone through is an indication of the genuine desire to find consensus."

He likes it that the committees meet behind closed doors.

"Free from the hurly-burly of public debate, people put their heads together and work with a view to getting the best possible legislation put through."

"This is only the beginning, and the answer to the future is that consensus must only become greater."

He believes the system is providing new bonds across party and racial lines.

"We meet face-to-face, as one human being to another ... a tremendous amount of fellowship is building up."

SOUTH AFRICA

FREEDOM CHARTER PROVISIONS REVIEWED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 23 Apr 85 p 14

[Article by Gary van Staden: "Freedom Charter--SA's Most Distorted Document"]

[Text] "We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know: That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no Government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people." Those words are the introduction to the Freedom Charter which is probably the most misunderstood and distorted document in the South African political jigsaw. Political Reporter Gary van Staden reports.

IT HAS been called a blueprint for socialism in South Africa, a plan drawn up by blacks to drive whites into the sea, communist-inspired African National Congress propaganda and in almost the same breath labelled an insipid document which falls far short of true socialism and South Africa's needs.

Yet for almost 30 years the Freedom Charter has been held up by millions of South Africans — black and white — as the basis for a constitution that would set all the people of the country free, and give them all a place in the sun.

It is probably the most misunderstood and distorted document in the complex South African political jigsaw.

This week the charter was in the news again when Chief Gatsha Buthelezi called for it to be re-examined.

The charter is a simple one-page document which was drawn up by the Congress of the People in Kliptown, Johannesburg, in June 1955.

It calls for the adoption of democratic principles in a new South Africa where all people have the right to vote or stand for election in a unitary state.

The charter has come under fire from two sides. Conservative whites say it is a blueprint for majority rule and the oppression of minority groups while some black politicians have criticised it for entrenching apartheid by insisting on protection for all "national groups".

The principles of the charter are set out under the headings:

- The people shall govern.
- All national groups shall have equal rights.
- The people shall share in the country's wealth.
- The land shall be shared among those who work it.
- All shall be equal before the law.
- All shall have human rights.
- There shall be work and security.
- The doors of learning and culture shall be opened.
- There shall be houses, security and comfort.
- There shall be peace and friendship.

Under the heading "All national groups shall have equal rights" the charter calls

for equal status in bodies of State. This has been interpreted by many significant black political groups, notably Black Consciousness, as entrenching ethnic divisions.

The BC stand on the principle that as all people are equal and the common enemy is capitalism, not apartheid as such, these artificial divisions serve only to divide oppressed workers.

The only division that BC and its major affiliate, the Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo), will accept is that between the workers and the capitalist system which oppresses them.

The charter provision for protection of "national groups" is a major point of difference between Charterism and BC.

The Charter's socialist principles have also been attacked from both sides.

Conservatives fear and mistrust anything associated with the word "socialism". They say the charter's call for ownership of all the mineral wealth, the banks and monopoly industries to be transferred back to the people as a whole, is ample evidence of the charter's true intentions to transfer the economy from free enterprise to socialism.

Azapo and its allies, on the other hand, claim that it does not go far enough. The only answer they say, is to destroy the capitalist system completely and to replace it with socialism.

It says the charter cannot achieve that aim.

The ANC's association with the charter is often highlighted as a means of discrediting the document. But at the time of its signing the ANC was not a banned organisation, its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) did not exist and the ANC was only one of several groups who combined to create the Congress of the People.

Charterists do not claim that the charter is an alternative constitution, only that it should be the basis for a new one and claims that the document does not call for one-man-one-vote are equally inaccurate.

The charter states quite clearly that "every man and every woman shall have the right to vote for and stand as a candidate for allbodies which make laws".

It also states that the "rights of all the people shall be the same regardless of race, colour or sex".

So the omission of the actual words, "one-man-one-vote," being taken to mean that the document makes no such demand are clearly inaccurate.

The charter is no more sinister than many of the entrenched rights which exist in the constitutions of European democracies, socialist or not.

Its only crime seems to be that it makes those same demands for South Africans.

SOUTH AFRICA

COMMENTARY URGES PEACE BY RENAMO IN MOZAMBIQUE

MB241720 Johannesburg International Service in English 1500 GMT 24 Apr 85

[Station Commentary: "Peace in Mozambique"]

[Text] It's (?high time) that ordinary people in Mozambique should reconsider the situation in which they find themselves and do everything possible to bring about peace in the country. There can be no doubt about the fact that the activities of the Renamo rebels are crippling Mozambique and as a direct result of Renamo violence there is widespread suffering in the country.

The security situation in the country is such that few development programs can be put into effective operation and the people are being drawn deeper into a state of despair. The question that Renamo and its supporters must ask themselves is where is this violence leading the country and does it hold any hope of overthrowing the Frelimo government through violence. Not only is South Africa now fighting with Frelimo in eliminating what a government spokesman called the Renamo threat, but the entire Eastern Bloc favors Frelimo and its (?certain) that the Soviet Union and its allies will not merely sit back and watch Frelimo being defeated.

At the same time, the United States lifted its trade embargo against Mozambique following the signing of the Nkomati Accord with South Africa. And it is now well known that Mozambique's relations with the West have improved considerably.

Renamo's support is severely limited and its activities do not carry with them the approval of a single government either in Southern Africa or further afield. This is a realistic assessment of the situation and it graphically illustrates the futility of the RENAMO struggle.

On the other hand the alternative to violence, a cease-fire and peace, presents Mozambique with a picture of prosperity never before seen in the country. What the Renamo rebels and their supporters must realize is that there is a better life awaiting them, but it will not be achieved through the barrel of a gun.

CSO: 3400/61

14 May 1985

## SOUTH AFRICA

## REDUCTION OF ARMS IMPORTS, SPECIAL DEFENSE BUDGET REPORTED

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 14 Apr 85 p 4

[Article by Stephen McQuillan]

## [Excerpts]

THE United Nations arms embargo on South Africa has cut the Republic's major weapons imports to a fraction of what they were 10 years ago.

Working on the value of the US dollar in 1975, South Africa's major weapons imports peaked at \$274 million worth in 1974 before crashing to \$35 million worth in 1983, according to Swedish researchers.

South Africa has been able to secure licences to manufacture ships, guided missile systems and aircraft from overseas, according to the authoritative Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (Sipri) yearbook 1984, titled World Armaments and Disarmament.

In a joint venture with France, it is understood South Africa developed the Cactus guided missile system — a launcher for ground-to-air missiles.




Each year from 1978, the book estimates South Africa produced 100 systems.

The researchers say South Africa planned to build nine Reshef Class fast attack craft under licence from Israel.

The licence was granted in 1977 and production started a year later.



## Special Defence Budget 'bolsters defence'





South Africa built one in 1978, 1979, 1982, 1983 and two in 1980. Three others — each armed with six Scorpion ship-to-ship missiles, derived from the Israeli Gabriel missile — were built in Israel.

Italy granted licences for South Africa to build the Impala-2 trainer/light ground attack aircraft in 1974. Four were built that year. The book estimates 12 were built in South Africa each year from 1976 to 1983.

Researchers also say fixed radars were exported to South Africa from Britain. Britain denied it was a violation of the UN arms embargo. But observers suggested the radars would have a military role.

Says the book: "In a handbook on weapon systems, the Marconi S247 radar is only described vaguely, since 'information relating to these radars is still largely subject to security restriction'."

France — notorious for its willingness to sell weapons to almost anyone — is currently embargoing South Africa and Chile.

On exports, South Africa believes it can penetrate the highly competitive international arms market, according to the Stockholm institute.

The Republic believed it could do this because its weapons were operationally tested and evaluated.

The book says South Africa's military expenditure is largely determined by its occupation of Namibia and the associated raids into neighbouring countries.

The Republic now has more than 40 military bases in Namibia and maintains a force of between 75 000 and 100 000 troops, excluding locally recruited forces, 110 000 armed white settlers in Namibia and additional reinforcements airlifted into the area.

The 1982 estimates of manpower requirements, included plans for an increase in South African forces in Namibia over the next three years and the programme of forced conscription of black Namibians.

"The high level of direct military activity is reflected in the high and increasing share of the budget required for operational costs," says Sipri.

According to the 1982 Defence White Paper, this share would increase from 55,6 percent in 1979/80 to 66,7 percent in 1982/83. And a continuation of the trend was planned for the following five years.

SOUTH AFRICA

NG KERK EXPRESSES CONCERN AT UNREST, DISINVESTMENT

MB231204 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1115 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] The Federal Council of the Nederduits Gereformeerde [NG] Kerk [Netherlands Reformed Church] has asked the government to investigate the causes of frustration among blacks and ways of diminishing it as soon as possible. In a statement issued in Pretoria, the NG Kerk, the NG Mission Church, and the NG Church of Africa have urged their congregations not to resort to violence and bloodshed. They have made an urgent appeal to their members to remain calm, even if provoked. They have also urged them to try to find solutions along the road of negotiation.

The churches have also asked for prayers of intercession for the government and other leaders so that they may reach agreement in their search for justice. They have also asked for prayers for those who have to maintain order because justice is not possible in the midst of disorder.

The director of the ecumenical affairs and information of the NG Kerk, Dr Pierre Rossouw, says churches in the United States are discouraging investment in South Africa. He says South Africa churches will have to find a way to counteract the disinvestment campaign. Dr Rossouw, who has just returned from the United States, said that there were at least three large church organizations in Washington and a number in New York which were involved in the disinvestment campaign against South Africa. He said that these organizations had a great influence on their congregations and also on companies which invested in South Africa.

Dr Rossouw told our Pretoria news office that these churches were in contact with certain churches in South Africa. Visitors from church circles in South Africa often address the American organizations. He said there were indications that there are churches in the country which cooperated directly with American churches. Dr Rossouw said that the NG Kerk had to reassess its vocation and responsibility and to consider possible ways of counteracting the disinvestment campaign.

CSO: 3400/61

SOUTH AFRICA

EAST CAPE LEADERS WELCOME IRRIGATION PLANS

MB230736 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 23 Apr 85

[Text] Eastern Cape political, business, and agricultural leaders have welcomed the state president's announcement concerning the development of irrigation projects in the Eastern Cape to create jobs. The chairman of the Ministers Council of the House of Representatives, the Reverend Allan Hendrickse, said in the council that the creation of more jobs in the Eastern Cape could help to stabilize family and community life, because many residents there had to seek work elsewhere or had to travel long distances to work and back.

The chairman of the Port Elizabeth Afrikaanse Sake Damer [Afrikaans Chamber of Commerce], (Mr Korbus Alberts), said the announcement was proof of the government's awareness of the area's problems. The director of the Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce, Mr (Tony Gilson), said the development of the agricultural sector could play an important part in countering economic problems. The president of the Eastern Cape Agricultural Union, Mr (Towie Meyer), said that during construction of the irrigation projects, jobs in the agricultural sector will be created in both the short and the long term.

Professor Nic Wiehahn of the University of South Africa said in the program that unemployment was one of South Africa's biggest problems today, and that the withdrawal of foreign capital would aggravate the situation. The people of all population groups were entering the labor market in increasing numbers each year. He said if the American companies were to withdraw from South Africa, then vital technological know-how and training opportunities would be lost.

CSO: 3400/61

SOUTH AFRICA

AFRIKANER, INKATHA YOUTH HOLD CONFERENCE ON FUTURE

MB200746 Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 20 Apr 85

[Text] The importance of political participation by blacks on central government level has been emphasized at a conference in Johannesburg on the political future of South Africa. It was organized by the Afrikaanse Studentebond [ASB] [Afrikaans Student Union] and the Inkatha Youth Movement.

Opening the conference, the minister of home affairs of Kwazulu, Dr D. Madide, said that a political system based on domination inevitably led to dictatorship. He praised the state president, Mr P.W. Botha, for his initiatives to bring change to the country, and urged him to issue a declaration stating that the future of South Africa lay in the political participation of all population groups.

The president of the ASB, Mr (Martinus van Schalkwyk), said that a national convention should be held. It should discuss the effective participation of all population groups in central government, the protection of individual rights, and the maintenance of community rights.

The president of the Inkatha Youth Movement, Mr (Musa Zondi), said that apartheid was destroying the country. However, he said, there was still time to find peaceful solutions to problems.

CSO: 3400/61

SOUTH AFRICA

TECHNOLOGICAL, SALES AGREEMENTS WITH TAIWAN REPORTED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 23 Apr 85 p 14

[Text]

**CAPE TOWN.** — Positive conclusions had been reached on the expansion of the export of South African wine to the Republic of China and it was decided that a new agreement on the future sales of South African maize to China would be signed early next year, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Dr Dawie de Villiers said in Cape Town yesterday.

Speaking after the signing of the agreed minutes of the discussions between delegations of both countries on conclusion of the seventh economic and technological conference in Cape Town, Dr De Villiers said the export of maize, leaf tobacco, wines and the possible sales of SA Krugerrands had been discussed.

He added that import quotas, import tariffs and other non-tariff trade barriers were reviewed and it had been decided in principle to enter into agreements on quality surveillance and the protection of industrial property rights on a reciprocal basis.

Mr Danie Steyn, Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs also signed an agreement of co-operation in the areas of minerals and energy with the Minister of Economic Affairs of the Republic of China, Mr T H Lee.

Mr Steyn said both countries were desirous to strengthen scientific and technological co-operation and would exchange scientists, engineers and information regarding mineral and energy technology.

Mr Steyn said both countries desired the promotion of joint venture agreements between entrepreneurs for the exploration, development and utilisation of mineral deposits and energy resources.

Mr T H Lee said, after signing both agreements, that the talks had been "open, candid and most successful" and that he hoped that the agreements "would be put into practice as soon as possible."

Dr De Villiers said the discussions were held in terms of the 1975 trade agreement which provides for regular consultations between representa-

tives of the two countries in order to consider ways and means of expanding the trade and economic relations and resolve any difficulties that may arise in this regard.

**Principle**

He said the two governments had concluded in principle to sign an agreement on the ATA Carnet system on the arrangements for the temporary importation of goods:

- An exchange of views on countertrade took place and studies on this subject will continue in both countries.

- The possible sale of further electrical railway train sets to China was discussed.

- The possibilities of a convention between the private sectors of the two countries were discussed and it had been agreed that both governments would further consider the feasibility of such a convention.

- It had been agreed that both governments will give support to the promotion of joint ventures in both countries.

**Accepted**

Dr De Villiers said a draft agreement had been

accepted in respect of the carriage of general cargo between the two countries. In the field of agriculture and fisheries the continuance of various existing co-operation projects and the exchange of researchers had been confirmed and field for further co-operation and research was identified.

Various existing co-operation projects in the fields of science and technology were reviewed and new fields for further collaborative research were identified. It was also agreed that two-way visits of scientists aimed at surveying the activities in this field would continue.

With regard to medicine and health, a draft agreement was approved on the training of medical personnel and nurses. Certain projects have been identified as research related issues and will be further investigated by the relative authorities.

"I believe the potential for further trade between South Africa and the Republic of China is vast," Dr De Villiers said. — Sapa.

SOUTH AFRICA

DETAILS ON INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION GIVEN

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 14 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by Brian Pottinger: "Get Out of Town!"]

[Text]

**SOUTH AFRICA'S R600-million a year industrial decentralisation programme is to turn into a run-away administrative nightmare involving 26 Government bodies — with millions of rands at stake.**

A multi-party parliamentary standing committee — including members of the National Party — this week expressed their deep concern at the way the policy was being implemented.

But President Botha has again called for massive private sector support for his mega-rand plan to tempt industrialists to establish themselves in rural areas and deconcentration points near the existing metropolises.

State expenditure on the scheme to create jobs in the rural areas has increased six-fold in four years and now accounts for 50 percent of the total

**Trade and Industry budget.**

But a startled Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance has been told by Government spokesmen that it is still not known:

- how many of the 777 approved decentralisation applications made three years ago by industrialists have been proceeded with;
- how much of the R2,6-billion in pledged investment has actually been invested;
- how many jobs have been created by the enormously expensive scheme in the last three years;
- what is owed in decentralisation incentives — wage, relocation, plant, interest, electricity and transport subsidies — to businessmen who have located in the growth areas.

Government spokesman persistently claim the initiative launched by the Government at the Good Hope Conference in 1981 is a success.

But four years and R600-million later, Government spokesmen admit there are no statistics available to judge its cost effectiveness.

Sources have indicated, however, that statistics are being extracted as incentive claims come in. The scheme has only been in operation for three years and industrialists were given two years to establish.

**Criteria**

They also claim the applications are measured by strict criteria and the paying out of incentives carefully monitored.

The PFP's Mr Andrew Savage disagrees: "The Government has no idea of what the scheme is going to cost in the long-run. There are no cost-benefit analyses available."

The Finance Committee's report, he said, was inadequate in that it did not address the central problem — the damaging effect of the strategy on industrial competitiveness.

The multi-million rand decentralisation project was first expected to cost R100-million in payment of subsidies to businessmen interested in setting up factories in the growth points in 1982.

By 1983 it had leapt to R160-million. Last year, the Government budgetted R240-million for the scheme but had to hastily pump in another R60-million when the claims from factory owners started rolling into the Treasury.

**Obligations**

This year a whopping R627,1-million has been budgetted by the Government for the scheme — and there is still no indication of how many jobs it will create or what the Government's contractual obligations to investors will cost next year.

Professor C L MacCarthy, Professor of Economics at Stellenbosch, argues in the recently published book "Up Against the Fences", that the strategy has the potential to distract from employment creation in the economy.

In the same book, Professor Gavin Maasdorp, Director of the University of Natal's Economic Research Unit, concludes "the economic arguments for large-scale and widespread decentralisation of industries in South Africa are not convincing."

President Botha — aware of the mounting criticism — this week in a speech at the Rand Show called on the business sector to help with the strategy in order to overcome the consequences of over-concentration.

CS0: 3400/58

SOUTH AFRICA

EXPLOITATION OF HOMELAND WORKERS CLAIMED

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 14 Apr 85 p 11

[Article by Jon Qwelane]

[Text]

PROMISES of huge salaries are used to lure many homeland workers to the cities where they are exploited, ill-treated, underpaid and generally made to work in conditions that are only slightly better than slaves.

Several such workers have been dismissed by Springbok Patrols, the firm which recruited them from Transkei.

The men claim that:

- Their homeland passports were taken from them as soon as the recruitment procedure was over. This drastically curtailed their movement because without identity documents they could be locked up.

- After commencing work they were never paid the salaries they were originally promised.

- Sometimes they were never paid because they were regarded as "spares" — meaning the firm had no work for them.

- They were often assaulted.

- They worked 12 hours every night with no time off.

- They were each given half a loaf of brown bread in the morning with a can of beef or fish, and only the bread when they went on duty at night.

- They were not registered by Springbok Patrols.

- They had no unemployment benefits.

The men's claims have been documented by Learn and Teach, a magazine aimed at improving literacy among working adults and making workers aware of their rights.

Seven of the men who once worked for Springbok Patrols have now signed affidavits alleging that the sons of Mr Mick Baartman, the owner of the company, often assaulted and insulted them.

Mr Paulus Zamekile Stuurman (27) says he was recruited in Queenstown in May 1982, and was promised a free uniform and R250 a month.

"In the first month I worked for 19 days, and was paid only R1. I worked for the whole of the next month, but was paid only R120 and for the third month I received R159 which was the highest I ever earned at Springbok Patrols," Mr Stuurman says.

He says there were times when he did not work because he was made a "spare".

He said he wanted to complain about the broken promises but was warned by other workers that he would be assaulted if he queried earnings.

Mr Mongezi Bhulu (50) says he was recruited in December 1981 and promised full time

employment, free food and R220 a month. In January 1982 he worked weekends only and was paid R4 for his efforts. From then on his salary varied.

Mr Matata Dikopu (31) comes from Engcobo in the Transkei and says he was promised a salary of R300 a month but was paid only R65 after working for more than half a month.

"When I asked about the low wages, I was told that money was deducted for food. We were given half a loaf of brown bread morning and evening, and a tin of fish or beef once a day," Mr Dikopu says.

Other workers who make similar claims are Mr Quantlosi Maseti, Mr Siphwe Hlatwayo, Mr Gqinisiko Mthini and Mr Lucas Mazinyo who adds that even though the working hours were from 6 pm to 6 am the men had to report at 3 pm and were sometimes not fetched by 8 am.

Mr Mthini said a dog was set on him when he went to claim money owed him.

The owner of Springbok Patrols, Mr Mick Baartman when told about the workers' allegations, said he was aware of them. "I have nothing to say," he answered and put the telephone down.

SOUTH AFRICA

BRITS GET FIRST OPTICAL FIBRE FACTORY

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 22 Apr 85 p 24

[Text]

PRODUCTION of optical fibre is to begin soon at the first factory in Africa to undertake manufacture — a R9-million installation at Brits in the Transvaal which will be run by Optical Fibre, a company established by ATC.

A Pty company, ATC is jointly owned by Barlows through Reunerts which has a 25 percent stake in ATC: other shareholders are AEI Henley and two UK concerns, STC and BICC.

Since 1982 ATC has been importing optical fibre for cabling at its Brits factory, using technology developed by a facility owned by Standard Telephones and Cables (STC), and in 1983 decided to establish the plant for local manufacture.

According to Optical Fibre chairman and ATC managing director Peter Watt the company has already decided to increase its capacity by 150 percent, building it up to meet growing South African demand which is expected to reach 30 000 km this year.

Initially, the company's principal customer will be the Post Office, the majority of the fibre being used in long-distance telecommunications, though eventually other types of customers could become more important.

The value of the cable made from fibre lies in various attributes not possessed by copper cable. The cable does not use electricity, but transmits voice by means of light impulses through a hair-thin glass core, and in use, a pair of fibres can carry 2 000 simultaneous telephone connections

over 10 km, whereas a pair of copper wires can handle only 15 calls over 3 km.

One km of 8-fibre, 10 mm in diameter, weighs 100 kg and will carry almost 8 000 calls with present technology: the biggest copper pair cable would be 80 mm in diameter, weigh 10 000 kg, and carry only 2 000 calls.

And having no metal in them, the cables are not disturbed by electrical interference and lightning.

Although certain raw materials for the manufacture of the fibres will have to be imported, including high grade silica and fused silica start tubes as well as small quantities of extremely pure liquid chemicals, the pure dry gases needed are locally available.

Estimates of the saving to South Africa's foreign exchange bills in 1986 are put at R10-million.

CSO: 3400/58



SOUTH AFRICA

## AZANIAN STUDENTS' CONFRONTATION RESULTS IN VIOLENCE

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 23 Apr 85 pp 1, 4

[Article by Ali Mphaki]

[Text]

**SIX people were injured in a violent confrontation between members of the Azanian Students' Movement and the Azanian Students' Organisation at the University of the North (Turfloop) on Sunday.**

Among the injured was former Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) president Mr Lybon Mabasa, who was invited to deliver a paper at a meeting organised by Azasm on the campus.

Azasm is affiliated to the National Forum with sister bodies Azapo, Azanyu and other black consciousness organisations. Azasm is affiliated to the United Democratic Front with other progressive democratic organisations committed to the Freedom Charter.

The two groupings, the BC movement and Progressive Democrats (PDs) constitute the major political ideologies in the black community.

The confrontation at Turfloop is a continuation of the rivalry between them as they vie for control of the black masses and to make capital out of any situation that arises.

About 10 days ago UDF supporters barred Azapo supporters from attending the mass Uitenhage funeral. Early this year Azapo members were injured after being attacked by Congress of South African Students supporters at Tembisa. Cosas is also affiliated to the UDF.

Others injured were Mr Thami Mcerwa, vice-president of Azasm, Mr Sydney Temba (who was admitted at the Groothoek Hospital with multiple stab wounds), also an Azapo member, Ms Sesi Baloyi, Azasm member, Mr Teboho Moloi, Azaso member and former Turfloop SRC president, and another student whose name was not available to The SOWETAN late yesterday.

Mr Temba's condition was late last night reported to be serious after he had undergone an emergency operation.

Mr Mabasa said while the Azasm meeting was on, a "group of students shouting support for the Freedom Charter marched into the hall disrupting the proceedings.

"They asked us to leave the hall as they had also booked it for their meeting. We left," said Mr Mabasa. He added: "While we continued with the meeting at a different hall, they came in again and a fight broke out.

"I saw Sesi Baloyi being beaten up. Thami and I were caught in the toilets. I saw them chopping and stabbing

Thami, breaking his teeth with a brick in the process."

But both Azaso and UDF yesterday denied attacking BC activists, claiming they (BC) came on the campus armed with an assortment of weapons.

"Since when do people attend meetings armed?" Azaso president Mr Simphiwe Mgoduso asked.

Azapo said in a statement: "In the context of various assaults to our members since 1982, the attack on Mabasa is the straw that will break the camel's back."

The UDF, of which Azaso is an affiliate, said in a statement: "We appeal to Azapo and Azasm leadership to control their members.

We ourselves will continue to restrain our rank and file against any form of provocation."

The Anglican Bishop of Johannesburg, Bishop Desmond Tutu, said: "Who benefits from this? Why must we intimidate one another? When are we going to learn to agree to disagree? Black solidarity has been preached for too long for us not to understand its importance."

Other leaders pointed out that an Azapo-UDF fight would lay both organisations wide open to attacks by Government-supporting organisations. These Government-supporting organisations would attack members of the one organisation knowing that the rival group would be blamed, they said.

SOUTH AFRICA

ACCESS TO EEC MARKET SOUGHT

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 14 Apr 85 p 5

[Article by Malcolm Fothergill]

[Text]

SOUTH AFRICAN companies are being offered a British doorway into the European Economic Community market.

Doing the offering is Mr Bill Muirhead, former managing director of Table Top and director of Defy, who left for Britain during the week. The export operation he is setting up will have two main aims.

First will be to get South African goods, either finished or part-finished, into the EEC; second will be to beat anti-South African moves in the United States by adding value to South African goods in the EEC, then exporting the goods from there to the US.

Mr Muirhead will operate from Welford-on-Avon, 20 minutes from the Birmingham city centre.

He believes disinvestment moves in the US will gather strength in coming months.

"Liberalism in the US has failed. Reaganomics has shown that conservatism works. Therefore the left wing in the US has picked on what they think is President Reagan's Achilles heel.

"Their campaign is beginning to build up, and this could be a problem for South African companies with high-profile products. If they can send me a part-finished product that I can get finished in Europe, preferably in the UK, I will be able to export it to the US without problems."

Mr Muirhead believes the British will not object to his link with South Africa: "The British are far more pragmatic than the Americans are. And they have been enormous purchasers of South African goods for generations."

Besides shuttling back and forth between Britain and South Africa for the past decade, Mr Muirhead has made a mark on the world of athletics — he was the man retained by the Budd family to negotiate on Zola's behalf before she left South Africa. His negotiations resulted in Zola's deal with the London Daily Mail.

● For more details of this export operation, write to: Mr W H Muirhead, The Scullards, Chapel Street, Welford-on-Avon, Warwickshire, England.

SOUTH AFRICA

TRANSKEIAN TRADERS REGULATION REPORTED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 23 Apr 85 p 12

[Text]

UMTATA. — Non-citizens at present trading in Transkei are hoping for a year's delay in the implementation of a proposed Bill that would revoke business registration certificates issued to non-Transkeians after December 1963.

The draft Bill, published in last week's Government Gazette, will be taken through Parliament by the Minister of Commerce, Tourism and Industry, Mr Ramsey Madi-kizla.

Traders affected will have to surrender their certificates of registration within 14 days after the Bill becomes law.

A delegation of affected traders has approached President Kaiser Matanzima for a reprieve of one year to enable those who wish to take out Transkeian citizenship to do so.

A delegation spokesman said President Matanzima had been "very sympathetic" and had promised to look into the matter after the Bill was passed.

The Bill empowers the President to grant exemptions by proclamation from the requirement to surrender certificates within 14 days.

Most Transkeian businessmen believe the intention of the measure is not to kick out non-citizen traders already in the country, but to prevent large chain stores coming into Transkei. Under the Bill, a licence holder as well as all partners must be Transkei citizens.

They say this would be in line with the recent buy-at-home campaign by the Transkei Chamber of Commerce, of which President Matanzima is a strong supporter. —Sapa.

CSO: 3400/58

SOUTH AFRICA

## URBAN DEVELOPMENT BOARDS TO BE ESTABLISHED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 23 Apr 85 p 13

[Article by Brian Stuart]

[Text]

ANOTHER major step in constitutional reform will be taken within the next few weeks with the establishment of municipal development boards throughout the country.

These bodies which will be set up on a regional basis, will:

- assist existing local government bodies to function more effectively;
- advise on the setting up of local government institutions of their own for the various groups; and
- act as a think-tank, leading to the creation of regional services councils which will have executive powers in providing essential services within each region.

The 1983 legislation providing for development boards referred to White, Coloured and Indian local authorities. Last month the legislation was amended to include Black local institutions as well.

The Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning, Mr Chris Heunis, told Parliament: "The general objective is the maintenance of security, stability and self-determination for every group and to give everyone a say in the decision-making affecting their lives.

"I shall now reiterate that this includes the Black communities."

The new law will give Ucasa (Urban Councils Association of SA), the Black local government association, representation on the Council for the Co-ordination of Local Government Affairs.

The council has already set standardised qualifications for municipal voters and new laws may be introduced later this session on qualifications for municipal candidates and periods of office.

It has also made recommendations on the delimitation of municipal areas in future. The possibility of combining the delimitation of a group area

with that of a municipal area has been referred to the President's Council for investigation.

Another study of the co-ordinating council concerned the requirements of a "viable local authority". Mr Heunis said the government wished to ensure only viable local authorities were created.

Now all is set for the next stage, which is the establishment of the regional development boards, which will provide expert advice to pep up the efficiency of existing local authorities as well as identify areas in which viable local authorities can be founded for people of colour.

Mr Heunis said: "In order to establish local government institutions of their own for the various race groups, it will be necessary to make use of specialised knowledge and experience in various spheres of activity of local authorities."

He said the municipal development boards would "provide local authorities with development aid and advise so as to make those authorities as self-sufficient as possible, as soon as possible."

Represented on the municipal development boards will be local authorities, provincial administrations and the central government.

"It is the aim of the Government that every population group should, as far as is practicable, have its own institutions of local government so that self-determination may be realised to the maximum extent at the local level as well," Mr Heunis said.

The third function of the boards will be to do the homework necessary for the creation of regional services councils.

These will be bodies with powers of taxation and whose function it will be to co-ordinate and provide essential services.

Legislation for the establishment of the services councils is due to be introduced in Parliament this session.

In the meantime, the Minister has already received recommendations for the provincial administrations on the boundaries of the development boards and the appointment of people to these boards by Mr Heunis.

These boards are due to be established soon and Mr Heunis is expected to set out the full procedure when his post is debated in Parliament from May 6. However, announcements about the creation of boards in specific areas may be made before then.

14 May 1985

## SOUTH AFRICA

## ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE NEED DISCUSSED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 14 Apr 85 p 6

[Article by Amrit Manga]

[Text]

**SOUTH Africa needs an economic growth rate of at least 3,7% to increase the average standard of living by 1% a year.**

Between 1972 and 1983 the average annual growth rate was 3%, and if 1984 is included it falls to 2,7%.

Jan Visser, executive director of the National Productivity Institute, says that if jobs are not to be found for the growing number of entrants to the labour market, the growth rate will have to increase.

### Inflation

Dr Visser says: "The obvious growth area is exports of manufactured products, but productivity improvements are essential."

Preliminary NPI results

for 1984 indicate that labour productivity improved satisfactorily. Labour productivity rose by 3,1% in the non-agricultural goods sector after a decline 0,9% in 1983.

"One must hope that this trend continues because our competitiveness on international markets depends on it. Wage gains that exceed productivity increases raise unit labour costs, leading to higher product prices and stimulating inflation."

At the end of the third quarter of 1984, labour productivity was almost 5,1% higher than in the same time in 1983 (see graph). It was the net result of an increase in production of 4,6% and a decline in employment of 0,5%. Employees earned on average about 12,5% more than in the same quarter of 1983.

Dr Visser says: "Productivity is making only a small contribution to overall economic growth in South

Africa. In many of our major trading competitors, productivity growth is responsible for as much as 60% of economic growth."


South Africa's rapidly increasing population is a major reason for low growth in output a head.

Between 1972 and 1983, SA's population increased by 2,7% a year against 0,96% in Japan, 1,9% in the Republic of China and 0,05% in the United Kingdom.

### Pressure

"South Africa's staggering increase in population, which is exerting tremendous pressure on the economic growth rate, must be slowed down by increasing the standard of living.

"The only way of achieving a higher standard of living is through higher productivity. We will simply have to produce ourselves out of our economic problems."



CSO: 3400/58



SOUTH AFRICA

NEW BANKS ACT REQUIREMENTS DETAILED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 14 Apr 85 p 1

[Article by Alec Hogg]

[Text] Banking groups will be calling on shareholders for tens of millions of rands through rights issues in the next few months.

The new Banks Act, to be ratified by Parliament this year, will force them to follow Standard Bank in making hefty additions to their disclosed reserves. That is the view of bankers who have seen the draft legislation.

Standard will reinforce its capital base with a R177-million rights issue. Other banks will have to ask shareholders for proportionately more.

Premiums

SA banks' share prices are almost alone in the world in trading at large premiums to net worth, so rights issues will be the cheapest way of improving capital bases.

Standard Bank group's deputy chief executive, Eddie Theron, says the capital Stanbic will raise "brings us into line with what is regarded as an acceptable level overseas."

SA banks have benefited from lenient capital requirements, which together with an officially sanctioned cartel helped to make them among the most profitable in the world. The cartel was scrapped in 1983.

Pressure on the Reserve Bank by central banks of major Western nations, including the US and the UK, has been instrumental in the proposed changes in SA banking law.

Barclays will be hardest pressed to meet the new capital requirement. It needs R293-million to get its capital into line with Stanbic's after the rights issue. Barclays capital will have to rise by 46%.

Trust Bank needs an additional R83-million of capital to bring its disclosed reserves up to the 4,8% of total assets in Stanbic. Trust Bank has to increase its present capital by 37%.

Nedbank needs R114-million, or 22% more.

#### Praise

The only other major bank whose capital base is close to adequate is Volkskas, which needs to increase its reserves by R41-million, or less than 10%.

The Stanbic rights issue has drawn praise from the opposition. Barclays general manager, finance, Stan MacDonald, says: "Their timing was impeccable."

Stanbic has a head start in the rush for capital and has placed other banks at a disadvantage.

But a sudden demand for all the needed capital, which runs into hundreds of millions of rands, is not expected to hit the JSE.

Mr MacDonald says: "It is not necessarily true that the rest of the banks will be rushing into rights issues--this would only depress the market as a whole.

#### Expensive

"There are other ways of improving capital ratios. These include the issue of preference shares or subordinated loans, which are large institutional investments with long enough to maturity to qualify as adequate protection for depositors."

The problem is that subordinated loans are far more expensive than rights capital.

Stanbic is effectively raising its R177-million at a cost of 9%. If it opted for subordinated loans at today's rates it would pay twice that.

Bank shares have lost ground in recent months, but still have relatively high ratings so a good portion of the new capital will be raised through rights issues.

Once the new capital requirements are in force, banks will be obliged to plough back a greater proportion of profit--causing restricted dividend payments and, eventually, lower JSE ratings.

Mr Theron says: "Nowhere else in the world do bank shares trade at such large premiums to net assets. In many countries they trade at a discount to net asset value.

"As a result, it makes good sense for us to raise money in the market at today's share price. Only in the past four or five years have share prices stood at a premium to net worth and there is no reason to believe this will last forever."

## Internal

Nedbank has always had a significant share price premium over net asset. Its general manager Merton Dagut, says: "This is probably because we hold large internal reserves so our disclosed net asset value is highly conservative."

Barclays discloses all and has no hidden reserves.

One mitigating factor for banks is that the new capital requirements will be phased in over five years, but even that period of grace is unlikely to allow them to avoid rights issues.

### Rights Issue Prospects

|                   | Share-<br>holders<br>Funds | Issued<br>Shares | Net<br>Asset<br>Value | Share<br>Price ‡ | Pre-<br>mium<br>Over<br>Nav | Total<br>Assets | Capital<br>Re-<br>quired† |
|-------------------|----------------------------|------------------|-----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|
| Barclays (Dec 84) | R638,1m                    | 58,0m            | 1 100c                | 1 455c           | 32%                         | R19 400m        | R293m                     |
| Stanbic (Dec 84)  | R751,2m                    | 73,9m*           | 1 016c                | 1 325c           | 30%                         | R19 367m        | R177m                     |
| Nedbank (Sep 84)  | R500,8m                    | 91,3m            | 549c                  | 1 080c           | 97%                         | R12 800m        | R114m                     |
| Volkskas (Sep 84) | R429,4m                    | 44,7m*           | 960c                  | 910c             | n/a                         | R 9 800m        | R 41m                     |
| Trust (Dec 84)    | R224,5m                    | 132,8m*          | 169c                  | 203c             | 20%                         | R 6 400m        | R 83m                     |

† Based on the Stanbic rights issue

\* Includes convertible preference shares

‡ As at opening of trading on Friday, April 12

CSO: 3400/58

14 May 1985

## SOUTH AFRICA

## COMPANY BANKRUPTCY, LIQUIDATIONS INCREASE

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 14 Apr 85 p 5

[Article by Ciaran Ryan]

[Text]

A TOTAL of 4 312 companies were liquidated last year — 13,5% more than in South Africa's last economic crisis in 1977, says Kreditreview, a credit information newsletter published by KreditInform.

The number of summonses issued against defaulting businesses increased by 15,7% between 1983 and 1984, but their value soared by 47% to R240-million.

Kreditreview says that sum is probably only half the amount owing because companies do not often issue summonses for small amounts of money.

### 16 a day

Dun & Bradstreet, another credit information company, reports that 330 companies were liquidated in March 1985 — 35% more than the 244 in March last year. Companies are closing at the rate of 16 a day.

The number of judgments in the Eastern and Western Cape increased by 22% and 23% respectively. More than

39 500 judgments were recorded in South Africa in March 1985 — almost 13% more than the 35 000 in March last year.

Kreditreview estimates that 2 000 close corporations have been registered since January. It says many sole proprietors and partnerships may be seeking to protect their assets under the Close Corporations Act.

Judgments against consumers and businesses in Johannesburg and the Reef jumped by 92% in March 1985 compared with March last year.

In the textile industry about 47% of debts — more than R20,3-million — are outstanding — 12,9% more than last year.

Kreditreview says some form of Government assistance is required in the textile industry as more than 13 000 workers have been retrenched.

The building industry in

the Western Cape is withstanding the recession. The increase in the number of debtors overdue has increased by only 3,7% in 1984 over 1983 the amount has risen by 2,1%.

CSO: 3400/58

14 May 1985

SOUTH AFRICA

PFP, NRP COOPERATION WELCOMED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 23 Apr 85 p 6

[Text]

WE CONGRATULATE the Progressive Federal Party and the New Republic Party for declaring their willingness to join the Cabinet committee considering the future of the Blacks.

Particularly the PFP, which has abandoned the boycott mentality that was evident when it refused to participate in the original President's Council, thus depriving itself of the opportunity of having any say in the constitutional reforms that were being planned.

Although the PFP campaigned for a "No" vote in the referendum, it has been doing its best to play a constructive role in the working of the new Parliament and dispensation.

Nevertheless, the Leader of the White Opposition, Dr Van Zyl Slabbert, has not suspended his criticism of the constitutional set-up and of the Government's policies.

Fair enough.

The PFP has to stick by its principles, even though it has no hope of coming to power, and as the Official Opposition its duty is to oppose.

Besides, the ruling party and Government are now following some of the very ideas propounded over the years by the Progressive Federal Party and the New Republic Party or their predecessors.

No doubt, in the climate of change, there will be other Opposition ideas which, considered today to be politically wayout and unfeasible, will in time be similarly taken over.

Dr Slabbert has never accepted that the PFP is irrelevant, what with Coloureds and Indians able to speak for themselves in Parliament and a reformist government taking the initiative for change.

He has hinted that when the Right-wing backlash threatens the ruling party's grip, the NP may have to consider alliances with other reformist parties.

This, too, may happen, however unlikely it seems at present.

One stumbling block, of course, would be the Left-wing of the PFP, the so-called Houghton Clique, which would not readily have anything to do with the NP. Nor would the party's youth wing.

It is also doubtful whether staunch Nationalists would be keen to have any association with the PFP as such.

But politics in this country has taken unpredictable turns before today. Anyone watching the reformist zeal of the present Government must wonder at the thought that it was a Nationalist Government which introduced apartheid in the first place.

The new broad South Africanism of the Government, which has resulted in English-speakers being taken into the Cabinet, is also a radical departure from the previously exclusive Afrikaner rule of the NP.

But with reform, White politics is changing dramatically — the battle now being between reformist and apartheidist parties, with the Government the arm of reform and the CP promising to block or reverse the process.

Against this background, the decision of Dr Slabbert to join the Cabinet committee is not strange.

Although he and his party have consistently called for a national convention, Dr Slabbert has accepted Mr P W Botha's invitation to all parties to join a "national team effort to seek solutions to burning problems".

Dr Slabbert says this is an important step, recognising that no one party can resolve the country's problems.

He intends to ensure that the committee "becomes a relevant forum for considering structural change, a sort of semi-national convention".

And he has pledged to use what influence the PFP has to draw in Black leaders who have shunned the Government's overtures.

It is a pity the Conservative Party has refused to participate since, even though it cannot accept power sharing, its voice should be heard.

As the PFP learnt when it boycotted the President's Council, there is nothing to be gained by standing outside any body that seeks solutions, whether one agrees or not with what may be ultimately decided.

SOUTH AFRICA

NOTED EDUCATOR DENOUNCES APARTHEID, VIOLENCE

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 14 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by Franklin Sonn]

[Text]

IT HAS been said that education and labour will prove to be the terrains on which the forces of change will be played out.

We who are deeply involved in both education and union affairs are conscious that our successful functioning is no longer only dependent on our ability as educators or on our skills at collective bargaining.

We are required to keep the show on the road, while at the same time meeting the legitimate demands of students and union members, and we have an important role to play to bring about much overdue change.

From year to year we muddle through in the hope that the following year will be a better one. There must surely be a better way than this form of crisis management.

Whatever we do, we have to stick to certain fundamentals:

- Peace, development and security are goals worth striving for and must underpin all educational endeavour.

- Apartheid and lasting peace are a contradiction in terms.

- Apartheid is a violent system which must go, but must make way for a better order.

- Justice must be established without violence because just goals cannot be achieved by unjust means.

- True reconciliation must be our radical goal.

- Education is a very precious commodity and is not negotiable.

- Sound yet fair discipline based on respect is imperative.

Few will disagree with these objectives. Some will say that the die is cast and these goals can no longer be achieved without burning our country to the ground and starting all over again.

Others, of whom I am one, believe that radical and dramatic action can still save the day.

After all, few are so unreasonable as to believe that those who perish in the streets stand to enjoy the fruits of a free and peaceful South Africa.

True radicalism means getting rid of what is wrong and building what is right.

Both must go together. If our hatred of the present system makes us so blind that we concentrate exclusively on the first, then we cannot claim to be radical.

## Freedom

Anyone can analyse and protest. That is needed, but it is only one part of the final objective.

New structures built on new and widely acceptable value systems are the crucial other side of the coin.

On the other hand, mere suppression can be successfully maintained if one possesses the military wherewithal.

This, however, can also not last forever and is, as has been seen in the tragic event in Uitenhage, the antithesis of peace and confidence.

which form the basis of nation, growth and a sense of security.

If a garden is a waste piece of mess of weeds, he can be proud, plan two stages at clears the weeds, new seeds and plants.

Otherwise the clear will soon erupt into an flourishing crop of weeds.

Let us be honest and we have seen too many examples of the freedom struggle ending in a new brand of exploitation and dictatorship.

Selfishness, arrogance and the for power are not the monopoly of the white man.

As we therefore work to uproot the weeds of apartheid, we must be preparing the seeds and plants of the new South Africa.

These new seeds and plants are people. Whatever new system is to emerge, its success or failure will depend solely on the quality of the people implementing it.

South Africa is entitled to a free and democratic social order. We need a society with equal opportunity for all.

The quality of freedom and democracy will be decided by how we treat one another as we pursue the struggle towards lasting peace in our land.

Democracy is our goal. Democracy, however, has its own demands. It compels us to respect the right of the other person to differ from us.

We certainly have the right to question the principles, motives, tactics and aims of others. We do not, if we claim to be democrats, have the right to impose our opinions, motives, tactics and aims on others.

Whether we like it or not, it is as wrong to intimidate with threats, slander or violence those who have chosen a different course towards freedom as it is for the oppressor to intimidate with legislation, the media or the police.

Let me say outright: those who burn neighbours' houses or dance on dead bodies inspire no confidence that their new South Africa will be an improvement on what we have now.

## Revenge

Similarly, the summary shooting of unarmed people in the streets of Uitenhage tends to confirm doubts about a peaceful future.

Authoritarianism is colour-blind. It is deeply embedded in the nature of people.

Some of these may be white reactionaries, while others may be among those on our own side who like to call themselves "progressive".

We must censure apartheid because it contains distinct elements of violence. We must equally condemn reactive black violence.

When the sword has once been drawn, hatred often blazes with such fury that the idea of a reasonable compromise is rejected with scorn; and the conflict has to be continued till one or both combatants are exhausted.

The exploitation of atrocities in order to rouse popular anger into a frenzy is an art practised by belligerents who are not counting the cost in the long term.

Hatred and revenge are more impracticable passions than calculating selfishness; they disregard even the most obvious considerations of self-interest.

Nietzsche speaks of:  
"... The deep impersonality born of hatred; the conscience born of murder and cold-bloodedness, the fervour born of effort in the annihilation of the enemy, the proud indifference to loss to one's own existence and to that of one's fellows."

The reproach has often been brought against Christianity that it has done so little effectively to deliver mankind from the evils of hatred and retribution.

Peace is a Christian calling, but peace is not appeasement. We can never come to terms with apartheid.

Apartheid must, however, be fought with better and more productive means as well as with higher passions.

Mahatma Gandhi led his people to freedom. He was fearless in his confrontation of the colonialist power. He led marches and went to prison.

He was, however, equally fearless in his challenge to his own people — that a new India would only be built by a new quality of life and higher moral standards of all Indians.

Martin Luther King, even when his life was at risk, still had the radical courage to proclaim as follows: "While abhorring segregation, we shall love the segregationist."

This is the radical struggle because it demands more and goes deeper. It requires restraint when

sloganeering and sheer abandon seem popular.

It requires calmness when high emotion is asked for and it calls for tactical reasoning when physical action is provoked.

It furthermore seeks to establish a better order, rather than merely destroying the status quo. It calls for soul force rather than physical force and has real peace as its final goal.

This is radicalism because it is fundamental yet responsible. It seeks answers at the root.

None of us can afford to be moderate. In our context, moderate means to move with less conviction and not to disturb comfort.

## Militant

Similarly, we must not confuse bloody-mindedness and militancy with radicalism. A man whom I respect challenges the restless generation:

"I do not say be patient; I say be passionate. A passionate pursuit of evil will only be mastered by a passionate pursuit of good."

Christ and Paul were radical, yet not willing to condone pettiness, hooliganism, empty demonstrative action and militant behaviour.

What do we tell our young and where do we tell our union members to stand amid the temptations of either militant leftist action or an overly compromising and materially beneficial rightist stance?

It is through education that we need to help our young to understand the justification of their indignation.

Similarly, education must be the medium to help them realise that hatred and rage are bad masters and that unbridled violence will exacerbate rather than solve the problem.

We must, in the words of the late Martin Luther King, meet physical force with soul force.

Education must help us all to understand that change can never mean merely changing the skin colour of the oppressor.

Education must instil in people an understanding of the importance of positive values like self-discipline and teach them to think for themselves and distrust slogans and easy options.

They must learn to develop convictions that are radical in that they present clear and positive options.

Education must open the eyes of young people to understand the limits of simple denunciation.



They must learn that reconciliation can only be established on the basis of mutual confidence in the genuineness of both parties to find real answers.

Educators must succeed in bringing across to their students that credible political action must go with success at one's job or one's studies, for in the end that will constitute the test of whether we can do better.

Jesse Jackson is right when he insists that no people can be expected to be led by failures and drop-outs. True leaders must demonstrate that they are, in the first place, masters of themselves.

We must take courage to tell our students that victory includes overcoming the temptations of position, women, money and liquor. The leaders of the new South Africa must be truly incorruptible men and women.

Education must foster a clear understanding that power lies in the preparation of the mind, body and spirit.

It is the cumbersome and laborious way, but is, like our faith, an acquisition that can only be estranged from us with our own consent.

## Option

The true radical is the peace-maker, the healer who is prepared to open the festering sore always with improvement in mind. Education must help people to understand this.

Some two years ago, I visited Zimbabwe. In Harare I saw two kinds of black Zimbabweans — those who walked the corridors of power and those who begged in the streets outside.

The first grasped education and prepared for the future, the second ate slogans and falsely believed that giving up one's stake in the future is a sacrifice worth making in the interest of uhuru.

The choice is not between breaking down and building up.

The only worthwhile option is to do both, remembering that success and achievement cannot be judged by what we have broken down, but by what we have created, and that calls for sacrifice, hard work, clean motives and radical action.

CSO: 3400/58

SOUTH AFRICA

BLACK MANAGEMENT FORUM EXPANDS WHITE RELATIONS

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 14 Apr 85 pp 1, 4

[Article by Malcom Fothergill]

[Text]

BLACK managers are leaving their laager.

Their official body, the Black Management Forum, which until now has acted largely as a support group for members, has begun forging links with a wide range of white business and professional bodies. In the process it is swiftly moving closer to the centre of the country's business stage.

It plans to use the links it is forging to gain access to the expertise of its white counterparts and to hold joint conferences on matters of common interest.

So far, it has found only co-operation and sympathy from the organisations it has approached — mingled with some fears that its intentions are political.

The BMF's new, outward-looking approach, masterminded by deputy president Mr James Seutloadi, began a year ago.

Among the bodies with which the 500-strong black executives' organisation has established links since then are the institutes of marketing management, supervisory management, personnel management and sales promotion.

Others include the Urban Foundation and the National Federation of Chambers of Commerce.

### Strong bond

A particularly strong relationship has developed between the BMF and the South African Institute of Management.

When the BMF was founded in January 1975 — one of its founder members was black tycoon Mr Eric Mafuna — it played a low-key role as a support group in which members could pool their experiences of the white-controlled corporate world.

More recently it has added an educational dimension to its activities, by way of monthly discussion forums featuring experts in fields such as stress management, marketing strategies and economics.

Now it is going all out to strengthen the position of the country's burgeoning number of black executives.

"Politics has nothing to do with it," says Mr Seutloadi, an executive with Murray & Roberts.

"The aim of the BMF is still to develop and train black managers to play their rightful role in commerce and industry.

"We believe at this stage of our growth there is no way we can claim to be self-sufficient.

"We are well aware of our limitations and would like help in overcoming them."

One practical effect of the BMF's move away from its laager is a joint management bulletin service it will share with the Institute of Management.

Joint conferences with SAIM and other white-controlled bodies are also on the cards.

Says SAIM's executive director, Mr Morris Cowley: "What our relationship with the BMF means, is a recognition of common yet separate aims.

"The partnership will not destroy each body's separateness, but we believe we can help each other achieve many of our common goals, for instance in promoting free enterprise and removing obstacles to black business education."

Mr Seutloadi believes that while the ranks of South Africa's black executives are growing fast, many old problems remain.

"Frustration is a big factor with many of our guys. A man crosses the line into a supervisory post then stagnates, perhaps because he does not have the education to go further, or because he does not know the ropes of corporate politics, or because of racial attitudes.

"It's easy to identify the problems, but there are few solutions."

CS0: 3400/58

SOUTH AFRICA

TV4 SPARKS VIDEO BOOM

Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 14 Apr 85 p 4

[Article by David Cumming]

[Text]

THE ADVENT of TV4 has seen an explosion in the sale of video tapes to the point where it is now estimated to be a R44-million a year industry in South Africa.

This is the estimate of Gavin Koppel of GoldStar Electronics, importers of JVC VHS video tapes.

The market is so strong that negotiations are now going on about JVC establishing a multi-million rand factory to produce the tapes in South Africa.

"We are selling every tape we import," Mr Koppel said. "Since the coming of TV4 our four-hour tapes have been going like hot cakes. People are watching TV1 and recording TV4 simultaneously."

He said the duplication market was currently worth R6 million and the consumer market R38 million.

While video recorders were high-price items, the recession had restricted the sums families had available for entertainment. This made the recorders good investments as "in-home" entertainment.

Consumers had realised this and sales of the machines

took off after a period in the doldrums.

Mr Koppel said a small thorn in the flesh was the duty paid by importers. This amounted to an effective 45 percent. When the rand's dip was taken into account, this meant there had been considerable pressure on prices.

He said the Government should perhaps consider some relief in this area since video was no longer simply an entertainment medium. It had many educational uses as well. Only if the tapes were manufactured locally would a high duty rate make sense.

Mr Koppel said the possibility of local manufacture of tapes was an exciting development since JVC, holders of the VHF patents, had issued only 20 manufacturing licences to date.

New developments in the field included vastly improved sound reproduction and a "mini-tape" for use in hand-held cameras which could be played in conventional machines through an adaptor.

SOUTH AFRICA

BRIEFS

**YOUTHS' 'RADICAL DEMANDS'**--The minister of education and welfare in the House of Representatives, Mr Carter Ebrahim, says it is irresponsible of youth to make radical demands which could lead to disorder and chaos. Speaking at a youth seminar in Pretoria organized by the Women's Bureau of South Africa, Mr Ebrahim said such demands showed a lack of involvement on the part of youth and, when order was restored, the problems would still not have been resolved. He said young people should play a role in solving pressing problems so that peace could be preserved. About 120 students and pupils of all population groups are taking part in the seminar. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0900 GMT 20 Apr 85 MB]

**BLACK ANGER**--An Inkatha leader has said South Africa's future depends on what is done to minimize black anger. Kwazulu minister and Inkatha leader Dennis Madide has been addressing a joint Inkatha-Afrikaanse Studentebond [Afrikaans Student Union] conference being held in Johannesburg. He told the conference that what South Africa could achieve depends on negotiation, on doing something which will most minimize black anger and break white intransigence. Mr Madide said youth could accomplish the breakaway from well-worn paths and blaze new political trails. [Umtata Capital Radio in English 0800 GMT 20 Apr 85 MB]

**ENERGY SYNTHETIC FUEL PLANS**--Results of a feasibility study into a synthetic fuel manufacturing process by which methanol is converted into petrol and diesel are expected by the end of this year. The minister of mineral and energy affairs, Mr Danie Steyn, said in the House of Representatives that the process required appreciably less refining than other synthetic full fuel projects now in use. Mr Steyn said that in 1980 a chemical company had already made proposals in this connection to the government. He said the use of a nonconventional fuel such as methanol would, however, have needed a new and comprehensive distribution network. If the project was implemented it was anticipated that it would be coupled to a colliery, but it was not yet known where the synthetic fuel plant will be located. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 1900 GMT 24 Apr 85 MB]

**UK DIPLOMAT RAPS DISINVESTMENT**--The British consul general and director of trade promotion in Johannesburg, Mr Colin Brant, has told the Friends of Baragwanath Organization that the British Government has no intention of interfering with the country's trade with South Africa. Speaking at the launching

of a new educational video on nutrition, Mr Brant said it was long-standing British policy that trade and investment were matters for the commercial judgment of the companies themselves. Mr Brant said the British prime minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, and other ministers had stated clearly that Britain did not go along with proposals for embargoes on trade and investment against South Africa. The British Government believed especially that international economic sanctions would harm all sections of South African society and would add to the problems of neighboring countries. [Text] [Johannesburg Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 24 Apr 85 MB]

**ELECTRIFIED BORDER FENCE TESTED**--Tests have begun on an electrified fence on the border between South Africa and Zimbabwe. The fence, situated in an uninhabited area, is intended to stop illegal border crossings, cattle rustling, and spread of animal diseases. Both sides of the fence are protected by a (?vetting) fence, which prevents people and animals from coming to accidental contact with the electrical cables which carry enough power to kill a man. Radio RSA's Pretoria news staff reports that warning boards have been placed at regular intervals on both sides of the fence, and people living in the area have been warned of the danger of touching it. The South African Defense Force is monitoring the fence on a 24-hour basis. Sensors on the barrier pick up any attempt to interfere with it, and our news staff reports that it is impossible to short-circuit the fence. [Text] [Johannesburg International Service in English 1100 GMT 24 Apr 85 MB]

**DEVELOPMENT BANK AID**--Loan agreements for nearly R10-million were signed in Johannesburg this week between the Development Bank of Southern Africa and Kangwane. Kangwane lies on the border between South Africa and Swaziland. Five loans will provide about 63% of the R15,3-million required for the projects. This is the first time a loan agreement has been signed between Kangwane and the Development Bank since the bank's inception in 1984. Two loans, amounting to R8,2-million, will be used to build 17 factory buildings and provide infrastructure at the industrial area of Kabokweni. Another R1,4-million has been allocated for the Louw's Creek sugar and subtropical agricultural project in the Mswati region. The loans carry interest rates of between seven and 20 years. [Text] [Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 14 Apr 85 p 6]

**BLACK INSECURITY**--Durban--Insecurity, poverty and political harassment are among factors contributing to low productivity among black workers, a survey by a social anthropologist has found. "I don't know if productivity is low, but if it is, there's a combination of factors contributing to it," said Jeremy Keenan, Professor of Social Anthropology at Wits University. He found that there was immense insecurity among black workers. Many lost their jobs because of illness resulting from poverty, and black workers, particularly those residing in the homelands but working in South Africa, were subjected to extremely harsh political harassment. A worker's place of employment was therefore also his place of safety and relaxation. [Text] [Johannesburg THE SUNDAY STAR in English 14 Apr 85 p 9]

CSO: 3400/58

SWAZILAND

BANK OFFICIAL OPPOSES DISINVESTMENT

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 9 Apr 85 p 3

[Text]

**MR Sam Kuhlase** general manager of the Central Bank of Swaziland, yesterday joined the debate over disinvestment from South Africa and complained that proponents of the cause overlook "the deleterious effect such action could have on South Africa's neighbours.

Mr Kuhlase is a visiting graduate student in economics at Boston University.

In a letter published on the editorial page of the New York Times, written from Boston, Mr Kuhlase says that South Africa's neighbours "remain vulnerable to disruptions in the South African economy. Unless these independent states can attract United States investment, disinvestment from South Africa will unfairly punish all the people of southern Africa."

Mr Kuhlase continues: "Swaziland, for example, a small nation, with a population of 50 000, is surrounded on three sides by South Africa. Because of a historical dependence on South Africa's economy, Swaziland would have difficulty surviving a US economic war against South Africa, unless American businesses soon came into Swaziland."

"Swaziland boasts an ever-diversifying economy.

Yet, it remains overshadowed by South Africa's apartheid economy, which has attracted investments from about 350 US corporations," Mr Kuhlase writes.

"To date, there is no American business presence in Swaziland."

Mr Kuhlase says the benefits of locating in Swaziland are real. US companies are spared the growing condemnation that attaches to business viewed as supporting apartheid. Swaziland has one of the most developed infrastructures on the continent, including the highest literacy rate of any independent black nation in southern Africa. It offers the same sophisticated transport and communications network available in South Africa.

"Moreover, Swaziland is a nation where black and white live peacefully under a non-racial system of government. Already, several large businesses, particularly from Britain, have moved their operations to Swaziland.

"Ending apartheid will take an effort from all quarters. US businesses would be wise to realise that there is an alternative to South Africa," Mr Kuhlase concludes — Sapa.

CSO: 3400/53

ZIMBABWE

SECURITY OFFICIAL ON DISRUPTION OF ELECTIONS

Harare THE HERALD in English 5 Apr 85 p 3

[Text] Trained Zimbabwean dissidents from South Africa may use the forthcoming general election to disrupt and sabotage the democratic process in this country, the Zanu (PF) secretary for security and Minister of State (Security), Cde Emmerson Munangagwa, has said.

In an interview with Zimbabwe News, the official news organ of the party, Cde Munangagwa said the clandestine "Radio Truth" in the Transvaal had recently increased its coverage with broadcasts in English, Shona and Ndebele aimed at Matabelaland and the Midlands.

"The broadcasts are highly critical of Zimbabwe Government policy and comment on all aspects of life in Zimbabwe. During the past year a number of disinformation campaigns were detected and these were directed at the business community."

South Africa had dissidents in that country trained to infiltrate Zimbabwe and disturb the political and economic order. "It is strongly believed that these elements may take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the forthcoming general election to disrupt and generally sabotage the democratic process.

"An extensive screening of people deported from South Africa has been in operation for some time and a number of dissident elements have been detected and weeded out. Agents continue to be infiltrated from South Africa on specific missions of espionage, reconnaissance and recruitment." Some of these infiltrators had been apprehended, said Cde Munangagwa.

The problem of dissidents originated with Zipra not fully accounting for all personnel and weapons during the integration exercise because of the Zero-Hour plan to take the Government by force. Many Zipra combatants left the army and "uplifted the arms which had been cached in preparation for the overall strategy."

When this failed Zipra combatants turned to banditry, killing farmers and tourists for international publicity, and, with the discovery of the arms caches, turned to South Africa which created Super-Zapu.



"At present," said Cde Munangagwa, "Super-Zapu is the most predominant threat to our security and South Africa is trying to use it in the manner in which it is using the MNR in Mozambique. However, this will fail because Super-Zapu has no political base."

More than 40 people including Zanu (PF) officials and supporters were killed by dissidents in Matabeleland last year and often the murders were accompanied by the assault and rape of women relatives and sometimes preceded by the torture of those subsequently killed, said Cde Munangagwa.

Despite the killings and banditry, the Government was on top of the situation but it was "difficult and not advisable for the Government to put a timetable as to when these problems might end."

CSO: 3400/59

ZIMBABWE

FINANCIAL GAZETTE WARNS ABOUT 'SECRETIVENESS'

MB220654 Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 12 Apr 85 p 4

[Editorial: "A Depressing Return to Secretiveness"]

[Text] Official secretiveness is a phobia which began in this country during the UDI [Unilateral Declaration of Independence] years. The security situation was then used to justify the withholding of much information to which ministers or civil servants did not consider the public was entitled to have access.

At independence there was a welcome relaxation of official control and a more open society seemed to be developing. Ministers and senior civil servants were prepared to answer legitimate questions from the press, and there was an understanding that the public was entitled to know what was happening.

Sadly the doors are gradually closing again, and the first signs of the information phobia are reappearing. What is worse, restrictions of central government are being extended to the municipal scene.

The latest example to be brought into the light of day is the wage increase or adjustment given to Harare's municipal staff in February. Not only has there been no public announcement, but the minister of local government and town planning has forbidden council staff to confirm or comment on the matter.

The council staff are not even permitted to comment on the saving which the municipality has made in its salary vote--a creditable \$8m by the end of its current financial year.

It is doubtful whether the minister had the legal power to order municipal employees to refuse to discuss decisions taken by their councils, or to provide information--but that is not the burden of our complaint.

What is of greater concern is that the minister made a decision to restrict the publication of a legitimate and not over-generous increase in salaries and of successes in keeping overall expenditure well within the budget.

These are not issues over which either the government or the municipality need to be ashamed--indeed they reflect great credit on the success of the wage freeze (which, after all, could not go on forever) and the council's financial controls.

Moreover, since it is the city ratepayers who will eventually have to foot the bill, the minister's action comes perilously close to "taxation without information," although a Harare Tea Party is unlikely to follow.

The only explanation we can offer is that the minister's action represents a return to the pre-independence situation where the public was considered to be entitled to know only what officialdom deigned to reveal.

There are matters over which the government must exercise control and the country's defence and security are cases in point. No one would dispute that too open a policy here will assist those who do not wish Zimbabwe well. However, it is difficult to understand the justification for an information blackout on wage increases and municipal economies.

In the absence of official candour rumours flourish, and recent misinformation on the state of Harare's finances can be cited as an example.

If central and local government were to concede that the public have a right to know, and that a well-informed press can play a positive part in public affairs, then the rather ridiculous situation that has arisen in Harare need not occur again.

CSO: 3400/62

ZIMBABWE

ZANU OFFICIAL CONDEMNS UNITED FRONT

Harare THE HERALD in English 8 Apr 85 p 1

[Text] ZAPU's proposed united front will throw away the people's gains and return Zimbabwe to a state of neo-colonialism exploitation and racism, Zanu (PF) Politburo member Cde Nathan Shamuyarira said yesterday.

Cde Shamuyarira, who is also the Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, said the Government was glad that the leader of Zapu, Dr Joshua Nkomo, had come out in the open with a "clearcut" proposal for uniting with Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the Rev Ndabaningi Sithole and Mr Ian Smith.

"This front of a sellout, a racist and two puppets is being set up to serve the interests of the enemies of Zimbabwe and South Africa," said Cde Shamuyarira, adding: "It is not a front of any progressive forces."

He said the central purpose of the forthcoming general election was to elect a government that would defend the people's gains in the past five years and advance them in future.

"There is only one political party that can do that, Zanu (PF). The Nkomo united front would throw away the people's gains and return us to neo-colonialism exploitation and racism," said the minister.

"The people of Zimbabwe--Shonas, Ndebeles, Europeans and Indians--are forging unity steadily under their national Government. They all accept Cde Robert Mugabe as their Prime Minister."

He said the Zapu leader was the one who was trying to divide and disunite the people and even more, was also eager to introduce violence into the election campaign "for personal ends." Zapu-sponsored former Zipra forces had been responsible for the murders of innocent civilians including prominent Zanu (PF) officials and white commercial farmers--Ziana-Herald Reporter

CSO: 3400/59

ZIMBABWE

# MUZOREWA MANIFESTO 'PACK OF LIES,' SAYS MINISTER

Harare THE HERALD in English 9 Apr 85 p 1

[Text] The election manifesto of the United African National Council, which is being circulated clandestinely, has been described by the Minister of Information, Posts and Telecommunications, Cde Nathan Shamuyarira, as a "pack of lies."

The two-page document is a policy statement which sets out the differences between the party led by the former rebel prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and the ruling party.

It listed 10 major differences on issues ranging from equality to the role of chiefs in traditional society, the one-party state, the legal age of majority and sales tax.

The bishop, whom the minister described as "the Judas Iscariot of this nation," openly betrayed the struggle for liberating this nation, Cde Shamuyarira told The Herald yesterday.

"He should not be presenting himself and his party to the people of Zimbabwe at this election. The UANC election manifesto is a pack of false statements about Zanu (PF) and pious hopes about itself," the minister said.

The minister then put the record straight.

On the allegation that the Legal Age of Majority Act allowed children to disobey their parents on attaining the age of 18, the minister said: "The Legal Age of Majority Act was intended to give girls and boys who had reached the age of 18 the right to vote but not a licence to disobey their parents.

"Any legal misunderstandings on this point shall be clarified soon," the minister added. "The Government created a new ministry to promote our African culture, not to denigrate it."

On allegations that the ruling party did not want chiefs and wanted committees to replace chiefs, the minister said the Government had since decided to give wider powers to traditional chiefs.

The powers were meant to enable chiefs to rule their districts and be represented directly on judicial bodies. "The chiefs are an integral part of the new provincial administration," Cde Shamuyarira said.

#### Co-operatives

The manifesto says villagers being moved into areas designated for resettlement by the Government have to work their fields as co-operatives with the income being shared equally among them. So far none of those resettled and working under this system have been paid. Instead they owed a lot of money, the manifesto added.

To this Cde Shamuyarira replied: "The Government has never and will never, take a single cow, goat or chicken from any peasant in any village. The aim of our policy has been to increase the income and property of the peasants."

He added that the Government provided seed and fertiliser and, in some instances, tractors to the peasants to help them increase their production.

The UANC charged that Zanu (PF) believed in party supremacy and that there was no God.

Cde Shamuyarira said freedom of worship and association had been upheld and enhanced by the Government, and the UANC continued to organise some churchgoers openly.

"Furthermore, UANC supporters continue to be employed in Government departments, even though they betrayed the nation and the people," he said.

On the one-party state, which the manifesto said was dictatorial and compelled people to vote for that one party alone, the minister said the system would be introduced only if and when the people of Zimbabwe wanted it.

"It must be the express wish of all the people. No one will be coerced to support it," the minister said.

The minister, who is the ruling party's secretary for publicity and information, also dismissed UANC claims that it would abolish sales tax and that only those receiving \$500 a month and more would pay income tax.

The manifesto also alleged that Zanu (PF) was sending all widows to the rural areas where they were being taught "scientific socialism" and that no one was entitled to a house in the urban areas unless he was in possession of a fully subscribed Zanu (PF) membership card.

Cde Shumuyarira said these allegations were "too silly" to warrant replies.

CSO: 3400/59

ZIMBABWE

RESETTLEMENT PLAN RECORDS GOOD PROGRESS

Harare THE HERALD in English 5 Apr 85 p 8

[Text] Musengezi resettlement scheme, one of the four unveiled in Mashonaland this week by the Government, will have some of its farms set aside for Model B projects.

About seven groups made up of 600 families will be absorbed in these projects. The entire Musengezi scheme will draw some settlers from Zvimba and Chirau.

The other schemes are Pote 2 and Muzwezwe, also in Mashonaland West and Karuyana in Mashonaland Central. People will be resettled under the Model A scheme.

Model A schemes involve the conventional type now common everywhere, but under Model B which will be funded by Zimbabwe in the case of Musengezi, collective agricultural cooperative groups are formed.

For Musengezi, which will cost \$1 297 819, the background of the programme is to accelerate socialism. The project will accommodate 600 families based on the Model A scheme which will spread over 12 600 ha.

In addition 47 families on Hamilton Hills farm are being settled on an accelerated basis which means they will not have to wait for the infrastructure before they move in.

At Karuyana the project worth \$1 766 238 will accommodate 634 settler families based on Model A on 16 328 ha. Of the families 359 will be settled on an accelerated basis.

The 56 settlers in two villages on Two Tree Hill farm will practice subsistence cropping and cattle ranching with a grazing unit for 15 livestock units each.

The Musweswe scheme worth \$1 656 792 will accommodate 401 settler families based on Model A on 36 207 ha. Already 30 families have been settled on Donafn Ranch on an accelerated basis. The total project cost is \$7.3 million.

The schemes are in Regions 11 and 111 suitable for the cultivation of maize, cotton, groundnuts, tobacco and small grains plus semi-intensive livestock production.

The estimated economic return is 44 percent for Karuyana; 27 percent for Musengezi; 19 percent for Pote 2; and 18 percent for Muzwezwe.

The scheme is a joint venture between Zimbabwe and Britain on an equal basis under the resettlement grant worth \$20 million agreed to in 1981.

The four schemes bring to eight the number of projects to be implemented under this grant since the beginning of the year.

CSO: 3400/59



ZIMBABWE

## DOMESTIC VEHICLE ASSEMBLY OUTPUT DROPS

Harare THE HERALD in English 5 Apr 85 p 8

[Text] Last year Zimbabwe assembled little more than 7 000 vehicles from completely knocked down kits, less than half the more than 15 000 assembled in 1982.

According to the latest issue of the CZI Industrial Review a total of 7 142 cars, light trucks, heavy trucks and buses were assembled last year.

The year before saw 10 866 assembled from completely knocked down kits and in 1982 there were 15 169, an improvement on the 14 243 assembled in 1981.

Not all sectors have suffered to the same extent. Passenger vehicles have suffered the biggest cuts. A total of 8 195 were assembled in 1981, 9 520 in 1982, 6 481 in 1983 and 3 696 in 1984, a little under 40 percent of the 1982 figure.

The light commercial vehicle sector managed to hold its own until last year. In 1981 there were 4 744 kits assembled, another 4 743 in 1982, 4 129 less in 1983 and just 2 483 last year. The heavy commercial sector was the only one to improve between 1982 and 1983. A total of 896 were assembled in 1981, 922 in 1982, 1 000 in 1983 and 752 in 1984.

Buses have shown the steadiest decline. In 1981 408 were assembled, in 1982 there was a sharp drop to 284, in 1983 there were 256 and last year, 211.

Besides these kits assembled at the five plants in Zimbabwe, and they form the bulk of the new vehicles on the local market, there are also some slightly knocked down kits assembled and a few completely built up units imported, usually through an aid agreement.

The ever-rising costs in foreign currency of kits, and the shortage of exchange has been a major cause of the drop in assembly. However, the recession that caused the problem has helped alleviate it with the drop in demand for new vehicles.

But the average age of the vehicle fleet in Zimbabwe has increased steadily and sooner or later, say those in the motor trade, a large investment in new vehicles is going to be vital.

CSO: 3400/59

ZIMBABWE

## ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SALES REPORTED

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 4 Apr 85 p 3

[Text]

**ALTHOUGH** the Electricity Supply Commission's sales of electricity declined by 1,87% during the year ended June 30, 1984, compared with the previous year, its income on sales increased by 65,78% to \$187 million.

The ESC's total income increased by 66,19% to \$192 million which, with expenditure increasing by only 57% to \$165 million, gave an overall profit of \$27,7 million, an increase of 160% over the 1983 figure. This profit represents a return on capital of 3,5% (1,9%).

The corporation's report says that the "surplus revenue over expenditure for the year is called for to ensure compliance with the cash generation covenant under one of the agency loan agreements, and will be utilised in stabilising tariffs in the financial year ending June 30, 1985".

### INCREASE ABSORBED

It is understood that one increase levied by the Central African Power Corporation (Capco) to the ESC during the 1984/85 year has been absorbed by the ESC, and no further ESC tariff increase is envisaged up to at least June 30 this year.

The ESC purchased 5 109 million kW/h of electricity during the 1983/84 year, compared to 5 161 million kW/h in the previous year. 5 094 million kW/h were purchased from Capco.

It was necessary during the year to purchase bulk supplies from Zambia, through Capco, costing \$22m to meet the shortfall in Zimbabwe's power requirements.

The commission also purchased 5 940 kW/h from Hippo Valley Estates and 1,2 million kW/h from Triangle Limited. Purchases from Hippo Valley declined compared to the previous year because the need for standby supplies in the area were reduced during the year. Triangle continues to supply farms which are connected into its reticulation system but which are commission consumers.

13,2 million kW/h was purchased from the Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa, a slight drop on the previous year due to a decline in the irrigation demand by farmers in the Beitbridge area.

District purchases were made from Zambia of 646 671 kW/h for Victoria Falls and Chirundu.

Sales to domestic consumers increased by 8,89% during the year, consumption of power for commercial and lighting purposes increased by 2,76% and for industrial purposes by 1,94%.

Sales to the farming community declined by 1,86%; to the mining sector by 4,42%; and to municipalities by 1,89%.

Sales for commercial and lighting and domestic categories recorded during the year were records.

### SATISFACTORY

The growth of the industrial sector was regarded as satisfactory, but a marked contribution to this was made by the commissioning of an additional furnace at the Zimbabwe Mining & Smelting company's works at Kwekwe.

Mining sales, with the exception partly due to the gradual shutdown of Wankie Colliery company's own power and the consequent purchases of power by the colliery from the ESC.

Sales to phosphate mines were up 10,48%, to gold mines by 9,81%, and tin mines by 1,16%.

Within the overall decline of electricity sales nationwide of 1,87% there were considerable variations in individual areas. Sales to the central area were up 0,68%, and to the eastern area by 0,11% over the previous year.

However, sales to the south-eastern area declined by 14,5%, to the southern area by 11,15%, to of gold mining, reflected the depressed state of the mineral market, and the marked decline in farming sales was due to reduced irrigation activity because of the lack of water following two successive years of drought.

Municipal sales, through bulk supplies to Gweru and Mutare, indicated reduced industrial activity in those cities.

Although overall the mining sector showed a decline in electricity consumption of 4,42%, individual classes within the industry showed increases. Sales to coal mines were up by 68,84%, principally the northern area by 3,72% and the western area by 1,09%.

The electrification of high-density suburbs has retained its prime growth position, with 2 083 load-limited supplies and 1 129 metered supplies connected during the year.

The number of farming connections increased by 1,45% to 7 131.

The growth of the ESC's national network is shown by the lengths of line in service during the 1983/84 year. The total network expanded to 33 000 kilometres (29 000 kilometres), of which 9 000 were transmission lines and 24 000 distribution lines.

CSO: 3400/59

ZIMBABWE

## MOVIE FILMING HOLDS UP CHROME ORE SHIPMENTS

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 4 Apr 85 p 1

[Text]

THOUSANDS of tonnes of chrome ore are held up at two chrome mines at Mutoroshanga due to the filming of railway scenes for "King Solomon's Mines".

The film company made an agreement with the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) to undertake filming during two weeks in February, but due to the heavy rains this did not take place and filming extended over almost the complete month of March.

The Kildonan branch line on which the scenes were shot links the mines at Mutoroshanga with the main line to the Zimalloys refinery in Gweru. Both mines, one owned by Zimalloys and the other by Union Carbide, made unsuccessful representations to the railways to make arrangements for the shipping of the chrome ore by night when filming was not taking place.

"Our movement of chrome was seriously affected during the whole of the month of March", an engineer for one of the mines told *The Gazette*, "and instead of being able to move 60 trucks per week we have been lucky to move an average of 13."

The mines suggested to the

NRZ that empty trucks be moved to the mines by night, loaded with chrome ore during the day, and then railed through to Gweru during the following night. The railways apparently refused to do this as it would involve night-work for their staff. Attempts to have the ore shipped during the weekend met the reaction that there were not sufficient railway staff available.

It is understood that 7 000 tonnes of chrome ore is a conservative estimate of the backlog accumulating at Mutoroshanga mines. The mines involved have asked the Chamber of Mines to intercede on their behalf with the railways to effect an improvement in the movement of their ore, but no news of any negotiations was available at the time *The Gazette* went to press.

● The output of processed ferro-chrome from Zimalloys' refinery has, fortunately, not been affected because of large stocks held in Gweru. The delays are, however, causing the mines considerable problems as their washing and screening plants do not have facilities for storing large stocks of chrome ore.

CSO: 3400/59

ZIMBABWE

HOMES BACKLOG TOPS 100 000 UNITS

Harare THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE in English 4 Apr 85 p 5

[Text]

**A SHORTAGE** of large contracts, a slow start to the national low-cost housing campaign and competition from foreign contractors is causing concern to Zimbabwe's building industry.

According to the RAL Executive Guide to the Economy published this week, more than half the increase in the value of non-residential plans passed for the year to November, 1984, compared to the previous year is attributable to two large office blocks in Harare for pension funds.

The remainder of the increase is from smaller projects for government and quasi-government organisations. Industrial plans fell by 50% to \$7m in the year under review.

The national low-cost housing campaign has also been slow to start, with only 540 plans passed in Harare in 1984. In other municipal areas, the review states, the number of plans approved declined substantially, "with Bulawayo approving what must be a record low of only five low-cost housing plans."

The survey states that with the annual requirement for additional houses and flats in urban areas estimated to be in the region of 15 000 units, and the current backlog of more than 100 000 units, "the performance of the past three years is dismal to say the least". Since 1981 plans for only 5 700 units have been approved in urban centres.

Plans for high-cost houses, which are normally privately funded, increased slightly to an estimated 230 in 1984. No plans for high-cost flats have been approved.

The RAL survey says that at current prices the value of work undertaken by the construction sector has been rising sharply since 1978. However, costs have increased and productivity declined since 1980. It said that in real terms in 1984 the gross output of the building industry fell to 50% of the level reached 10 years earlier. Even the high reached in 1981 was equal to only 55% of the 1974 level.

The survey said that fears were being expressed by private contractors that the industry was in danger of collapse.

The local industry's problems are being compounded by the award of some large tenders to foreign companies. It is also being claimed that despite the competition for tenders external contractors were undercutting local companies.

Some external contractors, the RAL survey said, have obtained exemption from sales tax on materials and some of the foreign companies are either supported or owned by foreign governments, and therefore profitability is not a vital consideration.

Although statistics for the building industry did not differentiate between work completed by local or foreign companies, the

guide estimates that 20% of work undertaken in Zimbabwe during 1984 was built by external companies. "Hence the decline in volume of work being done by local contractors is even more serious than the figures show".

Local contractors claim that building projects awarded to foreigners in recent years could have been undertaken by domestic contractors and the saving in foreign exchange would have been considerable.

The survey said that the construction sector had been in a state of decline for 10 years. There had been many bankruptcies and closures and those businesses that remained were mainly large contractors. These had heavy investments in capital and the capacity to take on large contracts, from the construction of thousands of low-cost houses to grain silos and high-rise buildings.

The current crisis has arisen because many of these large contractors were reaching the end of the few large contracts that have kept most of them in business.

"The volume of new work coming on to the market is not sufficient to keep them all in business", the RAL survey commented.

This situation was emerging as the need for the services of the con-

struction industry was greater than ever. The backlog of housing units has increased since Independence, and development programmes require new roads, water storage and reticulation services.

The main provider of work for the construction sector since independence has been government and quasi-government organisations. The cutback on capital expenditure to reduce the government's budget deficit is now having serious consequences on the construction sector.

Referring to private sector work, the survey said that some building would be undertaken as a consequence of the current economic upturn. However, large projects are not expected to be initiated by the productive sectors.

"Time will be needed to consolidate the gains made in the past few months and the business community will need some assurance that conditions in future years will become more conducive to investment".

Referring to low-cost housing, RAL Merchant Bank said that the resumption of construction on a scale that is required will depend on the availability of finance and the willingness of government to assume greater responsibility in this field.

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14 May 1985

## ZIMBABWE

## BRIEFS

MAPUTO ROUTE SHUT--The direct rail route to Maputo through Chicualacuala has been closed to traffic since the third week in August last year because of security problems posed by MNR bandits, the Deputy Minister of Transport, Cde Nelso Mawema, said last week. "The lines to the coast through Mozambique have been plagued with interruptions and increasing use has had to be made of the alternative route to Maputo through Beitbridge. This has resulted in a downward trend in the levels of traffic using the Mozambique routes and as a consequence greater costs for Zimbabwe." Cde Mawema told a meeting of the National Forum in Mutare last week that the railways now had 120 steam and 270 diesel locomotives as well as 9 100 wagons. "The railways now has the capacity to cope with the forecast traffic demands for the immediate future." A container terminal at Lochnivar in Harare equipped to load and off-load containers to or from road and rail vehicles would be commissioned about the middle of this year, he said. Cde Mawema said that it may be necessary to expand the Road Motor Services or to create a similar organisation to serve the needs of the communal lands and that this was being "actively pursued at present." [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 7 Apr 85 p 3]

PHONE PROBLEM SOLUTION--At least 437 technicians with the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation will have been trained by 1987 in a bid to alleviate telephone and communications problems, the corporation's director for personnel, Cde Kenneth Manyonda, said yesterday. He told The Herald the corporation had at one point been on the verge of collapsing when it had only 60 to 70 technicians before it started training programmes for over 300 technicians. Cde Manyonda was speaking at a reception in Harare to mark the end of two-year contracts for 15 technicians from Pakistan who were training local staff. "We have reached a position where we can now reduce our training intake. From this year to 1986 we will have trained 116 people, which means cutting the intake by about half," said Cde Manyonda. He praised the Pakistani technicians for training local staff which had eased telephone and communication problems. "They contributed a great deal to the extent that we still wanted them to extend their contracts by another year so they could give further experience to our staff," said Cde Manyonda. The Pakistani Ambassador, Mr Anwar Khan, said the programme of technical assistance would continue. [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 5 Apr 85 p 3]

**BANKRUPTCY REPORT 'MALICIOUS'**--The Minister of Local Government and Town Planning, Cde Enos Chikowore, yesterday described as "malicious" recent reports that Harare City Council was facing bankruptcy because of its overspending on overtime and salaries. In an interview with ZBC last night, the minister attributed the report to two white city councillors who were against the employment of ex-combatants as municipal policemen. He said the city council had employed over 1 000 of these municipal policemen and they were doing a "wonderful" job. The city council had in fact saved more than \$6 million in remuneration and allied expenses last month. He nevertheless urged the council to implement austerity measures with regard to health and educational grants. [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 9 Apr 85 p 1]

**PARTY YOUTH ORDER--ZANU (PF)** has issued new directives to its Youth League to guide the movement following reports of widespread politically motivated violence throughout Zimbabwe, ZBC reported yesterday. The radio quoted the party's secretary for administration, Cde Maurice Nyagumbo, as saying that the secretary for youth, Cde Ernest Kadungure, would meet youth leaders soon to explain the new directives.--Ziana [Text] [Harare THE HERALD in English 9 Apr 85 p 1]

**MIGRATION DROPS--Harare--**The number of people emigrating from Zimbabwe dropped last year to 17 000 from about 20 000 in 1983, according to government figures released in Harare yesterday. Most went to South Africa, Malawi and Britain. The figures also show that 5 567 people immigrated to Zimbabwe in 1984, down from nearly 7 000 in 1983. Those leaving the country are mostly Whites who complain of what they say are deteriorating education and health standards since the Prime Minister, Mr Robert Mugabe's socialist government assumed power at independence in 1980. The government denies the charge saying those emigrating are racists unable to live under black majority rule. There are now about 100 000 Whites left in Zimbabwe.--Sapa-Reuter [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 23 Apr 85 p 17]

**PUBLIC APPROVAL OF MUGABE--**The prime minister, Comrade Robert Mugabe, has been given a vote of confidence by the majority of people in Zimbabwe. A survey which was carried out by the national newspaper, THE HERALD, yesterday reveals that the public is satisfied by the way the first secretary and president of ZANU-PF, Comrade Robert Mugabe, has run state affairs in the past 5 years. Most people interviewed by THE HERALD cited different fields in which the ZANU-PF Government made progress. One of the interviewees, Comrade Benjamin Shoshe, contended that the government has made remarkable improvements in the standard of living. He added that roads, clinics, and schools have been built in his home area of Wedza. A resettled farmer, Comrade Isaac Vhungwe, said the provision of fertile land for peasant farmers has boosted crop production. A policeman, who refused to be named, says the police force has gone through dramatic changes since independence with blacks being promoted to senior positions. All the people praised the prime minister, Comrade Mugabe, for a job well done. [Text] [Harare Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 20 Apr 85 MB]



RAILWAY UNION MEETING--The chairman of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions [ZCTU], Comrade (Jeffrey Mutandare), says the labor movement has a duty to help the government steer the country on the road to socialism. Comrade (Mutandare), who is also the president of the Mine Workers Union, was opening a 3-day seminar of the National Executive Committee of the Railway Associated Workers Union in Harare today. He said cooperatives in the mining and industrial sectors are necessary for the attainment of the socialist objectives. Participants at the seminar are discussing socialism, cooperatives, and international trade unions. Meanwhile, the president of the Railway Associated Workers Union, Comrade Samson Mabeka, told the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, ZBC, that the three unions in the parastatal have failed to merge because of differences over leadership and the merger of funds. He also said the 3 unions can only merge after the new labor bill becomes law. [Text] [Harare Domestic Service in English 1115 GMT 22 Apr 85 MB]

AIRPORT TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT--Telecommunications and navigational equipment is being installed at the eight major airports of Harare, Bulawayo, Victoria Falls, Kariba, Hwange, Masvingo, Buffalo Range, and Mutare. [Excerpt] [Harare Domestic Service in English 1745 GMT 18 Apr 85 MB]

CSO: 3400/37

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